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Pakistan in 1956
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Image taken from the online resource “Story of Pakistan”. The cities marked as Lahore, Peshawar and 
Quetta are the provincial capitals of Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan respectively. Karachi was the 
provincial capital of Sind as well as the capital of Pakistan in 1956. The silver line at the top of West 
Pakistan demaracates the disputed area, Kashmir. 
 
East Pakistan laid across India and had Dacca/Dhaka as the provincial capital. 
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Abstract 
This book attempts an economic analysis of the first constitution of Pakistan. We use 
Rational Choice Model to carry out our research. We propose that the collective 
choice of constitution-making can be broken down to individual choices aggregated 
through aggregation mechanisms. Thus we analyse the decision-making at an 
individual level and take every member of the constitutional assembly as an 
individual unit. Assuming that the members of constitutional assembly are not 
participating in the process with altruistic motivations rather they participate because 
of their own self-interest and to maximize their own utility function. We chose to 
analyse six constitutional rules and developed hypotheses accordingly. Afterwards 
four other rules were also discussed because of their importance for the society and 
the constitutional makers. We used the constitutional choices of system of 
government, form of government, amendment rules, and human rights as dependent 
variables and the personal traits of members as independent variables. We find that 
in case of structure of government the ethnic majorities, linguistic majorities, 
political and religious majorities favored more the presidential system. While the 
political and religious minorities as expected favored the parliamentary system. In 
case of federalism we found out that as expected the older age group members, 
landowners and foreign educated members favored more the unitary system. Lastly 
for human rights, we found that that majority (ethnic, linguistic, political and 
religious) will try to curtail human rights for others. Similarly we assumed that 
minorities will opt for broader human rights which were corroborated by results in 
case of political and religious minorities but were not supported by empirical 
analysis in case of ethnic minority and linguistic minority. 
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 CAP: 2nd Constitutional assembly of Pakistan also written as Constitutional 
assembly or simply assembly. 
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 Jirgas: A group of respectable members of a tribe who take decisions on 
important issues of the tribe. They can act as electoral college or as jury and their 
decision is binding on the people of the area. This tradition of Jirgas is prevalent in 
many areas of Pakistan even now. 
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 NAP: National Archives of Pakistan. 
 
 NWFP: North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan. Nowadays its name has 
been changed to Khyber Pukhtoonkhua. 
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1 Introduction 
Constitutions serve as the foundations of the political, social and economic systems of 
a country. Constitutions have been created, modified and  abrogated throughout the 
world and their dynamics are interesting research areas for students and scholars. 
Constitutions are studied under various disciplines e.g. political science, law, 
sociology, constitutional history and economics. Our book researches the first 
constitution of Pakistan using an Economic Approach. Pakistan is a relatively small, 
comparatively recent and much overly populated country in the South-East Asia. It has 
shown volatility and instability to the extent of becoming a Failed State. Since the 
author also belongs to this area, the constitutional choices made in this country are 
chosen for this research.  
 
The first constitution of any country lays concrete constitutional foundations, which 
even if abrogated later on, can and do influence the subsequent constitutions or 
amendments. The first constitution of the French Republic has been an interesting 
subject for the researchers. Voigt (2009) proposes that the final shape and enforcement 
of the constitutional rules may also depend on the older constitutional rules previously 
established in the society. If such an observation is true then the the first constitution 
of a country may provide the  preconstitutional rules which are likely to affect all the 
subsequent constitutions. In that case any research on a constitution cannot be 
considered complete unless the precedents have been read thoroughly. This is the main 
reason that the first constitution of Pakistan is chosen for making an economic 
analysis. The current constitution of the country (Constitution of 1973) is very similar 
to the first constitution.  
2 Constitutional Economics 
Almost any phenomenon in life can be discussed using an economic approach
2
 
including complex inter-personal relationships. This study uses an economic approach 
to analyze a constitution. Thus attempting to make a contribution in the field of 
Constitutional Economics. Constitutional Economics (also called constitutional 
political economy) is a fairly recent strand of research. It differs from the standard 
                                                 
2
Gary S Becker, a Nobel Laureate theorises that any human life phenomenon can be explained using an 
economic approach.  
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economics which deals with the choices within rules thus assuming the rules to be 
exogenously given. Constitutional Economics delves deeper and deals with the 
analysis of how these rules are actually chosen (Voigt, 2011). The difference between 
choice of rules and choice within rules is the same as difference between policies and 
constitutions (Brennan, & Hamlin, 2002). The Constitutions provide a broad skeletal 
framework, while policies stipulate the day to day working.  
 
Like standard economics, there are two broad avenues of this science (Voigt, 2011). 
The normative branch deals with legitimising the state and its rules by drawing upon 
the self-interest of the rational individuals. This branch concerns itself with delineating 
optimal rules i.e. what should be? In contrast to this, the positive branch of 
constitutional economics relates to what is? It analyses the constitutions at two levels 
i.e. the endogenising and modification of rules and secondly the economic effects of 
these constitutional rules. 
 
Literature regarding the normative branch of the Constitutional Economics is much 
better developed as compared to the positive branch (Voigt, 2011).  On the side of the 
positive constitutional economics, economic effects of constitutions have been 
discussed by many scholars, while gap remains where the emergence of the 
constitutional rules in the first place is economically discussed. In spite of the fact that 
constitutional rules are necessary for maintaining social order, research in this area is 
handful. This study contributes to the existing literature by addressing to this lacuna 
and discusses the emergence of the chosen constitution. It attempts to further the 
knowledge base of Constitutional Economics by developing generalised testable 
hypotheses and tests them on a single country i.e. Pakistan. 
 
3 Constitution-making 
Constitution-making is a complex process with many different factors shaping up the 
process. These factors can be grouped into external factors, procedural factors, and 
individualistic factors. 
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3.1 External Factors 
These relate to the factors which are external to the constitution-making process and 
also to the individuals who have gathered to create the constitution, but these affect the 
process nevertheless. For example, a country’s internal setbacks like floods, riots, 
military dictatorship, and economic crisis. These may include other problems like 
world agencies stipulations, war, and economic sanctions. These factors can influence 
the time devoted to constitution making process, transparency of decision-making, 
involvement of public etc. 
 
3.2 Procedural/Direct Factors 
These are the factors that directly influence the constitution making process. The 
examples include the deadlines/time slot allocated for the constitution-making, 
quorum rules in the constitutional assembly/convention, mode of electing the 
candidates to the assembly, decision-making rules for collective choice, involvement 
of third parties (general public, an international agency or delegation, a religious 
powerful group, judicial body etc) executive controls/veto, the location of assemblies, 
transparency of proceedings, and so on. Procedural rules are a plethora of influences, 
each one having its unique importance. They can be studied in great detail and 
comparisons can always be made, however, neither the external factors nor the 
procedural factors are points of discussion in this book. 
 
3.3 Individualistic factors 
A constitution is a creation of men. These men maybe chosen because of their stellar 
performances in different fields of life. However when they sit for making a 
constitution, their minds are not clean slates. They bring their individual personas with 
them. There are ingrained norms and ethos, beliefs and cultures. This old baggage 
along with new expectations for the future together, can influence their decision 
making to a great extent. They have their own preferences and on basis of these 
preferences they can favor or oppose a constitutional choice. An individual is another 
factor influencing the constitutional draft (although his weight will depend upon the 
procedural rules to a great extent). 
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4 Constitution-Makers and Self Interest 
The constitution-makers or the foundingfathers usually claim that only altruistic 
motivations shape their decisions on constitutional rules. Skeptics however may 
disagree and claim self-interest as the motivating force. Charles Beard (1913) 
suggests that the US Constitution is nothing but a manifestation of economic interests 
of the foundingfathers. This observation can be extended to other constitutions. Our 
study also revolves around the same idea and uses rational choice as the economic 
model. We assume that the constitution-makers are rational individuals, making their 
cost benefits analysis and choosing an option that maximizes their own utility. If 
these foundingfathers are assumed as economic agents trying to maximise their own 
utility by voting in favour or against a constitutional rule, then their choices should be 
predictable on the basis of preferences of these individuals. If, by rigorous research, 
one is able to delineate the preferences and economic interests of these individuals 
then it must become possible to predict their choices in a constitutional setting. 
 
Though this model and similar hypotheses have been used previously (McGuire 
1988, Raudla 2009, Heckelman & Dougherty 2009), such a model  has never been 
used to economically analyse the constitution of Pakistan. Pakistan’s constitutional 
history presents a very colourful picture alternating between democracy and 
dictatorship. The constitution has been abrogated, suspended, held in abeyance and 
amended many times so it can be interesting to study the formation of this 
constitution. Though there are certain agencies which research the economic effects 
of the policies and laws (State Bank of Pakistan, Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics), no such agency has undertaken the task of economically researching the 
Constitution itself. The Supreme Law that governs all the legislation of this country 
has been an under researched area.  
 
The methodology used for this book will be that of developing a case study. This tries 
to provide an insight into a single country’s constitutional choices. Although the case 
or event is a single happening i.e. of constitution-making, observations are 80, 
equalling the number of decision-makers.  
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Keeping the above-mentioned things in mind, the research objective of this 
dissertation is to develop an economic analysis of the constitution-making in Pakistan 
and, to develop a theory regarding the factors which shaped the constitution into what 
was finally seen. Instead of simply accepting the constitutional choices as 
exogenously ``given´´, this research attempts to delve further and create an economic 
model regarding the decisions that were taken and the order in which they were done 
so. Thus trying to identify an inter-dependence in the choices made in the 
constitution. The objective therefore is to create an economically well researched 
account of the choices, determining whether they were taken simultaneously or one 
was a sequel to another. Which interest groups were involved and what were their 
economic motives, if any? This study also probes whether the constitution was an 
outcome of a tussle between utility maximising individuals and interest groups or 
whether it was an earnest effort on the part of the constitutional makers to achieve the 
ever evasive “General Public Welfare’’.  
   
Enumerating the basic research questions concisely:  
1. What were the economic interests that influenced the constitutional choices seen 
in Pakistan’s constitution?  
2. The constitutional choices that are seen, is there any inter-relation?  Does one 
choice lead to another or simply a random approach is taken based upon the interests 
of the utility maximising individuals.  
3. Which interest groups were involved and whose interests seem to be manifested 
in the constitutional draft? 
The rest of the book is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter II relates to the literature review concerning previous developments on the 
issue of choice of Constitutional Rules. Chapter III and IV relate to Economic Model, 
implications and hypotheses respectively. These provide the conjectures relating to the 
factors influencing the choices made in the Pakistani constitution, and also 
identification of a sequence if there is any. A set of hypothesis is also developed for 
the interest groups most likely to dominate the decision making on constitutional rules. 
Chapter V concerns the methodology and data issues. Chapter VI-IX onwards 
addresses the country as a case study and generate results. Chapter X concludes the 
research and is the final chapter.  
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1 ViewPoints on Constitutions 
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature. This overview of existing 
literature provides a background for the subsequent chapters. In order to carry out an 
economic analysis of the constitution of Pakistan, we first must learn what is a 
constitution? As we know it is a complex document which influences the society and 
its innumerable aspects and thus creating a complete definition is quite a difficult task. 
Nevertheless we look at the opinions of some economists and scholars. We also look 
at the functions that constitutions mainly serve. It is important to have an idea of some 
of those functions, because of the enormity of the effort needed to create constitutions. 
So it seems reasonable to expect that their functionality is understood to some extent. 
Last but not the least we look at the literature regarding formation of the constitutions. 
How they are drafted and what are the dynamics involved in their endogenisation?  
 
Although there are many other aspects of studying constitutions but the questions 
which are important for our research are: what is a constitution?, what are the 
functions performed by a constitution?, how is it made?. These three questions are the 
ones for which we give an overview of existing literature. 
 
2 What is a Constitution? 
Constitutions are sometimes viewed as complex interlocking structures full of 
complicated pieces which have to fit against each other in order to work optimally 
(Elster, 2009). Three forces are most likely to dominate the scenario of constitution 
formation. These are Interests, Passions and Reasons. Normatively speaking, an 
optimal constitution can emerge only when there is a strong dominance of reasons 
above the other two influencing factors.  
 
Constitutions can also be considered as contracts (Buchanan, 1975, 50ff). A contract 
that is based on the expectation that all parties concerned will be better off. On its best, 
it should be a solution to problems like inequalities in personal preferences and 
personal capabilities. Buchanan argues that state came into being and constitutional 
rules emerged because individual costs of producing some specific goods were so high 
that this function was voluntarily delegated to State. Collective approach makes many 
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individuals to become better off than before. Naturally if there is no hope for 
betterment no voluntary contract will emerge especially not a constitution. Individuals 
earn rights bestowed upon them by constitutional rules and therefore they place a 
positive value upon constitutions. Thus constitution is a voluntary contract between 
contracting parties and is of a positive value to all concerned. 
  
Constitution may also be looked as a surety or a guarantee. Most constitutions are 
created in times of crises and uncertainty. They are formed when countries declare 
independence,or states need protection from a war, or a nation is freed from a colonial 
power. Constitution writing is a time where long term rights and duties are established 
and now that the external threat is somewhat mollified, people start to look for 
securing benefits for themselves in the times to come. One view can be that when 
constitution-makers are undertaking the job of constitution-writing they confer to 
ensure that their rights are not curbed and their long-term benefits are secured. This 
view is expressed by several authors like Charles Beard (1913), McGuire & Ohsfeldt 
(1984, 1986) and Raudla (2009).  
 
Later in the book we see that in case of Pakistan, constitution-makers were prominent 
members of the society having shown their mettle in politics, academia, judiciary or 
other such departments (see chapter VII for the details of the members). They must 
have some costs by dropping their primary field of work and sit there through long 
debates relating to constitution making. One idea could be that constitution-making 
process helps them pursue their self-interest and that is the reason for their behavior. 
They are able to manifest their preferences in the constitution and that is the main 
reason that they join together to draft a constitution. If this is so then we may propose 
another definition of  a constitution; that is, a constitution is a draft of several interests 
aggregated through aggregation mechanisms. 
 
We propose that constitutions can be assumed as mosaics of rights and duties 
established by tussle of individuals who are trying to maximize their own utility. It’s 
in every man’s interest to secure his rights. To perform one’s duties may not be that 
interesting but bargaining and factionalism would where generate some rights; will 
automatically bring in some unavoidable duties. Desire to have rights and the security 
of these rights is the desire behind writing down a constitution. That is the reason that 
20 
 
most constitutional assemblies try to take representation from all the major groups of 
society. In case of USA and India these major group were states, and in case of 
Pakistan, the provinces. Including different factions of the society in the process 
generates bargaining and finally decisions on the constitutional rules.  
 
3 Functionality of Constitutions 
As we see above that constitutions are viewed differently by different scholars, 
similarly their functionality is also subject to different interpretations. 
 
Elster and Slagstad (1988, 3) state two functions which constitutions serve, the first; 
protection of individual rights and second; to act as a constraint against political 
changes brought about by the whims of the majority (This is done in several ways e.g. 
by declaring certain acts as unconstitutional, making constitutional change a difficult 
task etc). Both these functions protect the citizens and bring longevity and stability to 
the constitutions. This is imperative because constitutions inturn bring stability in the 
institutions.  
 
Apart from stability, constitutions can sometimes bring in credibility. Promises are 
made by the state to protect individual rights, promises are also made by people to let 
the state and its members work peacefully within the boundaries of constitution. The 
promises made by a country on an international level may also originate from the 
constitution
3
. They may describe the spheres of action and as long as every pillar of 
the state is within its constitutional limits the system of the country can be expected to 
remain stable.  
 
Stability and credibility of constitutions is imperative in the interest group perspective 
(Elster & Slagstad, 1988, 9). The interest groups will also seek for stable constitutions 
once they have established their position in the current situation. Once a constitutional 
position is established as a result of bargaining, interest groups will be interested in a 
stable and strong constitution. This will bring stability and longevity to their current 
                                                 
3
 For example, Article 31 of constitution of Cambodia stipulates that UN charter for Human Rights will 
be respected in the country (Constitution of Cambodia, Chapter 3). 
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position. What ever benefits these interest groups have secured, they will be interested 
to make sure that they can accrue these benefits in the times to come as well. In such a 
case they will depend on the constitution to bring stability to their position. In this 
way, constitution helps to avoid dead weight losses arising from bargaining and 
factionalism in the future assemblies. 
 
There is also an issue of an optimal criterion that must be met in order for the 
constitution to work most effectively. According to Elster and Slagstad (1988, 9) this 
criteria relates to several factors e.g. the tasks undertaken by the members other than 
constitution-making, size and duration of assembly, its location, election procedures 
for members and secrecy against public. In a perfect world these criteria could have 
been used for making a perfect constitution, however in reality it is very difficult to 
create and implement such criteria. 
 
Buchanan divides the collective decision making into two categories according to 
functions that they serve (Buchanan, 1977, 250) i.e. constitutional level of collective 
decision making and operational level of collective decision making. Former relates to 
choosing of the decision rules and the latter relates to the actions and decisions within 
the constitutional rules. The constitutional level of decision making establishes the 
rights and claims of persons, groups and state. Thus introducing a legal/political 
arrangement. On the other hand operational level of decision making relates to 
decision made by people or state within the limits/constraints set forth by the first 
level of decision making process (Buchanan, 1977, 289). 
 
Another classification of constitutional rules according to their functionality is put 
forward by Sunstein. He differentiates them as structural provisions and rights 
provisions (Elster & Slagstad, 1988, 327). Structural provisions relate to making sure 
that government will act for the welfare of public at large and will try to avoid 
factional tyranny and self-interested behaviour. Whereas rights provisions relate to 
individual rights e.g. freedom of speech and right to vote etc. 
 
McGuire (1987) gives yet another distinction in constitutional rules. This distinction is 
related to the function that a rule serves. He calls them interest-specific provisions and 
non-interest specific (general provisions) (McGuire, 1987). In most constitutions, 
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there are some general rules which stipulate the working of government’s systems and 
some specific rules pertaining to rights of some societal groups. The examples of the 
general provisions can be the number of houses of the government, electoral laws, 
amendment rules etc, while the examples for specific rules include subsidies to a 
specific state, and central/state lists etc. 
 
Funtionality of the constitutions cannot be reduced to one dimension or to another. As 
more and more research is being done on economic effects of the constitutions, more 
functions of the constitutions are coming to the forefront. Constitutions are multi-
dimensional and encompass all spheres of the society. In the self-interest approach 
constitutions maybe taken as the structures that protect not only the rights but also 
self-interests of the people. Once an interest group has established a position 
constitutions serve to provide longevity and protection to their position. 
 
4 Formation of a Constitution 
First and foremost question that comes up while forming a constitution is what to 
include in a constitution. It must be noted that constitutions are a mode of distributing 
public goods (e.g. defence, justice, foreign policy etc) and the society/chosen members 
must decide which choices should be included in the constitution and which should be 
left to the choices of administrators. 
 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962, 45-62) give a cost approach to the process of 
collectivizing activities e.g. deciding upon constitutional rules. They propose that a 
person will be willing to collectivize an activity if it increases his utility. His 
individual utility maybe increased at two levels. First level when such a decision will 
reduce some external costs that others may impose upon him and second level when 
he will get some benefits from his decision which are normally not available to him 
through private activity. Individual’s calculus for collectivizing an activity depends 
upon the  “net costs’’, if his share in “net costs’’ of organising the activity collectively 
is minimised then he would do so. These net costs are dependent on external costs and 
decision-making costs (or referred as social-interdependence costs).  
 
23 
 
Once the decision of collectivizing the activity is made, next comes the question of 
choosing a decision-making rule in the process of collectivizing things. Here again the 
cost calculation cycle repeats itself and the cost - benefit analysis of the various 
alternating rules is done. Only then a specific rule is chosen. The collectivization of 
any activity results in constraining the individual freedom but people will still choose 
such an alternative as this generates some positive value in the individuals cost - 
benefit analysis (Buchanan, 1977, 276). 
 
A Pareto-efficient rule in the eyes of Buchanan is the one which is either unanimously 
decided/chosen or at least the one which people fail to change collectively (Buchanan, 
1977, 34). However the ideal choice will not be the rule of unanimity rather perhaps of 
simple majority. Any decision making rule less than the unanimity will generate some 
negative externalities but people will choose a less inclusive rule because of the 
unacceptable delays and costs involved in unanimity rule (Buchanan, 1977, 283). In 
such a case every individual would want a rule of unanimity where his vote will 
always count but practicality will force him to choose a reasonable majoritarian rule. 
 
According to Elster (2007, 214), in the ideal sense, the cost of decision making 
consists of the cost of the means of deciding, the cost of the side effects of deciding, the 
opportunity cost of deciding i.e. the other things a person could have done with his 
time and effort if he was not involved in making the decisions. But in reality 
bargaining, logrolling and unnecessary delaying tactics increase the costs manifold. 
 
Collective decision making is about making a policy choice; every person has a set of 
beliefs and fundamental preferences and policy preferences. Collective decision 
making relates to ‘aggregating’ these individual preferences (Elster, 2007, 402). This 
aggregation may force/induce some people to transform their choices and yet others 
may mis-represent their preferences in order to achieve their goal. All this can make 
collective decision-making a very complex process.  
 
These aggregation mechanisms can be arguing, bargaining and voting (Elster, 2007, 
403). Argument may be seen mostly in places where unanimity is required while 
Bargaining consists of offers and counter offers (termed a substantive and procedural 
bargaining by Voigt (1999,110) and the final decision is dependent on bargaining 
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power of the parties. Voting is the third mechanism to make a collective decision. It 
classically should be free of any coercion but this is not seen in non ideal 
circumstances. Political decision-making mostly involves all three procedures and 
bargaining may include logrolling and filibustering and politics of empty chair i.e. 
using exploiting the rules of quorum (Elster, 2007, 405). 
 
The mechanics surrounding constitution formation are complicated. There are issues 
relating to the fact that constitution is a manifest of collective decision making. Each 
individual makes a cost benefit analysis in his own mind, votes accordingly and yet he 
is unsure if he will get what he voted for. The final outlook of the constitution depends 
also on procedural rules. 
 
Also it is a fact that there are many provisions for which a constitution-maker may or 
may not have full and complete knowledge. It is assumed that the Constitution makers 
are fully informed and completely literate in sense of constitutions. However it may 
not always be the case and constitutional rules emerge under very precarious 
conditions (Voigt, 2011). These have many factors influencing their final shape. These 
factors can be the circumstances at the time of constitution-making, the individuals 
participating in constitution making and the procedural rules. Another factor which 
may influence the final shape of the constitution are the existing rules which are 
already in place in the country (Voigt, 2011).  
 
5 Endogenising Constitutions 
As previously said, the research in the field of constitutional economics is rapidly 
flourishing, knowledge on emergence and endogenization of Constitutional Rules is 
rather handful (Voigt, 2011).  
 
According to different constitutional economists, there are many factors influencing 
the minds of the constitutional makers at the time of constitution-making. And these 
factors as well as the individuals (with their backgrounds) play an important rule in 
decisions on a constitutional draft. 
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Most important factor is the existence of a “Constitutional Attitude’’ (Buchanan, 
1977, 12). This means that there should be willingness to accept rules which is very 
important in any society. It is also imperative that the differentiation should be made 
between the choice of rules and different courses of action under these rules once they 
are chosen i.e. choice within these rules. This concept is akin to Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments (Ackermann, 2000, 4ff). 
 
Emergence of constitutional rules is deeply affected by another factor, i.e. the 
phenomenon of “Uncertainty`` (Buchanan, 1977, 187-189) Uncertainty of the 
situation remains a stable assumption in the mind of Buchanan. He posits that 
constitution or decision makers are unable to guess their own wealth/income status in 
the post constitutional world. Taking into account, a positive assumption about the 
thought process of people making the constitutional choices. What ever the person 
expects in the future, his constitutional decisions maybe affected accordingly. 
Uncertainty serves to make sure that people involved in collective decision making 
remain unsure how things will finally turn up so they can’t really pursue their self 
interests. The individual behaviour under uncertainty arises from the subjective 
feelings that an action may not determine the consequences (Arrow, 1984, 173). 
 
The temporal feature of uncertainty is noteworthy (Brennan & Hamlin, 2002). Since 
the constitutional decisions are going to affect many time periods, uncertainty is 
further strengthened because it is difficult to develop conjectures about the future 
positions of different interest groups (Buchanan, 1998, 6). A genuine constitutional 
choice will be the one that is permanent or at least quasi permanent. Normatively 
speaking, above-mentioned uncertainty of person regarding his own role and position 
in the future periods will help him choose a constitutional alternative that fills the 
criteria of equity, fairness and efficiency instead of blatant self-interest (Buchanan, 
1977, 266-267). 
 
Normatively a related phenomenon is “Rawlsian’s Veil of Ignorance” which should 
be attempted if an optimal constitution is desired (Rawls, 1971, 11). Veil of Ignorance 
relates to setting up a situation in which no person or group will have advantage over 
others because of asymmetrical information. Any decisions that will emerge will be 
fair automatically, as all decision-makers will be in the same position or under same 
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state of lack of information or Veil of Ignorance. In constitution-making scenario this 
is considered automatic by some scholars because of the fact that constitutions are 
meant to last over longer time-periods and future positions and standings are harder to 
speculate (Rawls, 1971, 136-142). However one may argue that demographies, 
geographical distribution and others such factors may be fairly stable atleast in the 
near future and so this uncertainity may not be so prevalent. 
 
Charles Beard has done some work in the field of positive constitutional economics. 
He maintains that all great philosophers like Plato and Aristotle have regarded 
property as a powerful force behind the political power (Beard, 1945, 46-47). He also 
states that these philosophers seem to agree that constitutions are a compromise 
between economic powers in the society. According to Beard most constitutions are  
manifestations of will of interests groups e.g. nobility, clergy, landowners etc. He tries 
to explain constitutions of the countries like US, England and Sweden on the basis of 
this theory in his book The Economic Basis of Politics. 
 
Beard (1913, 19-51) in his book Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States provides that constitution of United States and history surrounding it can 
be economically interpreted. He surveys the economic interests in 1787 and also the 
economic conditions at the time. He gives a non-statistical analysis of the constitution 
and also gives the broad guidelines for future research in the area. He maintains that 
the foundingfathers had their own personal and constituency interests to pursue and 
the constitutional draft is a manifestation of those interests, a statement corroborated 
by Heckelman & Dougherty (2009). He posits that constitution of US can be 
economically analysed using the self-interest model. 
 
Furthering the positive approach in Constitutional economics, McGuire & Ohsfeldt 
(1984) in their paper Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A 
Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard empirically test the Beardian 
Economic Interpretation of US Constitution. They develop an analysis of the voting 
patterns at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 and conclude that the 
voting pattern manifested the economic interests of the members. They also  present 
that economic factors play an important role when constitutional rules were being 
chosen. 
27 
 
Summing up all the above mentioned discussion, we can answer the initial questions 
of what is a constitution, what is its function and how it is formed? In our opinion, 
constitution is a pact of rights and duties established by tussle of utility-maximising 
individuals. The function that constitution serves is that of protecting the interests of 
the interest groups which formulated it in the first place.  Lastly, we propose that 
constitution is formed by bargaining and aggregation of preferences of the self-
interested constitution-makers. 
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1 The Economic Model of Constitutions 
A constitution is a set of rules chosen by a group of people together. This draft is a 
result of individual choices aggregated to collectivity, by using different aggregation 
mechanisms and procedures. This collective decision-making should be reducible to 
individual decision-making and a single collective choice should be explicable on the 
basis of several individual choices. Regardless of the mode through which 
constitution-makers are elected/selected to participate in constitution formation, they 
are expected by their constituencies or the executive to formulate an optimal 
constitution. But usually an ideal constitution is not achieved due to many reasons. 
One of the reasons can be that the people creating the constitution may not always be 
acting in altruistic ways and may decide what is better for them instead of what is 
better for others. 
 
Keeping this in mind, one can create an economic model about the behaviour of the 
constitution-makers when they are drafting the constitution. The basic assumption of 
this model is that an individual acts in his own self-interest and not in the interest of 
others. He is considered a rational self-interested decision-maker who chooses an 
option that maximises his own utility within given preferences and given constraints. 
So what brings him to stop his normal day to day life and sit in the constitution 
making assembly? There must be opportunity costs for him to be investing his time in 
a constitutional assembly. We propose that self-interest brings these constitution 
makers together and makes them invest time and effort in collective decision making. 
There could be twofold motives to this: first is to protect his own rights and second is 
to secure benefits for himself. Since constitution is expected to have a long life so the 
importance of securing these interests becomes magnified because of the long duration 
of the constitutional contract.  
 
If constitution is a draft of decisions affected by rational calculations of self-interested 
individuals then one should be able to predict the constitutional choices on the basis of 
preferences and interests of these members. One general hypothesis can be that when 
constitution is being formed the constitution-maker probes every decision with a keen 
eye at two levels: first he looks at the rule for his personal interests. If he is unable to 
pinpoint the effects of the decision on his exact present position or his future position, 
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then either he becomes indifferent or is ready to bargain his vote with the people who 
feel strongly about that specific rule. 
 
With this background it is assumed that, when the constitution of Pakistan was being 
drafted, the members of the constitutional assembly did not make decisions 
altruistically and made decisions which maximised their individual utility. Maximising 
their utility could be at two levels. They could either secure “personal economic 
interests’’ or they could further their “ideological goals’’.  
 
Personal economic interests can be furthered by voting for the policies that could 
bring economic benefits for the member, e.g. a member may vote for a subsidy/quota 
for a minority if he belongs to one. He also may vote for such a constitutional clause if 
his constituency consists of such a minority. In such a case he would maximise his 
utility by securing more chance of a successful re-election. 
 
A person also maximises his own utility when he works to promote his ideological 
goals. The conservative party, green party, socialist party all are examples of ideology 
oriented membership.  
 
If this is the case (as mentioned above) then their voting behaviour will reflect these 
thought processes and their interests. This is the idea that lies behind the research of 
developing an economic picture of members of the constitutional assembly. An 
economic biography is created so that their personal economic interests as well as 
personal ideological interests can be outlined therefore identifying the factors 
influencing the constitutional draft. This will provide answer to research question I.  
 
Some of these identified interests are purely economic while others ideological. Since 
constitutions are the rules that allocate the distribution of public goods, it can be said 
that a person who is proposing to put forth the interests of his ideological affiliations is 
a rational individual who expects to reap some economic benefits once he has secured 
a good spot for his ideological group. Also, to pursue one’s ideological goals is an 
economically rational endeavour. 
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Similarly representation interests can also be seen as directly proportional to the 
economic advantages that he/his group can claim later on. A representation of today 
can predict the economic position in future. A limit set on a majority or a constraint or 
an independent judiciary can be related to the fear that the individual may not think of 
himself to be in majority all the time so he may like some constraints applied to the 
majority at a given time. 
 
Normally one would expect the constituency interests to be included in the model, 
however in case of Pakistan we chose not to include them. There are several reasons 
for this. First of all a self-interested member will put forth his interest above those of 
his constituencies. In addition, some of the political leaders had their original 
constituencies in India. After the partition they got elected on the basis of political 
party affiliations but nevertheless there were no deep-rooted attachments between the 
leaders and their constituencies. Policing and monitoring costs were high so agents did 
not really have to be too cautious of the desires of their constituencies. The literacy 
rates and the mass communication devices at the time were so debilitated that voters 
were not informed enough to be able to form an educated opinion. Constituency 
interests are left out by choice in this economic model because we believe that these 
played a very minor role if any. 
 
In any constitution one would see two types of constitutional clauses. First would be 
the clauses relating to general design of constitution. These general clauses are usually 
present in most constitutions, for example rules regarding head of the state, head of the 
government or details relating to assemblies/houses of parliament. We may call them 
general constitutional clauses.  
 
Secondly, there are other clauses that relate to a specific country, which take into 
account unique demographic or social structures of the society. The constitutional 
clauses that affect such issues may be called interest-specific clauses as these would 
relate to the interests of specific groups in the country. The examples would be 
protecting a group of people against discrimination, providing religious freedom to a 
minority and so on. 
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In this study the rules of general constitutional designs are considered and the interest 
specific rules at the initial moment are left out. Ofcourse in case of interest-specific 
rules the voting behaviour can be much easily predicted (if the background is known). 
Therefore there maybe nothing noteworthy in such a research as the voting behaviour 
can be very easily predicted. Also the interest specific provisions will vary from 
country to country and may not yield replicable results. That is why they are left out in 
the sense of hypotheses development and testing but given at the end as general 
information. 
 
2 Rationality in Constitution-Making Settings 
A rational decision-making in the individual choice is different from the decision-
making in the collective choice (Buchanan and Tullock,1962, 35-39). In a market 
setting an individual makes a rational decision by weighing his alternatives with 
certainty. In a collective choice (in our case the constitution-making process) this 
certainty is missing. Despite knowing his choices, individual has no way of knowing 
the final outcome, because between his choice and the final outcome there are other 
factors involved, such as the choices made by others and the decision - making rules.  
The uncertainty surrounding the collective choice process limits the theoretical models 
of rational choice in collective settings to some extent. Buchanan & Tullock (1962, 
37) argue in their book “The Calculus of Consent’’ that this limitation is 
overestimated. In a political or collective setting this uncertainty can be reduced by 
mutual agreements and reciprocal behaviours. Uncertainty can also be reduced by the 
processes of logrolling and strategic voting when an individual can manipulate a 
desired outcome according to intensity of his interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, 
63-84).  
 
There is also another facet to the uncertainty regarding decisions involving longer 
spans (e.g. collective choice of constitutions) of time. An individual does not know 
that in the years to come what could be his position. Whatever the person expects in 
the future, his constitutional decisions may be affected by those expectations 
(Buchanan, 1977, 187-189). The individual behaviour under uncertainty may arise 
from the subjective feelings that an action may not determine the consequences 
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(Arrow, 1984, 173). The temporal feature of uncertainty is noteworthy. This means 
that uncertainty is not only of the fact that what will be the outcome at the moment but 
also of the fear that what this outcome will be like in future (Brennan & Hamlin, 
2002). Since the constitutional decisions are going to affect many time periods, 
uncertainty is further strengthened because it is difficult to develop conjectures about 
the future positions of different interest groups (Buchanan & Congleton, 1988, 6). 
 
In a country with multiple political parties there are always one or two parties which 
are stronger candidates. These parties are most likely to assume that they will stay in 
power at most times. Similarly ethnicity in the society is expected to remain stable for 
a long time to come. People from a populous state will know that the population 
demography is not likely to change much in the coming few decades. All these 
expectations can be as subjective as Arrow’s subjective uncertainty (1984, 173) but 
they may affect voting behaviour nonetheless.  
 
It is also possible that a person who has a strong intensity towards his preferences is 
keen to secure as much benefits for himself as possible in the situation. Constitutions 
are mostly formed in times of chaos and uncertainty, and a self-interested person 
would use this uncertainty and chaos to his advantage. It is easy for him to be 
convinced or to convince his group to join hands to secure their preferences. It could 
be possible that this chaos forces him to be more sensitive to his own needs and 
motives. 
 
There is also another aspect of rational decision-making in a collective setting that is 
of lesser responsibility (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, 35-39). Lesser responsibility is 
related to the concept that a person may become somewhat less rational in a collective 
choice because of the fact that neither he will enjoy the benefits individually nor will 
he suffer the consequences completely/individually. Sharing of responsibility is said 
to be lack of responsibility, likewise collective benefits and collective repercussions 
could make a person somewhat less rational. 
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3 Self-Interest in Constitution-Making Settings 
As scope of governmental and collective action increases as compared to private 
sphere of action, more people are affected. Governmental budgets increase and instead 
of a uniform cost and benefits to all individuals of society, differential effects are seen. 
This is the point where pressure groups get mobilised in the society who aim to 
receive special benefits for themselves (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, 63-84). These 
groups have their own economic interests and they work to achieve their interests, 
trying to maximise their individual utility. 
 
Self-interested behaviour also relates to the concept of homo-economicus and raises 
doubts that the people involved in constitutional decision making be willing to invest 
their time and effort to read and evaluate the constitutional alternatives (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1977, 298). And will they also selflessly design and propose changes that are 
not furthering their own self-interest? Since it is assumed that elected politicians and 
bureaucrats are motivated less by social good than by their own self interest 
(Buchanan, 1979, 211). This can be an interesting area for research in the side of 
positive constitutional economics. 
 
Elster (1993) identifies four types of Interests operating in a constitution-making 
setting. These are Purely Personal Economic interests, Interests relevant to the 
constituency, Political Party Interest and Political Institutions Interests. 
 
These four types of interests operate simultaneously, and may reinforce each other or 
cancel each other out, e.g. a strong candidate from a party may like to choose 
presidential system despite his political party’s bent to parliamentary system. This 
could be because he might expect to become president if his party wins. This would be 
a case where his personal interests are clashing with those of his party. 
 
On the other hand a member may ask that customs are made a provincial subject  
because he belongs to the coastal area and is trying to secure some benefits for himself 
as well as for his constituency. This would be a case where personal economic 
interests are reinforcing his constituency interests. 
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Elster’s observation can be extended on to several other factors e.g.  Personal 
economic interests can be related to his profession or religion or to his ethnic origins. 
The same can be discussed under the header of his constituency interests because it is 
possible that these affiliations secured him votes from his constituency in the first 
place. One can bring any other aspects in picture however almost all of them can be 
narrowed down to the four mentioned by Elster. 
 
To develop an idea about how participants view the constitutional rule to maximise 
their own utility: It is important to note a few things as mentioned by McGuire & 
Ohsfeldt (1986, 1989). 
 
Economic and political Conditions at the time of constitution-making should be 
understood in depth. They are important because they help to understand why the 
constitution was needed and what were the expectations of the general public from the 
constitution. Only then one can go into specifics and understand which were the 
groups that were most likely to benefit from constitution and how they were able to 
manipulate different constitutional rules in their favour. Developing an idea of 
perception of economic conditions by these members is also imperative, because only 
by getting into the shoes of those members, one can understand their preferences and 
the intensity of those preferences. It is noteworthy to observe how they perceive 
existing conditions as well as how they perceive the changes brought about by 
constitution. Another thing to note is the institutional structure existing prior to the 
constitution, since the constitutional rules that are selected are influenced by the pre-
constitutional rules (Voigt, 2011). 
 
A detailed look at the above mentioned points will depict a detailed picture of the 
economic and political conditions as well as the perception of constitutional-makers at 
the time. This would help to determine the interest groups that in turn will lead to the 
answer of research question 1 and 3. 
 
Referring back to the interests delineated by Elster (1993), at the time of constitution 
formation there are always groups in the societies that can be identified if political and 
economic condition are thoroughly studied as suggested by McGuire &Ohsfeldt 
(1986, 1989). These groups can be creditors, debtors, investors, labourers, 
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industrialists, farmers, sea traders, immigrants. All these characteristics contribute to 
mobilisation of Purely Personal Economic Interests or Constituency Economic 
Interests. Similarly party affiliations and institutional affiliations can contribute to 
Political Party Interest or Political Institutions Interests. 
 
Any constitution (except for maybe non-democratic constitution) takes some time to 
get drafted. It may face many hindrances and issues before finally taking the shape 
that is seen later in history. During this many new developments are seen. Therefore 
the process tracing is important. The idea is to trace the voting spectrum from one end 
to another and reflect the processes most probably operating behind the final decision 
on a vote. Thus providing the answer to the Research Question number 2. 
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1 The Designing of Pakistan’s Constitution 
A constitution of a country may be in an explicitly written format or in an unwritten, 
constantly evolving format. But in both cases it gives a fundamental skeleton on which 
all policy choices are based. A written constitution may take the form of an elaborate 
document that explains and guides about every detail. A constitution can also just be a 
policy document that gives only the most important policy guidelines and leaves the 
intricate details to the executives or the legislatures.  
 
The length of the constitution can vary from very long to very short. Regardless of the 
length of the constitution, in most cases one would see much similarity in constitutions 
of the world. Almost all the constitutions of the world provide the detail about the 
three branches of the government ie the executive, judicuiry and legislature. These 
three branches are related to each other as well as independent from each other. This 
separation of powers/checks and balances model is the hall mark of many 
constitutions (especially US) (Manning, 2011). These three together form the national 
government and the details surrounding their formation and working are very 
important in almost all constitutions. 
 
Another issue that is seen in most constitution is the relationship of the national 
government with provinces (or the unified administration). This is most often clearly 
stipulated in the constitutions. This clarity serves to avoid any encroachments on to 
each others turfs and protects the institutions from each others’ excesses. 
 
All the constitutions, in order to prevent rigidity (and paradoxically maintaining it to 
some extent), provide the amendment rules which ensure that constitutions do not get 
too out of line with the changing demands of time and society. The amendment rules 
also make sure that constitutions can not be too easily changed and do not become an 
easily manipulable document in the government’s hands. 
 
In light of the above dicussions and the ones stated in the preceding chapter (where we 
proposed that a constitution can be divided into general clauses and interest specific 
clauses), we can assume that when a constitution is being drafted it must include rules 
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relating to general design of the constitution as well as specific provisions relating to 
certain groups of society.  
 
Constitutional draft when delivering the rules of basic design would first of all provide 
the answer to a few basic questions. The first and central most problem would be that 
of who will run the government? Most of the countries of the world either have a 
Prime Minister or a President to run it. Though some countries may have royal 
families to head the government but Pakistan had no such family. Pakistan was a result 
of massive political movement, so an obvious head of the state would be an elected 
individual rather than a queen or a king. So first rule that is analyzed relates to the 
voting behavior of individuals while deciding the system of government i.e. Pakistan 
will have a presidential or a parliamentary system? 
 
The next question is how this elected individual will run the government in the 
country. What will be the system of the government? Whether the people will choose 
a strong center or a federation or a mixture thereof. So the next rule for which voting 
behavior is analysed is the system of government as well as number of houses of the 
legislative assemblies (as bicameralism is almost always associated with federalism). 
In case of Pakistan the system of government is even more interesting to read because 
of its unique goegraphy as we explain later in the coming chapters. 
 
One important issue arising in the basic design of the constitution is of establishing the 
judicial system. Voigt (2009) says that a strong judiciary can solve the dilemma of a 
strong state. A strong state protects the property rights but the same strong state can 
use its strength to attenuate property rights. In such a case the judiciary can solve the 
problem and can act as a constraint on the government. For a judiciary to perform its 
function as a constraint on executive its independence is important. The independence 
of the judiciary relates to long tenure of judges, fixed salaries, random assignments of 
cases and other factors as identified by Elster (1993).  
 
Human Rights are also included in the study, first because of the established 
economic effects and also because of the fact that after the mutiny of 1857 in Indian 
Sub-Continent, human rights were badly curbed. So it can be interesting to know 
about a country that took independence because the people believed that their 
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fundamental rights were being curbed. Do their politicians give the same rights to their 
own people? So the next constitutional rule for which voting roll call is assessed is the 
human rights clause. 
 
Last constitutional rule to be discussed is amendment’s rule. Amendment rules 
ensure how the constitution formed today will seem so in future thus providing or 
withholding stability of the drafted constitution. Since constitutional stability is quite a 
sought-after constitutional attribute, hypotheses are generated also for amendment 
rules and then tested for the selected constitution.  
 
2 Personal Attributes under Consideration 
For the purposes of this study, the interests of the members of the assembly are 
divided in two broad groups: economic interests (EI) and ideology interests (II).  
 
Economic Interests are defined as those interests which when pursued bring 
monetary benefits to a person. To identify the economic interests of the members of 
constitutional assembly of Pakistan several factors (variables) can be  taken into 
account
4
 e.g. principal occupation, lands owned, properties owned, credit lent, debt 
borrowed and others (bank balance). A preliminary reading of the society at that time 
gives a strong hint that public or private securities were not held by most people rather 
people used to keep their assets in form of gold (which is very difficult information to 
be obtained).  
 
Ideology Interests are defined as those interests which promote one’s own beliefs or 
ethos. These can relate to any attributes relating to the personal life of a member. For 
the purpose of the study mostly age, gender, education (local or foreign), religion, 
political party and institutional affiliations are used. These variables may not seem like 
a direct influence but they may help in explaining a person’s behavior in a certain 
scenario especially when the behavior is contradictory to the obvious economic 
interests.  
                                                 
4
 The data available from the field did not let us use all these variables so the ones available were only 
taken into account. 
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It is important to decide what the principal occupation of a person was, because most 
people would have more than one occupation, e.g. a person can have lands and enjoy 
their income while pursuing law as a career. For the purpose of this reseach, only 
principal occupation is taken and principal occupation will be the one that is most 
actively pursued by the member and most often documented in literature.   
 
3 A Snapshot of Country and Constitutional Assembly in 1956 
To carry out an economic analysis of the voting behavior of members in the 
constitutional assembly, it is important to know the conditions of the society (social, 
political and economic) at the time of constitution making. This includes the study of 
about a decade of history of Pakistan from 1946 to 1956. A detailed historical account 
is provided in chapter VI but for now a short description is given. 
 
Pakistan came into being on 14
th
 August 1947. Britain removed its colonial rule from 
the Indian Subcontinent in August 1947. India and Pakistan separated from each other 
after gaining independence from British rule. Muslim majority areas were included in 
Pakistan while Hindu majority areas were included in India. As the pre-dominant 
religion in Pakistan was Islam and the religious scholars/ulema became quite an 
active interest group. The other prominent interest groups in the society as identified 
by the historians were, landlords, business groups
5
 in West Pakistan and middle 
class group in East-Pakistan (Uphoff & Ilchman, 1973, 165-169). 
 
At that time, Pakistan had 5 provinces (states), Sind, Punjab, North Western Frontier 
Province (N.W.F.P), Baluchistan, Bengal or East Pakistan. (That is known as 
Bangladesh today). The first four provinces were geographically adjacent, named 
                                                 
5
 Businessmen in the society were of three kinds, capitalist, money lenders and industrialists. The 
distinction between the three is quite vague and overlapping but to have an idea of the society 
conditions it maybe reasonable to mention them a little. Capitalists or business men were those people 
who invested their money in their own projects or the projects of others. The industrialists were few as 
industry was very rare. Money lenders were also an interesting group. As there were no banks in the 
country at that time so this group acted as banks, borrowing and lending money at their desired interest 
rate. All the business groups overlapped with the landlords as they were the people who had enough 
money to lend, invest or establish industry.  
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together as West Pakistan while East Pakistan was quite far. Both wings had India in 
between and had hostile relations with India. This geography was unique because of 
the fact that East and West parts were separated by more than a 1000 miles. Not only 
were there geographical distances, but both wings were different in many other 
respects e.g. language, culture, customs, climate etc. 
 
A constitutional assembly was created in 1946 which failed to deliver the constitution 
till 1956. The sitting president dissolved the assembly and recreated a new 
constitutional assembly (Maluka, 1995, 138ff). The 2
nd
 Constitutional assembly of 
Pakistan was formed on 21
st
 June 1955 and was elected by members of provincial 
assemblies and also by municipalities in certain cities (Karachi and Quetta). There 
were 80 members, 40 from East Pakistan and 40 from West-Pakistan. To make 
predictions about the voting behavior of the constitution makers, it is important to 
have a slight understanding of the mind-sets of those individuals. 
 
Most of the members of constitutional assembly were Muslims who made a strong 
interest group. Again there were sects like Shia, Sunni, Sayyeds. These sub-groups 
have been traditionally present in Pakistani society and tend to stick together for 
ideological reasons. 
 
Professional occupations as gathered from the literature review were as follows: 28 
Landowners, 23 lawyers, 14 retired Civil Servants, 7 Businessmen, 8 Ulema/Religious 
scholars and some were journalists (Uphoff & Ilchman,1973,165-169)
6
. 
 
Political party affiliations of the members is also an important consideration. At the 
time there were a few political parties. Most members represented the coalition of the 
Muslim League (twenty-five members) and the United Front of East Pakistan 
(sixteen members). The opposition was represented by the Awami League (the 
People's League), Azad Pakistan (Free Pakistan), Ganatantri Dal (Democratic 
                                                 
6
 This data differs in various books, and the numbers look inconsistent. For sake of initial information 
we provide here what we learnt from the literature but for sake of empirical analysis we use only the 
data that we gathered from archives ourselves. 
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Party), United Progressive Party, the National Congress of Pakistan, and the 
Scheduled Castes Federation (Ahmad, 1970)
7
. 
Linguistically/ethnically the constitutional assembly was divided into many groups. 
Though Urdu was declared as national language, and English as official language, 
multiple groups existed in constitutional assembly which bonded with each other 
because of their language. Major groups seen were Punjabis (people from state of 
Punjab), Bangla (East Pakistan), Sindhi (people from state of Sindh), Pushto (from 
state of NWFP) and Urdu (immigrants from India). 
 
Genderwise distribution in the assembly was also interesting because all the members 
of the assembly were men.  
4 Conjectures 
Based on the above snap shot of assembly a few conjectures are made. In general two 
points are important to be noted: British influence in the constitution and 
Islamization of the constitution.  
 
British influence in the constitution would be expected because of the close ties of 
Pakistan and India with the United Kingdom. Before the British came and made India 
a colony, the subcontinent was run by the Moghul Kings (Schimmel, 1980, 75) and 
was naturally not a democratic society. During the Bristish rule India was run 
according to the acts introduced by the Viceroys. The act of 1935 was later on used in 
Pakistan as interim constitution (Choudury, 1969, 23). The British influence was 
prevalent not just because of these acts and their remnants but also because most of the 
politicians and elite families sent their children to study in the British Kingdom (as 
later shown by our own data). These people due to their foreign exposure had their 
own mindset which affected their thinking, and in turn the constitution. 
 
Since British rules were time tested and found to be durable as well as economically 
feasible, so older people are also expected to favour them because of risk aversiveness 
                                                 
7
 As said earlier this data differs in various books, and the numbers look inconsistent. For sake of initial 
information we provide here what we learnt from the literature but for sake of empirical analysis we use 
only the data that we gathered from archives ourselves. 
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generally prevalent in Pakistani society in this age group. Older people because of lack 
of social security in general avoid taking risks on their money assets and life (Sinha, 
1992) . This risk aversiveness along with the chaos and uncertaity prevailing at the 
time of constitution-making may lead them to vote for time tested and resilient British 
constitutional rules. Younger members are expected not to favour British rules 
because of the anti-British emotions in the younger politicians. In general old aged 
members, landowners and foreign educated people are expected to follow British 
systems. 
 
Islamization of the constitution would also be expected. The reason is that the 
subcontinent was divided into two parts in the name of religion. After the British 
retreat, Hindus assumed that they will be running the country as they were an obvious 
majority (Jaffrelot, 2004, 9 ff). This assumed status was challenged by the Muslim 
community because they were a minority in comparison but were in great numbers 
overall. Due to their unending conflict, the area was finally divided into two parts on 
religious basis. This gave way to many politicians using the Islam card and the 
religious sentiments to achieve their own agendas. One could expect that a country 
which was supposed to have been created on religious grounds would most probably 
not have a secular constitution. Therefore the constitution would be expected to have a 
lot of Islamic influence if not totally based on sharia’h laws. 
 
Most members would be in general assumed to favour Islamisation of the constitution, 
and Islamic interest groups are expected to play an important role. Especially 
Ulema/scholars would manipulate the fellow members in the name of religion (a 
factor prevalent even today and especially pronounced in those times when 
independence was gained for Muslim majority areas in the name of the religion). 
Since most other members were also Muslims so they can be made to act accordingly 
because of public and peer pressure.  
  
Land ownership in Pakistan was interwoven with many social aspects of the society. 
Landlords or the Zamindari System (Land reforms) was set up by the British to create 
a strong hold in the country. Law of Permanent Settlement when enacted by the 
Britishers was endorsed by Lord Bentick in these words: 
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“A vast body of rich landed proprietors, deeply interested in the continuation of  
British Dominion, and having complete command over mass of the people’’(Kazmi, 
2003, 12). 
 
Landlords had always supported the British Government. British government by 
bestowing vast estates to landlords enjoyed immense support by the common masses. 
The whole society revolved around the landlord, he was an employer, politician, 
leader, creditor and even industrialist at the same time (as most industry was somehow 
relevant to him e.g. sugar industry and cotton industry) (Kazmi, 2003, 12 ff). Thus not 
many people could standup against the landlord, i.e. the British imperialism. 
 
There were very few people in the society who had their own ancestral land 
independent of British generosity. The people with British endowed land are more 
likely to be following the British constitutional rules. Also because many of them were 
friends with British settlers and with many foreign tours, they had somewhat better 
understanding of British systems and favoured them to a great extent. 
 
Education as an influencing factor is categorised into foreign educated and locally 
educated. This distinction is important because of the ideological mindset that these 
persons will portray. Most of them were educated in Britian rather than in any other 
country, so they have had exposure and understanding of British constitutional rules. 
While locally educated people were usually studying in Islamic madrassah/schools 
which had strong anti-British environment (Zaidi, 2004, 39). Even in non-Islamic 
modern schools anti-British sentiments were rampant. 
 
Ofcourse all these influences are brought about by specific members in the assembly 
who are assumed to behave consistently. In a nutshell we assume that, British 
influence is to be brought about by landowners, old aged members and foreign 
educated members. While Islamic influence is mostly brought about by 
Ulema/scholars 
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4.1 Structure of Government (Presidential vs. Parliamentary) 
There are several societies that have worked well with having a presidential form of 
government (USA) and others are performing quite reasonably under parliamentary 
form of government (India). Some scholars by using their models on different 
countries propose that form of government appears to be endogenous to ethnic 
fractionalization (Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi, 2004). The authors discuss many factors 
(risk aversion, protection of property rights) but the relevant factor in this study is 
about the polarization and ethnic variation in society. The authors discuss about 
Insulation of leaders i.e. leaders are more protected against blocking of their 
legislation because the majority needed to veto is greater than normal. They find that 
various indices of insulations are positively correlated with measure of 
fractionalization and polarization (Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi, 2004). More polarized 
societies tend to have more “insulated” rulers i.e. such constitutional rules are chosen 
which will lead to a greater required majority that can effectively constrain the 
leader’s ex-post implementation of legislation. This leads to creation of more dictator 
regimes. A president is more powerful and insulated in presidential system as 
compared to a prime-minister in parliamentary system. Because a prime-minister has 
to take into account will and wishes of the cabinet.  
 
Robinson and Torvik (2008) create a positive model of constitutional choice of 
structure of government. They base their research on two principles, first that 
minorities are more powerful in parliamentary system because their votes matter more 
in parliamentary system, and second that a president is more powerful in his 
government than a prime-minister.  
 
Through their research they show that presidents have more power in their roles, and 
this can be a reason that most political leaders want to be presidents and not prime 
ministers. In contrast to their leaders the party members prefer more a prime minister 
unless their party position is in jeopardy. In such a case they would want to choose a 
stronger president who will protect the overall party position.  
 
Another important finding of the authors that is useful in our study is that they find out 
that poor and ethnically polarized societies will have a greater tendency to choose 
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presidential system (Robinson and Torvik, 2008). When ideological polarisation is at 
the maximum and budgets are smaller, then the countries tend to choose presidential 
systems.  
 
Since presidential systems are assumed to hold more power then parliamentary 
system, it is assumed by some scholars (Voigt & Salzberger, 2002) that members of a 
political party that is likely to be more powerful in the next elections would favor 
presidential system rather than parliamentary system. 
 
So in general, one could expect that in Pakistan majorities (ethnic, political, religious, 
linguistic) would support presidentialism because they will think of their position to be 
fairly strong
8
 while opposite will be the case with minorities. In addition to this a 
strong leader of a political party e.g. party chairman or secretary, would probably vote 
for presidentialism in the hope that if his party wins he can be a powerful president. 
 
Religious scholars/ulema are most likely to support parliamentary system because they 
can mobilize more members in such a system.  Locally/madrassahs educated people 
are most likely to be influenced by the Ulema group and they were in considerable 
numbers in every party. Such a widespread influence can be more powerful in 
parliamentary system than in a presidential system where one man holds all power. 
Therefore ulema are likely to be supporters of parliamentary system. 
 
Women members are likely to vote for parliamentary system because they would have 
a better standing in such a system. In Pakistan in 1956 no woman would expect to be 
in a race of being a president (there has not been a woman president in Pakistan till 
now).  While in parliamentary system a woman member can have an important 
standing in the political party, where she can have a comparatively powerful position. 
                                                 
8
 At the time of the independence there were predominantly two parties, Congress 
(mainly Hindus though it had many Muslim members) and Muslim League (for 
Muslims of the area). Muslim League after playing a strong role in Independence had 
also a strong prescence in constitutional assembly (Jalal, 1994, 35ff). 
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So women members would probably vote for parliamentary system where they would 
have a better power position.  
 
The above mentioned discussion maybe summed up as consisting of the following 
main hypotheses. 
1. If a constitution-maker has a strong political presence then he is more likely to 
support presidentialism. 
2. If a constitution-maker belongs to the majority (ethnic, political, religious, 
linguistic), he will most probably support presidentialism. 
3. (In continuation with hypothesis No 2) If a constitution-maker belongs to the 
minority (ethnic, political, religious, linguistic) then he will most probably support 
parliamentary system.  
4. If a member belongs to religious interest groups or Ulema, then he is likely to 
vote for parliamentary system. 
5. If a member is locally educated, then he is likely to vote for parliamentary 
system. 
6. If a member is in older age group or is a woman, then he/she is likely to vote 
for parliamentary system. 
7. If a member is foreign educated or is a landowner, then he is likely to vote for 
parliamentary system. 
 
4.2 Number of Houses 
Research on bicameralism and uni-cameralism is scarce (Voigt, 2009). Although these 
have been discussed in relation to different phenomena
9
 but endogenising the 
constitutional rule about number of houses has not been discussed very often and 
literature seems very scarce (Voigt, 2009).  . 
 
Separation of power relates to the the distribution of powers between the three arms of 
the governments ie legislature, executive and judiciary. This separation can either be 
very formal and rigid) or the boundaries can be vague. However both types have their 
own merits and demerits (Campbell, 2004, 1-3). A joint decision system however acts 
                                                 
9
 decision costs (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962), budget deficits (Heller, 1997) or bargaining and decision-
making (Levmore, 1992) 
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as a constraint on politicians and is considered as favourable for citizens (Voigt, 
2009). James Madison, the Father of the US Constitution envisaged the constitution to 
divide the powers amongst different elements in order to separate the powers as well 
as to use it as a check and balance system (Madison, 1788). He proposed to divide the 
legislative authority into sub-parts having different modes of election and having 
separate mode of action. Bicameralism has been said to be used as a tool for check and 
balance by causing delay in passing legislation which can be termed both positive and 
negative (Heller, 1997). 
 
Though rudimentary bi-cameral structure of government was seen in the ancient 
societies, the glaring example in history is that of the British parliament (Muthoo & 
Shepsle, 2007). Like most bicameral governments, it consisted of two houses but the 
election criterion was discriminatory. Only elite lineage and aristocracy as well as 
upper class gentry were allowed to join the upper house, rightly named as House of 
Lords. The second house was House of Commons. Even House of Commons allowed 
only the people who fulfilled a minimum property requirement. US parliament 
deviated from the British parliament despite being bi-cameral in structure. It divided 
the representation between the two houses on the basis of federal principles.  
 
Bi-cameralism is considered as a stalling mechanism. Heller (1997) considers that bi-
cameralism increases the number of veto players that can block legislation. Two 
houses of legislature mean more individuals need to agree on a piece of legislation. 
This therefore increases the number of veto players and also increases the costs of 
aggregating their preferences. Bi-cameralism then would automatically lead to  
increase in  under the table deals and mobilisation of interest groups. Taking a cue 
from here, let us assume that the same interest groups were active at the time of 
constitution-making and thinking what they would have done. One hypothesis could 
be that these interest groups would like to reduce the veto players. The less the veto 
players/members of the assembly, less are the costs of influencing their voting 
behaviour. These interest groups may aspire for uni-cameralism. In the light of this  
one can say that stronger interest groups (comprising of stronger political party 
members or the members from ethnic/religious majorities) would vote for uni-
cameralism. 
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On a similar note, the members belonging to the executive (or those who have strong 
expectation of coming to government soon) may favour uni-cameralism because of the 
less cumbersome procedure for effective legislation to pass. Members belonging to 
minorities (ethnic, political, religious, linguistic) would most likely vote for bi-
cameralism hoping to cause delays in the legislative process. 
Foreign educated people, landowners and older aged group people are likely to 
support bi-cameralism because of aforementioned reasons. There can be another 
reason for that; usually both houses have different mode of elections, some members 
may get elected in the upper house because of giving representation to a certain group 
of society or to the elites as in House of Lords of the British parliament. In that case, 
landowners, retired civil servants and women can be easily elected in senate because 
of the reasons of representation, aristocracy or gender equality. So it is easier to stay in 
political scene if there are two houses with separate mode of elections. So these groups 
will most likely support bi-cameralism. 
 
While ulema and locally educated people are likely to oppose it for two reasons, first 
because of their being anti-British sentiments and also because two houses mean more 
stalling mechanisms and less manoeuvring of self-interests as mentioned before. 
 
All  the above conjectures may be shortened to the following hypotheses. 
1.  If a member belongs to the stronger political party then he will most probably 
choose unicameralism and vice versa. 
2. If a member is from ethnic/religious majority then he is likely to vote for uni-
cameralism and vice versa. 
3. If a member is a landowner, retired civil servant or a woman, then he/she is likely to 
vote for bi-cameralism. 
4. If a member belongs to religious interest groups/Ulema or is locally educated, then 
he is likely to vote for uni-cameralism. 
5. If a member is foreign educated, then he is likely to vote for bi-cameralism. 
 
4.3 Federalism vs. Unitary form of government 
Buchanan & Congleton (1998, 142-143) argue in the book ‘Politics by Principle not 
Interest’  that a central government with majority rule in place can not provide 
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heterogeneous benefits to different parts of the society without incurring massive 
decision making costs. The rent seeking behaviour, self interest and coalition 
compromises result in discrimination.   
 
In contrast to the unitary system the federal system may not be a panacea but it does 
provide another approach. Federalism is a hierarchical system of government that is 
highlighted by the division of powers at two levels, ie national and state levels. On one 
hand, federalism is considered inferior to the unitary system because the decision 
making cost between different bodies is considerably increased (Buchanan & 
Congleton, 1998, 142-143), on other hand it is considered a reasonable constitutional 
design by many scholars (Sproule-Jones,1975, 42). Since it divides the provision of 
public goods at two levels i.e. national and constituent levels. It gives the opportunity 
to read consumer preference signals appropriately because of various access points 
within and between government authorities. Federalism also provides better chances 
of internalising any negative inter-dependencies between individuals and 
organisations. 
 
Voigt (2009) points out the fact that various research is done on the economic effects 
of choosing a federal structure
10
 but the research done about why the countries choose 
a federal system or a unitary systems is almost non-existent. Voigt proposes that 
constitutional choice of federalism maybe relevant for those countries that have 
fragmented societies on the basis of ethnicity, language, or religion. He also thinks 
that this choice could be relevant to those countries which have been British colonies. 
Many British colonies (Australia, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, and 
the United States) show federal system of government unlike most former French 
colonies. According to him newly formed constitutions (most of Central and Eastern 
Europe) have chosen a federal structure so age of constitution maybe a relevant 
phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
10
e.g Blume, Lorenz & Voigt,Stefan (2008) Federalism and Decentralization – A Critical Survey of 
Frequently Used Indicators.Online Resource. 
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The constitutional choice of the system of government may also be proposed to relate 
to the income of the states/constituting units. When Pakistan was made it consisted of 
several Indian states that joined together to form Pakistan (Mahmood, 2000, 2ff). 
Pakistan was a country which had many different kinds of states, some small, some 
large and there were differences in incomes generated from these states. This situation 
can be seen as similar to the differences (of ethnicity, language, or religion) proposed 
by Voigt (2009). If such was the case then the members from these states would like to 
have federation so that they can maintain their independence while enjoying the 
benefits of a central government. It can also be possible that richer and bigger states 
would not want to let their revenues get into a common pool. They would choose a 
loose federation or a confederation (having a broader range of provincial sunjects) so 
that their revenues could be used within. So again, it could be said that in Pakistan 
members belonging to richer states (which were predominantly agricultural) would 
ask for federal systems while members belonging to poor states would vote against it.  
 
Ulema would not want federalism because one unit will make their interests more 
central and pervasive, while in case of federalism they will want to bring all the state 
laws in accordance with their ideology which could become a little more cumbersome. 
 
As mentioned previously where we assumed that older age group, foreign educated 
people and landlords are likely to support the British systems always. They are not 
likely supporters of federal system rather they would prefer unitary system just like the 
British model. 
The hypotheses discussed above can be clearly articulated as follows. 
 
1. If a member belongs to a rich state then he will most probably choose federal 
system and vice-versa. 
2. If a member is of older age group, landowner or foreign educated, then he will 
most probably vote against federal system. 
3. If a person belongs to the group of Ulema, he will vote against federal system. 
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4.4 Judiciary 
Independent judiciary protects the rights of citizens from supression and ensures that 
the powers of insitutions are not usurped. In the strictly positive sense, an independent 
judiciary can even be beneficial to the interest groups in the society. Its independence 
will prolong the life of legislations,  interest groups might like to invest in a strong and 
neutral judiciary (Landes & Posner, 1975). 
 
After the promulgation of the constitutional document which represents an agreement 
between various stakeholders, the diverging interests do not cease to exist. The people 
who have not secured a desirable position in the constitutional contract  try to pursue 
their interests by bringing constitutional change. The constitutional change itself may 
be explicit or implicit (Voigt, 1999). Constitution can be changed explicitly by 
amendments and implicitly by judicial interpretations and judicial review. If 
constitutionally judiciary is bestowed with the power of judicial review, its importance 
in interpreting the constitution is profound (Voigt, 1999). Courts can use the power of 
judicial review to keep the constitutions stable and to protect it from unconstitutional 
changes by analysing all laws, legislations and executive actions (Ginsburg & Elkins, 
2009). 
 
Ramseyer (1994) says that choice of granting independence to courts depends on the 
expectations of politicians who try to manipulate this choice according to their 
interest. If they expect their own party to remain in power, they are less likely to opt 
for an independent judiciary (Hanssen, 2004). In this case the candidates from stronger 
political parties are expected lesser to vote for an independent judiciary. Ginsburg 
(2006) state that independence of judiciary seems to be directly co-related to political 
uncertainty. If this is true, we should be able to see that the constitution-makers in 
general (in a country that is in any kind of crisis) should support independent 
judiciary. Ofcourse it can also be expected that the constitution makers who are from 
judicial institutions are likely to vote for judicial independence because of their 
institutional interest. 
 
In general Judicial Independence would be a clause that would probably be supported 
by most members (except for stronger political party members) because of the 
54 
 
uncertainty surrounding the political process. Since no-one could tell for sure when he 
or she would be ending up in the minority so judicial independence would be desired 
by most members in the assembly. 
 
In conclusion we can draw the following hypotheses. 
1. If a candidate belongs to a stronger political party then he is expected less to vote 
for an independent judiciary and vice versa.  
2. If a member is related to judicial system (lawyer), then he is likely to vote for 
higher  judicial independence. 
3. If there is political uncertainty at the time of constitution making then the neutral 
members (not from stronger political parties and related to judicial system) will 
probably vote for greater judicial independence.  
 
4.5 Procedures for Amendments 
Procedure of amendments is stipulated in the constitution to add stability as well as to 
create adaptability in the times to come. Nevertheless the process of amendments 
should be stringent, only then one can expect the constitution to last for a long time. It 
is important that constitution can be changed only with greater majority so that the 
sitting majorities cannot make changes according to their own whims and wills. 
Stability of the constitution is relevant to the stability of investments and long term 
planning in the country (Elster, 1993). Therefore it can be expected that political 
majority will like to opt for stringent amendment rules because of the uncertainty of 
their own standing in the future. 
 
Relating again to Landes and Posner (1975), if judiciary can be viewed in interest 
group perspective, so can be the process of amendments. Interest groups might want to 
have a stable constitution so that it adds credibility to the promises and gives longevity 
to the legislations. If such is the case then amendment process should also be made 
stringent so that the constitutions remain stable.  Ideally the majority needed should be 
more than the majority needed for simple legislation (Elster, 1993). 
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Regarding a general view on amendments procedure, it can be said that all 
constitutions would have explicitly stipulated rules for amendments. This would add 
reasonable stability as well as flexibility to the constitutions.  
 
We expect that constitutional rule regarding amendments would require more than 
simple majority and would be considerably stringent. The interest groups which would 
belong to the majorities and are prevalent at the time of constitution, they would opt 
for stringent amendment rules so that the constitution (which reflects the interests of 
these members) can stay as desired by them. In the same context the minority 
members would also want even tougher amendment rules because they would not 
want their  current position to deteriote further. We expect that in the end the Pakistani 
constitution would have tough amendment rules and most members would vote for 
more than simple majority to bring change in the constitution. 
 
Summing up the discussion we dont expect any member to ask for lax amendment 
rules. 
1. If a member belongs to the majority (ethnic, political, linguistic, religious) then he 
is most likely to vote for stringent amendment rules. 
2. If a member belongs to the minority (ethnic, political, linguistic, religious) then 
he is most likely to vote for even more stringent amendment rules. 
 
4.6 Human Rights 
Almost all the constitutions after the US and French Constitutions include a clause of 
human rights (Elster, 1993). This constitutional clause may not seem to have a direct 
co-relation with economics but some economists suggest otherwise. According to 
Blume and Voigt (2004) ensuring observance of human rights lead to certainty in the 
economy which then leads to economic growth and prosperity. Violations of human 
rights create uncertainty and lower investments. The authors also provide a broad list 
of human rights naming them as basic human rights, economic/property rights, 
civil/political rights, social/ emancipatory rights. 
 
Most of the work done on economic analysis of human rights is done on the effects of 
human rights. It is believed that these have a co-relation with economic prosperity of a 
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country. If human rights are considered to have such a co-relation then should the 
constitution makers not consider their importance when drafting the constitutions? 
Endogenising the constitutional rule of human rights has been discussed by Voigt in 
relevance to Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971, 11). He theorises that since the 
constitution makers are uncertain about their positions after the constitution is 
promulgated so most interest groups would be interested in maintaining the human 
rights and in ensuring that they are protected by the constitutions. A constitution 
protecting the human rights increases the utility for all members of the society since 
they can act according to their own preferences. 
 
Normatively speaking the basic human rights is an important aspect for overall 
society’s welfare but the positive branch also suggests deeper implications. They can 
be researched positively in two aspects, the economic effects of human rights and 
what propels the constitution makers to create strong human rights rules. 
 
One idea could be that ex-colonies may have more public demand to create stronger 
basic rights since the rights have been curbed for so long that it is possible that former 
colonies provide broader rules. Another focus of research could be that, as in case of 
Pakistan, during the colonial rule there were many jobs which were off limits to 
common people. Also freedom to speak, freedom to have a say in political processes, 
freedom to assembly was curtailed so it could be possible that constitution makers 
wanted to grant basic human freedom constitutionally and to protect its violation. 
Speaking in context of this book, it would be interesting to note this phenomenon. 
 
As far as the personal characteristics are concerned, it is possible that the constitution 
makers have different preferences according to their own interests. The constitution 
maker belonging to the majority are less likely to support broader human rights then 
those who are likely to remain in minority. This majority-minority status can relate to 
the populous –non populous states, or to the minority religion, or to the dominant 
political party. In countries with low development, women and less educated people 
are also likely to support broad human rights. 
 
We expect that: 
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1. If a member is from weaker political parties, minority groups, or is a woman 
then he/she is likely to support broader human rights.  
2. On a similar note, majorities are expected to try to curtail the Human Rights to 
some extent. 
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Constitutional 
Rule 
For Against 
Presidentialism  Majorities 
 Strong political leaders 
 
 
 Minorities 
 Religious ulema 
 Locally educated 
 Foreign educated 
 Old Aged 
 Women 
 Landowners 
Bi-Cameralism  Minority 
 Landowner 
 Retired civil servant 
 Woman 
 Foreign educated 
 
 
 Majority 
 Religious ulema 
 
Federalism  Members from rich states  older age group 
 landowner 
 foreign educated 
 Religious ulema 
 
Judicial 
Independence 
 Lawyers 
 Minorities 
 
 Majorities 
Strict Amendment 
Rules 
 Majorities 
 Minorities (even stricter     
rules) 
 
Human Rights  Most members (In theory 
will support, actual scenario is a 
different issue) 
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Chapter V: Data Sources and 
Methodology 
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1 Data Sources 
Basic data that was required consisted of 3 main documents, an economic biography 
of all 80 members (that should ideally contain all the required variables), rules and 
procedures of assembly and thirdly voting roll calls of members (this should depict 
how a member voted on certain constitutional clauses). 
 
Since this information was not to be found in books and journals, we had to research 
in archives and historical records. To collect this information, data had to be collected 
from Pakistan. The main point of contact was National Archives of Pakistan (NAP) 
which held a great deal of information. NAP is a fairly recent organization. It is a 
central place where important records are sent in order to be compiled at a single 
place. When the first constitution was being discussed the capital of Pakistan was 
Karachi and not Islamabad so all the records were transferred to National Archives 
later on. Therefore a great deal of information is now found here. 
 
Other institutions which held a reasonable amount of information for this project were 
National Assembly of Pakistan and Sind Assembly. Other good sources were National 
Library of Pakistan, Library of Law and Justice, and several national university 
libraries. 
 
Document relating to Rules and Procedures was easy to find and was readily available 
in a booklet form from National Assembly. 
 
The economic biographies were comparatively difficult to gather. A basic document 
consisting of names was available in the debates which started out the process. Then 
another archival document with short biographies was available from National 
Assembly. Later on the author consulted several libraries and biographical institutes to 
fill out as many variables as possible. During the course of research, the Election 
Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was contacted as well. It was hoped that ECP would 
have information on profiles of politicians’ especially in relevance to their wealth and 
asset records but it was told that ECP destroys the data about members every 5 years 
for the lack of appropriate space to keep all these documents. On some occasions 
families were also contacted to ask specific information about their relatives. All this 
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effort yielded considerable amount of data to carry out this research project. The 
members from East Pakistan were comparatively difficult to research because of the 
fact that some of them supported the formation of Bangladesh. Their existence in 
Pakistani history was smoothly eliminated by calling them traitors. However through 
internet a lot of information was gathered and some through newspapers of that time. 
Considerable information came through four newspapers of that time namely Pakistan 
Times, Dawn,Nawai-Waqt and Civil & Military Gazette. The news bulletins from four 
different radios of that time have been researched as well and much information 
extracted from thereof. 
 
The voting roll calls were unavailable for most of the clauses. We were able to have 
voting lists for only 14 clauses. It was possible to have an idea about a few members‘ 
frame of mind because these members gave press statements about their choices in the 
constitutional design
11
. Some members spoke in the assembly favoring one choice or 
another. Author believes that as the proceedings in constitutional assembly were open 
to public and press, so most probably these persons would have voted as they had said 
they would vote. Also there were many members of the constitutional assembly, who 
were neither vocal in press nor in the assembly discussions
12
. But we do believe that 
these members must have voted according to their party stance. As the voting was not 
secret balloting
13
, so the political leaders would have the knowledge of how their party 
members are voting. There were also cases of party members (Firoz Khan Noon, 
Mozaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash) being expelled from their parties because of not 
following orders  so most probably no member would have gone against the wishes of 
his party leadership (Nawa-e-Waqt, 24
th
 June,1955). Although these discussions have 
been read but for hypotheses testing only those voting roll calls have been used which 
were available in detail. 
 
                                                 
11
 Just as a single example: Mr Fazlur Rahman favoured a unitary form of constitution. Though the 
unitary form of government was not established in the end by the constitution, the honourable  
member was quite vocal about it (Pakistan Times,1st Jan1956 ,Lahore, Pakistan). 
12
 As shown the chapter IX (Table-8), a large majority of members were completely silent in the 
discussion phases. 
13
 As the Rule 30 of the document “Rules of Procedure of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan`` 
published on 27th July 1955. 
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General discussions in news and literature mention that several members of the 
constitutional assembly were not present the day the constitution was finally adopted. 
Also there is a problem that the constitution was voted upon clause by clause and the 
discussion was spread over several days (CAD, Jan-March 1956). A complete 
attendance list of members over all these days is nowhere to be found. Records do not 
contain such information. So to know exactly which member was present on which 
day and whether he participated in voting or stayed neutral would have been 
impossible to know. The author attempted an indirect method and tried to extract 
record from finance division since the members were paid according to their 
attendance in assembly, but even they did not have such old data. 
 
Because of all these constraints only limited number of constitutional rules have been 
then empirically tested. We have in total 14 roll calls available but during the course 
of research it became obvious that interest specific provisions were more in focus in 
members’ eyes and the constitutional rules of general design were somewhat ignored. 
2  Methodology 
As mentioned above the data available was very limited and in order to carry out the 
research with the limited amount of data, a detailed methodology is to be designed. 
This study will be carried out as a single subject case study which focuses mainly on 3 
research questions. It is an economic analysis of a historical event (constitution-
making) that has long term implications. Since the approach used to analyse the event 
is individualistic so logically the first thing to do is to analyse the preferences and 
interests of all the actors involved. 
 
As the event under analysis can no longer be observed or recreated, the possibility of 
using many qualitative research data collection methods (observation, focus groups) is 
no more possible. Therefore, secondary data collection methods will be applied for 
this study mainly focusing on the study of the records and documents. These 
documents can be the debates and discussions of the assembly records as well as the 
official archival documents.  
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Other sources  of use may be the personal documents of the members, or other 
relevant people (historians, journalists) in that time period. These may include letters; 
auto-biographies etc. Another important source could be the print media or audio or 
video records of that time. In short, the sources used will be mostly secondary. When 
and where possible interviews will be arranged of any member, journalist or relevant 
person who can provide important information. 
 
First step would be to arrange a list of name of members of constitutional assembly 
and then to create short biographies of all these members. These would be our Units 
and treating each member as an individual unit in the event will generate a large 
number of Observations. These observations are about 80 i.e. as many as the number 
of the members of assembly.  
 
One thing worth mentioning came out in initial reading i.e. a constitutional assembly 
was formed at first soon after the country declared independence and was dissolved 
because it failed to draft a constitution. Then a second constitution-making body was 
created that finally delivered the constitution. For purposes to understand the case 
better, detailed information would be provided to explain why such a measure had to 
be taken. And what was the interest of the executive who took this step so a thorough 
process tracing would be done. However for generating results only the second 
assembly would be considered because the focus is on the roll calls of the selected 
constitutional rules, therefore detailed backgrounds of only the members in the second 
assembly would be provided. 
 
A constitution consists of two types of constitutional rules; some are general rules 
which are usually discussed in all constitutions, while some are specific rules which 
are only relevant in case of a specific country. These specific rules are based on the 
problems of society and try to alleviate some issues eg a religious society may want 
the constitution to be in line with religion, a society filled with discrimination may 
want to give specific representation to a minority group or minority gender. These 
kinds of rules will not be uniform all over in the world’s constitution, but a choice of a 
president/prime minister will be in almost all constitutions. They are termed as 
interest-specific and general constitutional clauses respectively (McGuire, 1987). The 
interest specific rules are prone to manipulation by interest groups more commonly 
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than the general rules. For the time being only the endogenising of some general 
constitutional rules is pondered upon. As many specific and interesting interest 
specific constitutional rules were seen so they were accommodated in the study along 
the way. 
 
For now, the roll call on the following constitutional rules is taken into account: These 
will serve as our dependent variables: 
1. Structure of Government (Presidential vs. Parliamentary) 
2. Number of Houses 
3. Federalism 
4. Judicial Independence 
5. Procedures of Amendments 
6. Human Rights 
 
To know a member’s Institutional Interests, we would like to know his education, 
profession, main sources of income etc. To know this it can also be noted that at the 
time of his tenure in assembly was he member of a legislature or executive or judiciary 
etc, thus his institutional linkages will be probed. Similarly to know if he is influenced 
by foreign constitutional models it might be relevant to note if he has been working or 
studying in foreign universities. To know whether a person is in minority groups it’s 
relevant to note his ethnic, linguistic and religious background. Similarly gender 
would be noted as women are expected to vote in favour of broad human rights 
clauses. In the end a person’s political party affiliations would be noted. To know his 
strong political presence it must be seen if he is seen as a party’s main political figure 
or not. Strength of political party can be seen as seats won in the last election, and also 
by number of votes won. All these are presented in the following table and are used as 
Independent variables. 
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Independent Variables 
Gender 
Religion 
Ethnic Origin 
Geographical Origin 
Political Party 
Political Presence 
Education 
Profession 
Institutional Linkage 
Language 
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Chapter VI: Background Information 
of Pakistan and the Constitutional 
Assemblies of Pakistan 
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1 Background about Pakistan in 1956 
This chapter is a short account of the relevant information about Pakistan in 1956. The 
background knowledge is important because otherwise reader will not be able to 
understand the dynamics involved in constitution-making. In Pakistan it will also be 
impossible to understand the frames of mind of different members unless the reader 
knows the ethnic, linguistic and other details about the members. In this short 
introduction, territorial limits, geography, culture and society of the country is 
provided. 
2 States of Pakistan in 1956 
Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP (North West Frontier Province) were 
geographically contiguous Muslim majority provinces which were included in 
Pakistan and termed as West Pakistan. The people living in these provinces differed 
from each other in various aspects of cultural and linguistic attributes.  
 
2.1 Punjab 
Punjab was a bigger province in British India. It was then divided in 1947 into two 
parts Indian Punjab and Pakistani Punjab. Muslims came to Pakistan’s part and Hindus 
and Sikhs migrated across to the Indian Territory. Both sides of border speak Punjabi 
as a mother tongue and Hindi and Urdu (official languages of India and Pakistan) 
come only as second languages. Ethnically these people are called Punjabis and the 
language they speak is also called Punjabi. They have a distinct culture and distinct 
physical features
14
.  
 
In 1955, Punjab was given 21 seats in constitutional assembly (out of 80) including 1 
for a non-Muslim member (Khan, 2010, 90). As evident for the number of seats in 
assembly Punjabis were the majority in West Pakistan. Except for one non-Muslim 
member, all of them belonged to Muslim League. The non-Muslim member also sided 
with Muslim League and was one of the “Muslim League associates’’. 
 
                                                 
14
 Online Resource: http://www.encyclopedia.com (Encyclopedia of World Cultures, 1996 ,Leaf, 
Murray) 
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Most members belonging to Punjab in assembly were either land lords or business 
elites of their areas (as seen in the table 4 of chapter IX). In Punjab there were huge 
land areas that belonged to a few renowned families and landlordism was quite 
prevalent. Many of them had their estates bestowed upon them by British viceroys 
while others inherited them.   
 
2.2 Sind 
Sind is the Southern part of Pakistan. Sindhi is the term used for its people, as well as 
for their language
15
. They are physically similar to Punjabis but their dressing and 
culture is quite different. Sindh had much less population both at that time as well as 
today so five seats were allocated for Sind in the assembly (Khan, 2010, 90). These 
five seats also included a non-Muslim seat as the population of Hindus was quite 
significant in Sindh. 
 
2.3 NWFP 
NWFP stands for North Western Frontier Province. It was geographically adjacent to 
Afghanistan. The people of NWFP speak Pushto which is similar to the language 
spoken in Afghanistan
16
. These people are known as Pathans and they have a distinct 
physical appearance quite similar to Europeans with fair skins, light eyes and a 
blondish hue to their hair. Culturally they are distinct from people of other provinces 
and resemble the people of Afghanistan in many ways. NWFP had been given 4 seats 
in assembly. All of these seats were won by Muslim League (Khan, 2010, 90). The 
people from NWFP also represented the linguistic and ethnic minority in the 
constitutional assembly. 
 
2.4 Baluchistan 
Baluchistan is the South-Western part of Pakistan bordering with Iran. The people of 
this area though belong to various tribes and families, they are generally called 
                                                 
15
 Online Resource: http://www.encyclopedia.com (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. , 2011 ) 
16 Online Resource: http://www.encyclopedia.com (World Encyclopedia, 2005) 
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Baluchs and their language is called Baluchi
17
. Baluchs are culturally, ethnically and 
linguistically distinct from all other provinces. Baluchistan is a backward and poverty 
stricken area of Pakistan though this part is rich with natural resources. It is the largest 
province of Pakistan area wise and the smallest population wise. It was allocated only 
one seat in the constitutional assembly (Khan, 2010, 90).  
 
2.5 East Pakistan 
East Pakistan was not geographically adjacent to Pakistan rather it was more than 
1600 kilometers away. Both wings of Pakistan had Indian territory in between the two 
parts and communication means between the two wings were very rudimentary 
(Online Britannica Encyclopedia). All this made the issues between the two parts of 
Pakistan, more complicated than they already were.   
 
Bengal as a province under British rule had only Calcutta as a developed industrialized 
city which was also its capital. During the partition, this industrialized city was added 
to India. The rest of the Bengal that was added to Pakistan was only a “rural slum” 
(Afzal, 2001, 3) as the historians put it. It had much less GDP and per capita income 
than West Pakistan. 
 
Bengal/East Pakistan had completely different culture, language and other attributes. 
Bengali people were short statured and could easily be identified from a group of West 
Pakistanis. Bengal had a larger population of Hindus who were an important part of 
the economy. East Pakistan had a total of 40 (50%) seats in the constitutional 
assembly. Out of  these 40, 9 seats were for the non-Muslims as the non-Muslim 
community way in a greater number in East Pakistan (Khan, 2010, 90).  
 
In 1956, 56 % of population lived in East Pakistan while around 44 % lived in West 
Pakistan. 4 out of 7 Pakistanis spoke Bengali as first language
18
. Pakistan’s total 
population was 76 million
19
. Population of East Pakistan was 42 million
20
 and West 
                                                 
17
 Online Resource: http://www.encyclopedia.com (Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North 
Africa ,2004 ,Yavari, Neguin) 
18
Time Magazine (Online Version) Pakistan, Butchery in Bengal, Monday, May 31, 1954. 
19
Time Magazine (Online Version) Pakistan: The Mad Mullahs. Monday, March 30th 1953. 
20
Time Magazine (Online Version) Pakistan, Division Affirmed, Monday, March 29, 1954. 
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Pakistan had a population of about 34 million
21
. Hindus were 12 million in Pakistan 
which made around 14% of the population
22
. Most Hindus stayed in East Pakistan and 
a small number lived in Sindh. 
 
2.6 Tribal Areas 
The Tribal Areas of Pakistan consist of Pakistan’s North Western Borders23. These 
areas are geographically adjacent to Afghanistan and the inahbitants also are closely 
connected to Afghanistan through culture, language and appearance. These areas 
consist of seven subdivisions or agencies (North Waziristan, South Waziristan, 
Orakzai, Kurram, Mahmand, Khyber, Bajour). The government writ was difficult to 
establish in these areas even in colonial times and is difficult till today. Today these 
areas come up time and again in the news because of jihadi movements and terror 
issues.  
 
The state-wise distribution of the seats in the assembly can be summarized in the 
following table (Khan, 2010, 90): 
 
 
 
3 Interest Groups in the Society 
The following major interest groups can be identified through literature: 
 
                                                 
21
Time Magazine (Online Version) Pakistan: Reluctant Dictator. Monday, April 11 1953. 
22
Time Magazine (Online Version), Pakistan: Islamic State. Monday, Nov 16 1953. 
23
 The Economist (Online Version), Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: A Wild Frontier, Sep 18, 2008. 
 
States Population in Percentage Seats in Constitutional Assembly
East Pakistan East Pakistan
West Pakistan Punjab 21
Sindh 5
NWFP 4
Baluchistan 1
Tribal Areas 9
40
45%
55%
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3.1 Landlords 
This was the most numerous and the most dominant interest group both in the society 
and in the assembly (Kazmi, 2003, 12ff). The group was so strong that government did 
not want to take any steps that could offend the landlords in the assembly
24
.  
 
As mentioned before, the landlord system was created by the British to keep their hold 
over the common man. After the colonial rule the same support was enjoyed by the 
sitting governments and this relationship became mutually favourable (Kazmi, 2003, 
12). 
 
The zamindari
25
 (landlord) system worked in such a way that the landlord was both 
creditor as well as debtor thus was intricately woven in the social and economic 
systems (Kazmi, 2003, 13). Since most landlords were pretty affluent they would lend 
money to the farmers or industrialists and acted as debtors to many. Also the landlord 
took payments from the farmer and paid revenue to government. Under Agra Tenancy 
(Amendment) Act sometimes he had to pay the Government dues without realising the 
rents from tenants and in that case he was forced to borrow money from money 
lenders which resulted in both groups supporting each other on many issues. 
 
Mian Iftikharuddin, a member of the constituent assembly and a minister of Punjab, 
once tried to put forth a rehabilitation programme which included taking the lands 
from landlords and giving them to the refugees coming from India. As expected, his 
idea was received most negatively and even destroyed his relations with the chief 
minister (Nawab of Mmadot) and the (Liaquat Ali Khan) (Kazmi, 2003, 320). 
 
3.2 Capitalists 
This group emerged within 1930’s. Debt was a major problem for peasantry and the 
credit came from money lending class as well as from other landlords. After Pakistan 
                                                 
24
 Pakistan’s first Prime-Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was also a very strong voice in favour of the landed 
gentry. His speeches in Uttar Pardesh Legislative Council widely available are supportive of the rights 
of the Landlords at that time. 
25
 Word zamindari comes from word zamin of Urdu, that literally means land. Zamindar would be 
someone who own lands in literal translation. 
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came into being, its assets were withheld by India and released much later (Kazmi, 
2003, 242). At that time the management of Government was done by money lent by 
capitalists who gave the money to run the government and had underwritten it in many 
ways. Therefore the Pre-independence business profit taxes became superfluous in 
Pakistan. These capitalists instead of paying taxes, gave loans to government which 
naturally increased their hold in the government.  
 
3.3 Industrialists and Businessmen 
This was another powerful interest group in the society and assembly. Since Pakistan 
was an agricultutral country predominantly, the industrialists and the landlords were 
deeply connected. For examply sugar industry was a very important industry since it 
benefited both the industrialist as well as the landlords (Kazmi, 2003, 19). Similarly 
textile industry similarly connected both groups. Though the businessmen were very 
few in the society as well as in the assembly, they still exerted their influence because 
of deep connections with the landlords. 
 
3.4 Religious Leaders 
Religious factors were very important when Pakistan came into being. Like the power 
of the Church in old Christian society, the Mosque and the religious leaders enjoyed 
immense importance in the state business of nascent Pakistani society (Kazmi, 2003, 
322). Twenty-Two Ulemas (Priests) presented a unified charter of their demands that 
influenced the constitution through a document called Objective Resolution. It held 
the importance of Magna Carta in Pakistani constitution. The Objective Resolution 
was a type of preamble to the Constitution. It was presented in March 1949 (but was 
existent throughout, even in the current constitution of Pakistan). It was a fundamental 
document that influenced all the subsequent constitutions. Objectives Resolution was 
deeply influenced by Islamic ideologies and pressures by this interest groups. 
 
4 Interim Constitution of Pakistan 
After the independence from British Dominance, Pakistan and India both had no 
constitution. In Pakistan, Government of India Act 1935 (created by the British) was 
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adopted with some modifications (Choudury, 1969, 23). This was named as Pakistan 
(Provisional) Constitutional Order 1947 (PCO 1947). It is important to know the 
salient features of the interim constitution because traditionally all the later 
constitutions of Pakistan were in essence quite similar to the very first interim 
constitution.  
 
4.1 Federation 
Under the original Government of India Act 1935, the basic idea of the act was to 
grant provincial autonomy which was recognised as need of the situation
26
 (Choudury, 
1969, 23). Since India was a country consisting of several different ethnic, linguistic 
and religious communities, federal system was considered convenient. Foundations of 
this provincial autonomy can also be traced back to 1857 when the revolt for Indian 
independence had taken place and the centralised system of governance came up as a 
nuisance in dealing with the mutineers. 
 
Taking the cue from Indian Independence Act 1935 the first structure of government 
that was laid in Pakistan was that of a federation. According to this PCO Pakistan was 
a federation with distribution of powers between Centre and the States (Afzal, 2001, 8-
12). The federation consisted of five or more provinces, Sindh, Punjab, NWFP, East 
Pakistan, Baluchistan and other Indian States which might later on decide to join 
Pakistan. The federation of nascent Pakistan had Karachi as its capital (Khan, 2009, 
50).  
 
4.2 Division of Power 
The legislative powers were divided between Centre and province on the basis of three 
lists, namely the federal, provincial and concurrent lists (Afzal, 2001, 9). The federal 
legislature could discuss the matters enumerated in the federal lists while the 
provincial assemblies could legislate upon the matter prescribed in the provincial lists. 
                                                 
26
 According to some authors (Choudury, 1969, 23) during the mutiny of 1857, British government 
realized that a central mode of administration lacked efficiency in case of India and provincial 
autonomy was granted gradually. The British representatives claimed that it was a part of granting 
administrative powers to the provinces so that they can manage their own affairs to some extent, but 
many historians differed in opinion. 
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Concurrent list was however another matter, which was a discretion of both federal 
and provincial assemblies. The federal list included the subjects defence, foreign 
affairs, currency, banking, insurance, import/export, customs duty, income tax, posts 
and telegraphs, and sales tax (Afzal, 2001, 9 & 10). Provincial lists had mainly the 
subjects judiciary, police, prisons, local government, education, communications, 
railways, public health, production, agriculture, land, land tenure, taxes on agricultural 
income and taxes on mineral rights. The concurrent list had subjects of criminal law, 
marriage and divorce, wills and successions, transfer of property, trust, contracts, 
factories, labour, trade unions, and electricity
27
. 
 
The powers of the federal government included the executive control in the provinces 
through its officers
28
 (Afzal, 2001, 10). Federal government had the authority to direct 
a provincial authority to act in a certain manner if it had the feeling of threat to peace 
and security of economic life of Pakistan. Provinces had the right to collect and retain 
taxes on federal estate. Also provinces could take succession duties, stamp duties, 
terminal taxes, tax on railway freight and fares. They also had fixed shares in federal 
taxes: i.e. income tax (50%), jute export duty (62.5%) central excise, salt duty and 
duties on some other items.  
 
4.3 Head of the State 
The position of the head of State was noteworthy in PCO 1947 (Khan, 2009 , 50). 
According to the British India Act, the Governor General was a representative of the 
Queen and enjoyed immense authority (it was only natural of the colonial power to 
keep maximum authority in their own hands via representatives). He had executive 
control as well as control over defence forces and foreign policy. He also enjoyed 
discretion in judicial matters. When Pakistan came into being these powers of 
Governor General were reduced. The name of the head of the state remained governor 
general instead of president but most discretionary powers were limited  (made subject 
                                                 
27
 This amazingly broad list is in essence repeated in the actual constitution of 1956. We take up this 
topic again in chapter VIII, section 3. 
28
 This pattern is quite similar in India and Pakistan. This organization was called Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) or Central Superior Services. This setup then continued in India and Pakistan as Indian Civil 
Service and Pakistan Civil Service.  
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to the parliament and to the advice of ministers). The governor general could declare 
emergency and assume complete executive control and similarly direct the governors 
of the provinces to do the same. He was the head of federation and all actions were 
taken in his name. He could appoint prime ministers and cabinet who held offices in 
his pleasure. 
 
Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah was elected as the first Governor General of Pakistan. 
Since it was Mr Jinnah who was considered the most important personality behind the 
creation of Pakistan, he continued to enjoy much power even after the reduction of 
powers enjoyed by the Governor General. This, he enjoyed solely because of the 
personal charisma and respect enjoyed by him overall in the country and in political 
scenes. This power that was traditionally enjoyed by the post (both by British Viceroy 
and Mr Jinnah) fell into the hands of the next Governor General who was responsible 
for dissolving the first constitutional assembly and creating many political and 
constitutional fiascos.  
 
4.4 Electoral Rules 
Prescribing the electoral rules, PCO not only retained the system of separate 
electorates (as was so under British rule) but also extended it to scheduled caste 
Hindus (Afzal, 2001, 10). This system meant that for non-Muslim seats only non-
Muslims can vote and choose their candidate. Similarly PCO extended it to schedule 
caste Hindus and the minority could vote only for their own candidates for specific 
seats. On one hand this system meant that there will always be representatives of the 
minority in the assembly, on the other hand this system segregated the minorities a 
little bit from the main stream of electoral processes.  
 
5 First Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan 
Pakistan’s first constitutional assembly was created in 1947, which also functioned as 
the federal legislature (Khan, 2009, 50-53). It had representatives from all the 
federating states (except tribal areas). The modus of electing the candidates was 
chosen differently for different provinces for no obvious reasons. For provinces of 
Sindh and N.W.F.P members were elected on the basis of elections of July 1946 (the 
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most recent election before partition). These elections were recently conducted and the 
members were elected through separate electorates, thus they were accepted in the 
constituent assembly without any further objections.  
 
For East Pakistan and Punjab fresh elections were held and the provincial assemblies 
were formed. These assemblies then chose amongst themselves their representatives 
for the constituent assembly.  
 
For Baluchistan, local municipality and jirga performed these functions and held new 
elections. Seats for refugees and princely states
29
 were filled by nomination by rulers 
and subsequent acceptance by the assembly. 
 
Total membership of the assembly at the start was 69 and one member represented one 
million of population (Afzal, 2001, 11). About three years later, ten more seats were 
added (four seats for refugees and six for princely states). Final distribution (area 
wise) in the assembly was as follows: East Pakistan 44, Punjab 22, Sindh 5, NWFP 3, 
Baluchistan 1, Bahawalpur States 1, Khairpur States 1, NWFP States 1, Baluchistan 
States 1. Political Party wise position was as follows: Pakistan Muslim league 49/69 
and then later 60/79, Pakistan national Congress 11 and Azad Pakistan Party 3.   
 
The working of the assembly on constitution went on but at a very slow pace. On top 
of all the problems already existing in the new formed country, assembly had an issue 
with the short attendance of members. Some non-Muslim members migrated to India 
leaving their seats empty. Most members were simultaneously holding other 
government offices so they were mostly absent from the sessions because of their 
executive commitments.  
 
                                                 
29
The adjacent independent states ruled by different princes, who agreed to join Pakistan but were not 
ready to let go of their individuality completely. These states were given their own representative seats 
in assembly. 
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5.1 Working of Assembly 
The first session of the assembly was held on 10
th
 August 1947 in Karachi, four days 
before independence. 50 out of 69 members attended the session (Afzal, 2001, 12). A 
Hindu member, Jogendra Nath Mandal enrolled the members present. Mr Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah was elected as president and Maulvi Tameez-ud-din was elected as deputy-
president. The session lasted for 6 days and the committees on fundamental rights and 
problems of minorities were made. The constituent assembly did not meet for 18 
months after this session because of other issues going on in the country. 
 
The assembly acted both as legislature and constitution maker. As constitution making 
body, it was independent and chose its procedures. They could amend the provisional 
constitution and make laws for the country and only simple majority was needed. 
However Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure
30
 demanded that any constitutional bill 
would be deemed accepted only after it is signed by the president/speaker of the 
constituent assembly. 
 
The constituent assembly was tiered into committees and subcommittees. Some 
important ones were named as, Basic Principles Committee, Committee on 
Fundamental Rights, Committee on Minority Rights, State Negotiating Committee, 
Tribal Areas Negotiating Committee etc. 
 
Basic Principles Committee was the most important committee and was appointed on 
12
th
 March 1949. It was presided by Maulvi Tameez-ud-din and Liaquat Ali was the 
vice-president of the committee. It had multiple sub-committees relating to Franchise, 
Judiciary and Federal Provincial Issues and Distribution of power. The first proposal 
that it gave, was termed very undemocratic by the media and masses. Executive power 
was to be exercised by the Head of the state on advice of ministry (Ali Khan, 1996, 
205). However the head of state had unlimited powers and he could proclaim 
emergency and suspend the constitution. Other suggestions that the committee offered 
were deeply religious, and a strong tilt towards the religious groups could be observed. 
Urdu was suggested as the national language which was seriously criticised by East 
                                                 
30
 It was a document retrieved from National Assembly of Pakistan Archives. The manual is not 
available in published form. 
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Pakistan. East Pakistan had Bengali as local language and since this wing had more 
population, they wanted Bengali to be chosen as national language (Kazmi, 2003, 
324).  
Apart from other issues, assembly had issues relating to quorum and 
representativeness of members. Some of the members of the constituent assembly 
/legislature had no constituency in Pakistan. For example, the then Prime minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan had no constituency in Pakistan rather he had won elections from an 
Indian district and yet he became the Prime Minister (Kazmi, 2003, 290).  
 
Similarly there were some members of the constituent assembly who did not have 
permanent resident status of Pakistan. They still maintained their residences in India 
e.g. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. Ofcourse this fact affected their performance in the 
assembly. This lacuna was later removed by passing a bill in the constituent assembly 
on 18
th
 May 1948, which closed the membership of the constituent assembly to all non 
– residents (Kazmi, 2003, 320). 
 
5.2 Dissolution of the Assembly 
The governor general of Pakistan enjoyed vast powers. The PCO and the Act of 1935 
provided vast powers to the governor general. Though these powers were curtailed to 
a certain extent after independence but the post remained powerful nonetheless. 
Secondly the first governor general of Pakistan Mr Jinnah enjoyed more power than 
written words could give him owing to his strong personal charisma as well as sound 
political standing. These two factors culminated in setting up a tradition where 
governor general became much powerful regardless of who was holding the post. 
When the first constitutional assembly had almost completed a very reasonable draft 
of the constitution in which most issues were settled, the assembly adjourned to meet 
again to discuss the constitutional draft sometime later. It was then that the governor 
general dismissed the constitutional assembly. And the task of constitution-formation 
broke down once again. It is believed that he took this step because of the bitterness 
over the reduction of powers of governor general  although the stated reason was that 
parliamentary bickering was the cause for choosing such a strong course of action 
(Hamid, 2009, 78). 
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Constitutional assembly’s representativeness became an issue when Muslim League 
suffered a massive defeat in the elections of 1954 in the East Pakistan. Some people 
believed that since Muslim League got defeated, constitutional assembly did not 
depict the exact desires of people so maybe it should be restructured. But again as a 
counter argument, the representativeness issue can be used to question the 
performance of assembly in the legislative business but its constitution making task 
can not always be subject to the result of elections. A constitutional assembly may 
need scholars or political scientists who are not political figures and yet they may 
produce a fairly durable constitution. But in Pakistan after a long era of British 
dominance, some sections of the society believed that the constituent assembly must 
be a representative assembly, the questions of representativeness arose.  
 
It is true that the first constitutional assembly was not performing optimally in its task 
to make a constitution as about 7 years had passed since 1947. But again the right of 
governor general to dismiss the assembly was not responded without criticism. Maulvi 
Tameez-ud-Din the speaker of the dissolved assembly questioned this move in 
Provincial High Court of Sindh (Khan, 2009, 81). The High Court decided in favor of 
Mr Tameez-ud-din agreeing that the move by governor general was against the interim 
constitution and was illegal. 
 
The government appealed against the decision of High Court in the Supreme Court 
/Federal Court which decided in favor of government. It maintained that governor 
general could take this action and no law could become operative until it received 
assent from the governor general. Regardless of the constitutional and legal issues 
surrounding the issue, it was obvious that constitution of Pakistan was delayed once 
again for the want of new assembly. This situation exacerbated the already rampant 
wide chaos and instability in country (Jalal, 1991, 194). 
 
6 Delay in Constitution Making 
India and Pakistan both countries had multiple ethnicities, religions and cultures in the 
society but all these divergent factions ceased to conflict in order to focus on ending 
the British rule. Hindu and Muslims (two main groups) kept their hands joined till 
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there was British Empire ruling them. They joined hands on many occasions (1857) 
till the time they ousted the British dominance (Mahmood, 2000, 5ff). Once it was 
seen that Britishers are soon to be leaving, Muslims decided to separate themselves 
from Hindu majority and demanded for their own homeland named Pakistan. Next 
when Pakistan came into being and people had no Hindu majority to fight they started 
having issues between them on account of ethnicity, language etc. In the constitutional 
assembly each faction had the fear that they might get suppressed or they might have 
to give in to pressure, thus polarization became very strong. It also hindered the 
business of assembly. Till the time Mr Jinnah was alive these factions were a little 
subdued but as soon as he died, all this factionalism started to raise head. These issues 
kept the performance of the assembly at a snailpace. The assembly had two functions 
(legislature/constitutional) but most historians quote that the performance was not upto 
the mark on both levels (Mahmood, 2000, 45) (Khan, 2009, 78). The reasons could be 
many but one quoted often was the absence of the members from the assembly very 
often (Kamran, 2009). K.K. Aziz (1976, 86-87) mentions that on average, in 7 years, 
assembly used 33 days per year for legislative business and 16 days per year for 
constitutional business. So maybe not devoting enough time could also be one of the 
causes. Another reason mentioned was that the representativeness of assembly had 
created doubts (which was the officially quoted reason was dissolution of assembly). 
So many divergent interest groups were present in the assembly and their agreement 
on any issue was quite painstaking process (as read throughout the time between 1948-
1956) which affected its performance (Ahmad, 1970, 136ff). 
 
The polarization is also evident from the fact that initially there were only two parties 
in the constitutional assembly, Muslim League and Congress which represented 
Muslims and Hindus respectively. However in the later years from 1948 to 1956, 
when the constitution was finally made, many parties came into formation. 
 
The only constitutional document that was unanimously agreed by all the Muslim 
political parties or groups was the Objective Resolution (Khan, 2009, 63). It was 
approved in March 1949. Despite the excitement shown in assembly over its adoption, 
in actuality it contained nothing but the general principles that were difficult to define 
and even more difficult to implement in reality. Its vagueness probably allowed it to 
be passed in the assembly so smoothly. All the Hindu members unanimously voted 
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against its adoption criticizing the overly religious content of it. However despite the 
unified opposition of non-Muslim members, Objective Resolution was not only 
adopted then, but remains a policy statement in later constitutions till today. 
 
There were other unending political issues at the time around the constitution-making 
which caused an invariable delay. Centre-province relationship was not good and it 
constituted a delay in the constitution-making. All the provinces had different 
ethnicity and geographically one wing was so far away from the other that problems 
were bound to emerge (Kazmi, 2003, 316). West Pakistan had its own doubts, while 
Sindh had doubts that if Karachi (the most industrially developed city of Pakistan at 
the time) is made capital then Sindh would suffer as a province (Kazmi, 2003, 318). 
This delay in selecting a capital for the country caused anxiety and delayed the foreign 
investors (Kazmi, 2003, 319). 
 
On the other hand, East-Pakistan was the problematic zone since the very beginning. It 
had much lesser geographical area than the West but much greater population. It was 
quite backward. Not many Bengalis were inducted in Army and Civil Service by the 
British. At the time of independence only one Bengali was in the Civil Service (Nurun 
Nabi Chaudary). Government of Pakistan then increased the quota for Bengalis to 
50% in the Civil services along with other steps to bring uniformity between the two 
zones but problems kept on continuing (Kazmi, 2003, 319).   
 
Industrial development was in a debilitated situation. Pakistan inherited only 14 
Cotton mills at the time of independence. Although an industrial policy was created in 
1947 but the investment from foreign investors was minimal. Pakistan had not even a 
single bank at the time of independence however the number rose to 34 commercial 
banks in 1950 (Kazmi, 2003, 327-329). 
 
All these executive and administrative issues took a lot of time of government and the 
constitution-making process suffered in consequence. All the constitutional reports 
submitted by different committees received unwelcoming responses in this chaos and 
the assassination of then Prime Minister Mr Liaquat Ali Khan created another 
unforeseen delay. Finally the assembly was dissolved without any progress on 
constitution except for the Objective’s Resolution. 
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7 Second Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan 
The second constitutional assembly (CAP) was formed in 1955. The elections to 
second constitutional assembly were held on 21
st
 June 1955 and 72 members were 
elected through indirect elections
31
. These elected members belonged to different areas 
of the country. 40 belonged to East Pakistan and other 32 belonged to West Pakistan. 
Out of 32 members who were from West Pakistan, 21 were from Punjab, 5 from 
Sindh, 4 from NWFP, 1 from Karachi (capital), and 1 from Baluchistan
32
. The 
remaining eight members (of total 80) joined later on, through nominations. 
 
All the 80 members of assembly were distinguished people of their areas.  Each one of 
them was included in the assembly either because of his education, experience, or 
political standing (to see the qualifications of the members please refer to the next 
chapter).  
 
The members generally were affluent and respectable members of society belonging to 
various professions. Professionally most predominant members were lawyers in East 
Pakistan and landlords in West Pakistan. However there were also civil servants, 
journalists, doctors and religious scholars etc (table 4 in chapter IX). 
 
The age group predominant was middle age group ranging between 45 to 65. A few 
were younger popular leaders in their thirties (table 5 in chapter IX). 
 
Religion-wise most members belonged to Islam. Out of 80 members only 11 were 
non-Muslims. They mostly belonged to East Pakistan. Out of these 11 non Muslim 
members, only 2 were Christians and all others were Hindus (table 3 in chapter IX). 
Muslim League was a major party in the assembly having about 31 members and 
several associates. Second major party was Awami League that held much power in 
East Pakistan. Unlike Muslim League which predominantly consisted of landlords and 
other affluent members of society, Awami League consisted mainly of middle class 
people. ‘Awami’ word itself stands for common man. Third major party in assembly 
                                                 
31
Dawn, Karachi, 21
st
 June 1955. 
32
Dawn, Karachi, 22nd June 1955. 
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was United Front. It was not a predefined party rather it was a loose alliance of several 
parties having a common front, as the name suggests (table 2 in chapter IX). 
 
The first constitutional assembly had a few women members, but the second 
constituent assembly had no woman member. 
 
 The first session of assembly was held in Murree on 7
th
 July 1955
33
. The first task of 
the assembly was to validate old laws and also to create rules of procedure for itself. 
And later on the issue of constitution making was to be taken up. The constitution was 
drafted by drawing freely on the draft of the old constitutional assembly
34
 and later on 
presented to the assembly for general discussions. 
 
7.1 Political Parties in the Constitutional Assembly 
Muslim League was the strongest party in the constitutional assembly. This party was 
established in 1906 and was originally named as All India Muslim League. After 
independence, it was named as Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in 1948. In Pakistan 
Muslim League commanded the majority for longest span of time (Ahmad, 1970, 
136ff). Since Muslim League’s reason of creation and existence was to provide a 
platform for Muslims so after independence it had no specific party manifesto. All it 
had as a party manifesto was the vague statements already present in Objective 
Resolutions
35
 e.g. protection of fundamental rights, minority rights, ensuring peace 
etc. After the independence Muslim League became a party of the elites and its 
membership was mostly held by landlords (especially in West Pakistan). Muslim 
League enjoyed the power which its members held in an agrarian society of Pakistan. 
The party won many elections from West Pakistan because of the hold of landlords 
and was not so successful in East Pakistan because in East Pakistan it did not enjoy 
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Dawn, 8
th
 July 1955. 
34
CAD: 9
th
 Jan 1956 (as admitted by the Law Minister himself in his speech) 
35
Objective Resolutions was the first constitutional report that was unanimously accepted by all factions 
of society (1949).  The reason could also be that Objectives Resolution did not affect any part of 
society and stipulated only policy directions. It contained provisions that only directed what must 
ideal constitution do for society e.g. bring peace and tranquility, promote Islam, protect fundamental 
rights etc. The full text is available as the annex in Constitution of 1973 Pakistan and it’s gist is 
reproduced in the preamble of the current constitution. 
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this support. In second constitutional assembly, out of 40 seats from East Pakistan 
Muslim League only won one seat. From West Pakistan however it was in majority. 
 
United Front was second largest political party in the assembly. It had 16 members. 
Since Muslim League was not in complete majority in the national assembly/CAP, it 
had to create a coalition with someone. United Front with its 16 members and Awami 
League with its 13 members, both could be candidates for making a coalition to run 
the government (Ahmad, 1970, 148ff). However because of some issues with Awami 
League, PML made an alliance with United Front. Before aligning with PML, United 
Front had joined hands with Awami League in 1953 before the upcoming elections. 
For the uplift of province of East Pakistan they had made a compromise named 21 
point formula
36
. After the elections, United Front joined hands with Muslim League 
and ran the coalition government (amidst the constant allegations and criticism from 
Awami League to have forgotten the 21 points and not doing enough for East 
Pakistan). 
 
United Front itself was nothing but a compromise between several small parties. The 
main party behind the United Front was Krishak Sramik Party. It was founded as 
Krishak Praja Party 1927, by Mr AK Fazlul Haq (Ahmad, 1970, 148ff). Mr Fazlul 
Huq was the oldest member of the assembly and had a law degree. He was a seasoned 
politician who led his party by his magnetic personality. He was known for his 
canvassing and campaigning abilities and his target group of society was of peasants 
and farmers. This class had its own problems like indebtedness and of being very 
down trodden.  The party went into oblivion for some time and re-organized itself as  
Krishak Sramik party in 1953. While Krishak Praja meant “peasant’’ Krishak Sramik 
meant “peasants and workers’’. The name change was interesting in the sense that it 
relates to the masses that the party catered. Before partition the province was mostly 
agrarian so the name of the party related to the peasant. After independence when the 
province became a little industrialized the party catered both to workers and the 
farmers. In both cases it is evident that unlike Muslim League it was a party that 
related itself to middle and lower classes of the society. However its manifesto did not 
                                                 
36
The complete text of 21-Point formula can be found in Dawn, Karachi, 20th Dec 1953. 
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contain any serious provisions how it planned to bring change in the life of a common 
man of Bengal (Ahmad, 1970, 164). The party stood for establishment of socialism, 
abolition of landlord system (without giving compensation), nationalism etc.  
 
At the time of constitution-making Nizam-e-Islam party was a part of United Front 
and also of 21 point agreement. This party was very strict against secularism. Word 
“Nizam” itself means the “system’’ and this party wanted the Islamic system to prevail 
in Pakistan. Almost all its members in CAP were educated in local Islamic 
Madrassahs and belonged to middle or lower middle class in East Pakistan. The party 
was a strong proponent of Islamic constitution. Since apparently demand for Pakistan 
was on the basis of the desire to have a separate homeland for Muslim, it is obvious 
that this party had a strong voice in Assembly. Although very few members of this 
party were in CAP but it was a part of United Front so it could manipulate the 
religious fervor prevalent in country since partition. 
 
Awami League was an important party in the assembly. It held about 13 seats in the 
assembly and almost all the members came from East Pakistan. The word Awami 
itself means belonging to “Awam’’ that means people or commons. This party had 
neither big industrialists nor landlords as members, rather middle class common 
people. The party originated in 1952 from Lahore (West Pakistan) as Jinnah Awami 
Muslim League. It was established by some younger politicians from East Pakistan 
and later on it became stronger in East Pakistan as compared to the West. It was later 
known as Awami League and included the non-Muslims into its memberships. The 
party consisted of some dissenting leaders of Muslim League who had a conflict over 
the choice of leadership and party positions (Ahmad, 1970, 163).  It was a result of the 
initiative taken by Mr Hussain Shaheed Suhrwardy who was the leader of opposition 
in the constitutional assembly in 1956. The main reason for its formation was to 
oppose the policy lines of Muslim League. But despite that it did not have a manifesto 
too different from Muslim League. The major ideology difference between the two 
was that it believed in land reforms and wanted to curtail the landholdings to a certain 
level. It also had certain demands like complete provincial autonomy, acceptance of 
Bengali as a national language and a unicameral government that would hold 
membership on population basis. The party initially tried to establish itself on the 
national level trying to take up the national issues. But later on it was reduced to a 
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communal group raising issues relevant only to Bengal and manipulating communal 
and provincial feelings in the masses. It had charismatic and passionate leaders like 
Sheikh Mujeeb Rehman who was the main person behind the creation of Bangladesh. 
With the United Front it had signed the 21-point formula and its members seemed to 
hold on much of the constitutional debates limited to the demands raised in this 
formula. Awami League as a party overall, wasn’t happy with the constitution and had 
walked out on the third reading of this constitutional bill.  
 
7.2 Rules and procedures 
The assembly created its own rules and procedures which was one of the very first 
tasks that it undertook. 
 
The assembly sessions were headed by the speaker and in his absence by the deputy 
speaker
37
 (Rules 7-12). Both these persons were elected through simple majority 
within the assembly. Speaker had the power to call for the assembly meeting and also 
to adjourn the meeting to a specific date. 
 
Assembly minimum quorum that could constitute a meeting of assembly was 1/3
rd
 of 
total members (Rule-19). The members present would not be ordinarily counted unless 
any member would point out that the number of members is less than necessary. Only 
in that case speaker would call out for counting of members and if not found 
satisfactory then he would adjourn the meeting. It is interesting to note that ruling 
party had more than 35 members while the minimum quorum necessary to conduct the 
business was of 27 members. 
 
There were committees in the assembly just like the first constitutional assembly 
(Rules-63-75). These committees could bring forward motions to steer the discussions 
to a certain issue. Similarly any member could start a discussion by giving proper 
notice. Also every one could propose amendments to such a motion. A member could 
                                                 
37“Rules and Procedures of Constitutional Assembly”: A document secured from archives of National 
Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad.  
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join in the discussion after giving notice to the speaker and speak only when permitted 
to do so (Rule-35 to 39). His time for speech could be curtailed when the speaker 
wished to do so. Speaker could also tell a member to stop if he thought that his speech 
is irrelevant or repetitive. No member could speak twice on a certain issue. It can be 
said that rules were quite strict and could be used by speaker in his own discretion. 
 
Normally the reports on discussion would be available to members only (Rule-41). 
Only when there were meetings open to public then the reports would be released to 
press and public. When a bill (e.g constitutional bill) was passed and accepted in the 
assembly it was officially released in government’s magazines. The record of such 
reports is not available anymore. 
 
The official languages in the assembly were Urdu and English (Rule-29). Later on 
Bengali was also added as an official language (CAD, 17
th
 Jan, 1956). 
 
As far as the constitutional or legislative business was concerned, a bill could be 
proposed by any member in the assembly (Rules-44 & 45). There had to be three 
readings of the bill. First would only consist of discussion on general principles of the 
bill and no one was allowed to go into the specifics (Rule-48). The speaker could use 
his right to curtail the discussions if he thought a member was going too deep into the 
bill. After this reading the bill could be channelled for either second reading or to a 
select committee for further drafting (Rule-49 to 58). It was also possible to send the 
bill for drawing opinion from public through general referendum. Public had a right of 
opinion if majority of members decided in favour of a referendum (Rule-47
38
). In the 
second reading the bill was discussed in depth (Rule-48) and members could propose 
amendments. In the third reading the bill would be read clause by clause (Rule-59) and 
finally passed. 
 
According to Rule 30 of the rules and procedures of constitutional assembly, members 
voted on the bill by voice. Once the speaker (chairman) presented the bill for voting, 
                                                 
38
 An option of referendum was available but was not used despite the opposition’s demands, as evident 
from constitutional assembly debates. The ruling factions emphasized the importance of passing the 
constitutional bill quickly and the referendum would have delayed it. Due to non-agreement in the 
assembly over this issue, a referendum never took place for the Constitution of 1956.   
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members shouted Ayes or Noes. Whatever voice seemed stronger the speaker would 
accept or reject the motion accordingly. 
 
If there was a doubt or both voices seemed equally strong then members had a right to 
demand counting of votes (subject to agreement by speaker)
39
. Members supporting 
Ayes and Noes would rise in their seats turn by turn, the votes would be counted and 
speaker (Chairman) would announce the decision. This would yield the number of 
votes and only the numbers will appear in the records of assembly. The names of the 
members supporting or rejecting the motion will not be named thus providing a little 
bit of confidentiality (this presented a difficulty in data collection). Since the 
proceedings were open for public and the newspapers, some names can still be found 
in the newspapers but complete lists for empirical research purposes is unavailable.  
The third option was termed as division, if members had still a bit of doubt and 
disagreement, then they could demand division. Speaker would call out for members 
to walk towards the right end of the hall or left respectively for Ayes or Noes. Then 
the members on both sides will be counted and names put in the record. Only this 
mode yielded reliable lists of names which can be used for research purposes. But this 
mode took time and agreement by speaker was necessary, thus not used very often. 
 
This chapter provided us with the basic knowledge of our case study to go on to our 
next chapters. Without this knowledge it would not be possible to understand the 
dynamics involved in constitution-making. It covered the general information about 
Pakistan, its territories, political and economic conditions. All this information is very 
important to understand the analyses provided in further chapters. 
  
                                                 
39
 Rule 30(3) states‚‘‘Votes may be taken by voices or divison and shall be taken by division if any 
member so desires” As seen in the CAD the division was the only mode which made the counting of 
votes possible. 
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1 Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the individual units of our research i.e. members of the 
constitutional assembly. The 80 members of assembly were all prominent people of 
their constituencies. Due to bad record keeping in the country, most of these details 
are lost in time. In addition, many details have been deliberately obscured because of 
the fact that many of these members (specially belonging to East Pakistan) supported 
the formation of Bangladesh. History of Pakistan was purged from the account of their 
contributions by declaring them traitors. Though we were not able to find detailed 
history for most of them. We did gather a lot of information for our own research’s 
sake. This chapter sums up our field data collection as well as gives a compiled 
information that could be used by researchers (be it in areas of political science, 
history, constitutional history etc). Though gathered by painstaking effort from 
multiple sources, the main document is an old type-written booklet that has never 
been published
40
 and for this reason maybe never consulted. Though we give extra 
information about the members wherever possible, but the main focus is on the 
variables that we need for our research. 
 
2 Members of East Pakistan 
2.1 Abdul Aleem41 
A lawyer by profession, Abdul Aleem was born at Comilla in 1906. Initially he 
practiced law in Alipur Court at Calcutta. But later on, he joined the Calcutta High 
Court Bar in 1937.  He held several administrative positions in provincial government 
before Pakistan came into being. 
 
At the time of constitution making he was 50 years of age and was an advocate in 
High Court of Dacca. He was elected to East Pakistan provincial assembly on the 
                                                 
40
 As stated by the incharge of the archives. 
41
Almost all the data given in this chapter has been taken from a rare document retrieved from National 
Assembly of Pakistan. It was an old typewritten document that gave short information on the 
members of the then National Assembly. This being the main source, extra information has been 
referenced where used accordingly. 
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United Front Ticket. He belonged to Krishak Sramik Party since 1954 and this party 
became a part of the United Front later on. 
 
2.2 Abdul Karim 
Mr Abdul Karim was born in Tippera District of Bengal. His college education was 
received from Comilla at Victoria College in 1923. After college, he completed his 
law degree from Calcutta University in 1928 and practiced as a lawyer at Chandpur. 
His political life started from Congress. But after a few years he quit Congress. In 
1937, he joined Muslim League in its struggle for Pakistan.  
 
After Pakistan came into being, he stayed with Muslim League for a few years and in 
1953 he renounced his allegiance to Muslim League. He was then elected to the 
constitutional assembly on United Front ticket.  
 
2.3 Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
Muhammad Abdul Khaleque was born in 1911 and was 45 years old at the time of 
constitution-making. When he first started politics he joined All India Congress but 
later on joined Muslim League in 1946.   
 
After the independence of Pakistan, he joined Awami League. He was President of the 
Jessore District Awami League. In the elections of 1954 he was elected to the 
provincial legislature of East Pakistan from where he was elected indirectly to 
Constitutional Assembly. He was a lawyer by profession.  
 
2.4 Al Haj Abdul Wahab Khan 
Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan was born in 1898 in the village of Rahmatpur in the Barisal 
District. He got his law degree from the Calcutta University in 1921. Later, he joined 
the Barisal Bar to practice as a lawyer. Soon he established an impressive name in his 
field.  
 
He served at several executive posts. For example he was Assistant Public Prosecutor 
for two decades. He was also vice-Chairman of Barisal District Board for about six 
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years, and Chairman for 12 years. He also served as the Commissioner of the Bansal 
Municipality for three terms. At the time of constitution-making he was President of 
the District School Board. 
 
He was elected to provincial assembly of Bengal in 1937 on Krishak Praja party ticket. 
However he later joined the Muslim League in 1946 and then again changed his 
allegiance to United Front. He belonged specifically to Nizam-i-Islam wing of United 
Front. He won the elections to the East Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1954 on 
United Front ticket. He had done great deal of work in the field of education. He was 
founder of many educational institutes and madrassahs. He was one of the religious 
ulemas in the assembly and his opinion held weight in the religious discussions in 
assembly.  
 
2.5 Abdur Rahman Khan 
Mr Abdur Rahman Khan was born in 1906 in Brahmanbaria, sub-division of Tippera 
District. He was a lawyer by profession and held government posts in relation with his 
profession e.g. served as Public Prosecutor. He also had an important presence in 
lawyers unions etc. 
 
In addition to this, Mr Abdur Rahman Khan held executive posts in local government. 
At provincial government level, he participated much later. He joined his District’s 
Awami League on its inception in 1948 and rose from the ranks to be elected to 
Provincial Assembly in 1954. He was a staunch provincialist and was proponent of 
Bengali as a national language. He was jailed for his political activities in 1952 and 
then again in 1954 under section 92-A. He was also supporter of peasant movements 
and spoke freely against landlordism.  
 
2.6 Abdus Sattar 
Abdus Sattar was born in 1905 in West Bengal in the district of Bhirbum.  He was a 
lawyer by profession and was associated with Alipur Court at Calcutta.  After Pakistan 
came into being he moved to Dacca and joined Dacca High Court in 1950. 
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2.7 Abul Mansur Ahmad 
Abul Mansur Ahmad was born in 1898 in village Dhanikhola of District Mymensingh. 
He graduated from Dacca College in 1921. Then he secured his Law Degree from the 
Calcutta University in 1928. He joined Mymensingh Bar right after he graduated from 
the university. His law practice was quite successful and was his major source of 
income. 
 
Professionally he was also a journalist. He started his journalism career in 1922 and 
was a well known name in Calcutta. He was associated with daily newspapers named 
Sultan, Mussalman, Ittehad and weekly papers named Khadim and Mohammadi. 
 
Politically he started out with Krishak Praja Party in 1936 and then changed his 
allegiance to Muslim League in 1947. After establishment of Pakistan, he joined the 
Awami League party of his district and was then elected to provincial assembly in 
1954 on Awami League ticket. 
 
2.8 Adeluddin Ahmad 
He was born in Kalinagar, a sub-division of District Faridpur in year 1913. At the time 
of constitution-making he was 43 years old. He graduated from Rajendra College 
Faridpur in 1936. He was a lawyer by profession and received his law degree from 
Calcutta University in 1940. Afterwards he started his law practice in Faridpur. Soon 
he became quite famous as a lawyer.  
 
Once his law practice was established, he started indulging in politics. He started out 
under Muslim League banner in 1943 (Khan, 1960, 548). Initially he started at a 
district level, and later reached the provincial level of Muslim League. When Awami 
League was established, he joined Awami League right away and was elected to the 
provincial assembly. 
 
2.9 Chaudary Mohammad Ali 
Mr Mohammad Ali was born in 1905 in Jallunder city of Indian Punjab. He obtained 
his early education from Lahore and then obtained Masters of Science degree from 
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University of Punjab. After completing his education, he joined Islamia College 
Lahore as lecturer of Chemistry. Later on he joined the central services of India in 
Audit and Accounts department. After several years of government service, he was 
chosen as the Finance Minister and then later on the Prime minister. At the time of the 
constitution-making, he was the Prime minister and belonged to Muslim League. He 
was able to win from East Pakistan, the only Muslim League seat. 
 
2.10 Ataur Rahman Khan 
Mr Ataur Rahman Khan was born in 1907. His birthplace was Balia, a village of 
Dacca district. He graduated from the Dacca University and got a law degree in 1936 
from the same university. 
 
He started his law practice in Dacca courts and served on several executive posts at 
local administrative level. He started his political career with Muslim League but 
changed his allegiance to align with Awami League in 1949. He was quite an active 
member of Awami League and even performed as an acting president in time of need. 
He was elected to constitutional assembly on the ticket of Awami League as well. 
 
2.11 Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
One of the prominent religious scholars in the constitutional assembly, Mr Ali enjoyed 
quite a clout in the assembly. He believed in religious education and an Islamic 
constitution.  
 
He was born in 1896 in village Ghungadia of district Sylhet. He started his education 
in a local religious school but then moved to other cities to pursue higher religious 
education in different institutes. Most prominent of which was Madrassah Deoband. 
After he completed his education he came back to his home town, and started teaching 
at the local religious schools in Sylhet. Not only he was associated with several 
religious educational institutes but also built a famous mosque (Shaheedi Mosque). He 
was basically less of a politician and more of a religious zealot. Initially his passion 
was to save Turkish Khilafat. Then his political activities were focused on creating 
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Pakistan. After Pakistan came into being, he started focusing on Nizam-i-Islam 
movement. This political party was established to promote Islamic system in Pakistan.  
 
Since Nizam-i-Islam party was a part of United Front, he won the elections of 1954 on 
United Front ticket.  
 
2.12 Gour Chandra Bala 
He was one of the Hindu members of the constitutional assembly belonging to 
Scheduled Caste Federation. He was one of the younger members, born in 1927 in 
village Ullabari in district Faridpur. He was only 29 years old when he became 
member of constitutional assembly. He started actively participating in politics in 
1946 and won the provincial assembly elections in 1954. Professionally he was a 
teacher in the local high school of Faridpur. 
 
2.13 Canteswar Barman 
Mr Canteswar Barman was also a Hindu member belonging to the political party of 
Congress.  He was 60 when he became member of constitutional assembly. He was an 
ex-army man and a local politician.   
 
2.14 Abdul Latif Biswas 
He was born in village Sonakandar of Dacca district in 1897. Professionally he was a 
lawyer and obtained his law degree from Calcutta University after obtaining 
graduation from Dacca University. He established a good law practice locally. 
 
Like most politicians of his time, he also started involvement in politics through 
Muslim League which he joined and quit a few times. However in the constitutional 
assembly he was elected on United Front ticket specifically Krishak Sramik party. He 
was quite an active and prominent member of this party. He helped in establishing this 
party and also he was the general secretary of the party when he became a member of 
constitutional assembly. He also served as a provincial minister for some time. 
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2.15 Mohammad Nurul Huq Chaudhury 
A prominent lawyer and politician, Mr Mohammad Nurul Huq Chaudhury was 60 
years of age in 1956. He was born in Chittagong district and that is where he 
established his constituency for later elections. He obtained his law degree and 
established his legal practice in Burma for sometime. Later on when he came to India 
he started participating in politics under the banner of Swarajya party. 
 
In 1916 he joined Muslim League and became quite prominent in local politics of 
Bengal. 
 
2.16 Hamidul Huq Choudhury  
He was born in Noakhali in 1903. He did his bachelors from Presidency College and 
his law degree from Calcutta University. He also established his law practice in 
Calcutta and was an advocate of High Court of Calcutta. 
 
He had a very prominent political and professional career. He was member of boards 
of multiple law colleges and also a member of several executive boards. He was 
elected in 1947 to the first constitutional Assembly of Pakistan. He also served as a 
provincial minister from East Pakistan. He was again elected to second constitutional 
assembly of Pakistan on behalf of United Front. 
 
2.17 Yosuf Ali Chudhury 
Commonly known in history as “Mohan Mian’’, Mr Yosuf Ali Chudhury was born in 
Faridpur district in 1905. Not being able to gain much education, he entered politics at 
a very early age. Soon he started participating in several movements like Non-
Cooperation and Khilafat as early as in 1920’s. He was also very popular in his area 
for his philanthropic activities. A first he joined the Krishak Praja party of Mr Fazlul 
Huq but later shifted to Muslim League to support cause of Pakistan. In 1954 however 
he was elected to constitutional assembly on United Front ticket. 
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He was a big landlord of the area belonging to a very rich family. He worked for 
social causes and provided shelter to homeless. He was also founder of a newspaper 
named Millat. 
 
2.18 Akshay Kumar Das  
A Hindu Scheduled Caste Federation member, Mr Akshay Kumar Das was born in 
Sylhet in 1903. Professionally he was a lawyer having a well established practice in 
Sunanganj. He started his political career with Scheduled Castes Federation 
Constituency of Assam District. He kept returning to government in several elections. 
When Pakistan was formed, his district Sylhet was added to Pakistan so he 
automatically became member of East Pakistan legislative assembly and also became 
member of first constitutional assembly. In the second constituent assembly he was 
elected again from the same political party. 
 
2.19 Basanta Kumar Das 
Mr Basanta Kumar Das, commonly known as BK - Das was born in Sylhet district in 
1883. He was a lawyer with a well established practice in Sylhet.  
 
He started participating in politics from the forum of political party of Congress. He 
participated in Civil Disobedience and Non-Cooperation movements. He became a 
member of legislative assembly of Assam and was elected as the speaker of the 
assembly. He performed as speaker for several years before becoming the home 
minister for the State of Assam in 1946. He was 73 years old when he became a 
member of constitutional assembly. In constitutional assembly he was part of the 
ruling coalition with Muslim League. But he had won the elections on Congress ticket. 
 
2.20 A.H Deldar Ahmed  
Mr A.H Deldar Ahmed was born in 1911. By profession he was a lawyer and 
practiced at Khulna Bar and Dacca High Court.  
 
He started politics through the forum of Muslim League but later joined Awami 
League. He became quite an active member of Awami League. 
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2.21 Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
Mr Bhupendra Kumar Dutta was born in village Thakurpur of Jessore disctrict in year 
1894. When he was hardly 20 years old, he was arrested for Indo-German conspiracy 
case. At that time he was a student of bachelors in Calcutta University. He stayed in 
various prisons of India and Burma for 23 years. 
 
He was an elected member of the first constitutional assembly and was also member 
of second constitutional assembly on United Front/Congress ticket.  
 
2.22 Kamini Kumar Dutta 
Mr Kamini Kumar Dutta was born in Tippera district in 1878. He was a lawyer by 
profession and did his law degree from Dacca College. He joined the Bar at Comilla 
and practiced law for several years. He also was an advocate in Calcutta High Court 
and Dacca High Court after the partition of India. 
 
He started participating in politics from the forum of Congress as early as in 1900. He 
remained associated with All India Congress till 1947 when he formulated a new 
political party named Pakistan Gana Samiti. It formed the minorities United Front and 
was a part of the national United Front. Mr KK Dutta was elected to both first and 
second constitutional assemblies of Pakistan. 
 
He held several executive posts at district and provincial levels. In 1956 he was health 
minister for the center
42
. He was an educationist too and founded a college named 
Srikail in Tippera district. 
 
2.23 Farid Ahmad 
Mr Farid Ahmad commonly known in history as Maulvi Farid was a prominent 
religious scholar in the constitutional assembly. Though he was only 33 at the time of 
constitution-making in Pakistan, his opinions on religious matter carried considerable 
weight. 
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Monitoring Reports of All India Radio, Jan 30, 1956 (available from National Archives of Pakistan). 
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He belonged to Chittagong district and was born in 1923. He obtained a Masters 
degree in English Language and also a Law degree. His main profession though was 
of being a lawyer. He was associated with Bar of Cox’s Bazaar. He also served in 
government service and was a teacher of English language. Politically he belonged to 
Nizam-i-Islam party and was a proponent of Islamic constitution. 
 
2.24 Sardar Fazlul Karim 
One of the younger members of constitutional assembly, he was only 32 years old in 
1956 as he was born in Barisal district in 1924. He did his Bachelors and Master in 
Philosophy from Dacca University. Then he joined lecturership in the same university. 
Only after 2 years into his academic career he was arrested and detained for six years. 
He only got released in 1955. Later he contested the elections and was elected to the 
constituent assembly. He was elected as an independent candidate. 
 
2.25 Fazlur Rahman 
Mr Fazlur Rahman was born in 1905 in Dacca which was his home town and 
constituency. First he did his Masters from Dacca University and then completed the 
law degree from the same university. He practiced as a lawyer in Dacca for some time. 
He was closely associated with Dacca University and was a member of University 
boards.  
 
He got elected from the university constituency to the provincial assembly of Bengal 
in 1937 and then again in 1946. Initially he started his political career from the 
platform of Muslim League but later on resigned from its membership. In the second 
constituent assembly he was an independent candidate. He was an important political 
figure and remained minister for several portfolios in his public career. 
 
2.26 Peter Paul Gomez 
Mr Peter Paul Gomez was a Christian member of constituent assembly. He was born 
in 1918 in a small village of district Dacca. 
 
100 
 
He had a Bachelors degree from Dacca University and worked as an insurance agent 
in a Life Insurance company. He was dismissed from his job on the reason of union 
activities. He was later reinstated on his job. He participated in politics under the 
banner of Congress and was elected to constituent assembly on Congress ticket. 
 
2.27 Lutfur Rahman Khan 
He was born in 1911 in district Mymensingh. He did his Bachelors from Islamia 
College Calcutta. He joined government service in police department but later 
resigned. Then he started his own business and established a chemical factory. He 
started politics as a student leader and later on joined Krishak Praja party. He was 
initially elected to the provincial assembly of Bengal and later on elected to 
constituent assembly of Pakistan on United Front’s ticket. 
 
2.28 Mahfuzul Huq 
He was born in 1901 in Chittagong district. He entered the government service as a 
sub-registrar and retired with grace. Afterwards he joined politics and was elected to 
the constituent assembly on the United Front ticket. 
 
2.29 Mahmud Ali 
Mr Mahmud Ali belonged to Sylhet and was 37 years old in 1956 (Mahmood, 1998, 
859). He did his bachelors from MC Collge Sylhet. 
He started participating in politics as a student leader. Later on he joined Muslim 
League but resigned on the issue of Bengali language in 1952. He was a firebrand 
leader and held an appeal for the younger population of Bengal. He was president of 
East Pakistan Youth League. He was an active member, convener and general 
secretary of Ganatantri Dal. 
 
2.30 Rasa Raj Mandal 
Mr Rasa Raj Mandal was a Hindu member of the Scheduled Castes Federation in the 
constituent assembly. He was born in a village of district Dacca and was 41 years old 
at the time of constitutional discussions. 
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His constituency was from Dacca Scheduled Castes Federation. He was General 
Secretary of East Pakistan Scheduled Castes Federation and president of the party in 
Dacca district. 
 
2.31 Syed Misbahuddin Hussain 
He was born in 1891 in a small village in district Mymensingh.  First he did his 
bachelors from Calcutta University and then his law degree from the same university. 
He practiced law in Calcutta bar and became quite a well known lawyer of his area.  
 
2.32 Muslim Ali Molla 
Mr Muslim Ali Molla was born in Rajshahi District in 1893. Professionally he was a 
businessman and started his business when he was as young as 15 years old. That is 
why he did not attain much education and did not have a formal degree.  
 
He was elected to provincial assembly of East Pakistan on Awami League ticket and 
also maintained his allegiance in Constituent assembly. 
 
2.33 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
Mr Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was 33 year old when he got elected to the constitutional 
assembly. He was one of the younger energetic politicians of Awami League. He 
belonged to Faridpur district and started participating in politics at a very young age. 
He did his bachelors from Calcutta University
43
but was unable to continue further 
education because he was expelled from the university on political grounds 
(Mahmood, 1998, 82). 
 
He started out on the platform of Muslim League before 1947 when he must be hardly 
in his twenties. He became quite famous in Sylhet referendum. He was a leader of the 
youth and founded Muslim Students League. After Pakistan came into being he got 
involved in language issues and was jailed for his activities in 1948. He was a law 
student then and was expelled from the law course because of his political activism. 
                                                 
43
Internet Resource: Virtual Bangladesh; A biography of Mujib. 
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2.34 Muzaffar Ahmad 
Mr Muzaffar Ahmad belonged to Chittagong district and was born in 1908. He was a 
government servant in Railways department. Later on he quit Railways and joined the 
Civic Guards as commandant of his district. He joined Muslim League in 1944 and 
soon became an important name at his district level. In 1949 however he quit Muslim 
League to join the newly rising party Awami League. He was also a writer and wrote a 
book named Banglar Patan.  
 
2.35 Nurur Rahman 
Mr Nurur Rahman was born in 1921 in Sylhet district. As with most other politicians 
of that time he joined Muslim League in 1946 at a young age of 24. After Pakistan 
came into being, he shifted his political affiliations to the nascent Awami League in 
1950. Due to his political activities he was quite many times in conflict with the law 
and was imprisoned. After several imprisonments he was finally released in 1954 and 
got elected to the constitutional assembly. He was a business man/merchant by 
profession. 
 
2.36 A.K Fazlul Huq 
Mr Fazlul Huq was born in 1873 in district Barisal. He attained his early education 
from his home town Barisal. After his high school, he went to Calcutta Presidency 
College for Bachelors. He did his masters in Mathematics from the same university 
and also obtained the law degree.  
 
He was a man of many talents. He was a professor at Rajchandra College and also a 
practicing lawyer. He established his legal practice in Calcutta as well. He was also a 
journalist and edited the newspapers named Balak and Suhrid. 
 
He was a charismatic and a seasoned politician. He was a member of Muslim League 
from its early years and was a very active member. For 5 years in the League’s early 
years he remained president of All India Muslim League. He started his own political 
party in 1927 and named it Krishak Praja Party. Afterwards however he sided with 
Muslim League for a few years till partititon. Later on, he re-established his party in 
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Pakistan and called it Krishak Sramik Party. This party was a part of the major 
parliamentary party, the United Front. He was also the president of United Front at the 
time of Constitution-making. 
 
2.37 Dr S.K.Sen 
Mr Sailendra Kumar Sen was born in 1897 in district Dacca. He was a doctor by 
profession and had attained his degree of medicine from Calcutta Medical College. He 
worked in the government sector for some time but soon left it to establish his own 
practice in Dacca. 
 
He later joined Dacca National Medical College and was soon given the position of 
professor of surgery. This institute was a non-recognized (non-governmental) institute 
where he served for 10 precious years during non-cooperation movement,  showing 
his active interest in politics. 
 
He was also a philanthropist. He was actively involved with the homeless shelters, 
orphan homes and Hindu widows etc. He was elected to the assembly on the ticket of 
Progressive party. 
 
2.38 H.S Suhrawardy 
Mr Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy was the leader of opposition and an important 
spokesman in the assembly. 
 
He was born in Midnapur in 1893. Despite his very secular beliefs in assembly he was 
educated initially at a madarsaah in Calcutta. He studied in St Xavier College 
afterwards. Then he received his Masters and Law degree from Oxford University. He 
was called to Bar at Grey’s Inn. 
 
He was quite an active political figure at district level of Calcutta. Later he became 
quite active at the province level and held several portfolios. After the partition of 
India he became active with Awami League and was a convener and organizer of 
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Jinnah Awami League. He was elected to he constituent assembly on ticket of Awami 
League. 
 
2.39 Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish was born in 1900. He was 55 years of age at the 
time of constitution-making. He came from district Pabna. He was not very educated 
as he left formal school to join political movements like Khilafat and Non-
Cooperation. Later on he joined the famous religious school of Deoband and attained 
religious education.  
 
Politically he was associated with Muslim League in early years but later on joined 
Awami League. He was also the chief preacher of Jamiat-e-Ulmae Hind (literally 
meaning group of religious scholars of India). He also had active involvement in 
movements like language movement and also Kisan (literal translation as Farmer) 
movements. In the constitutional assembly he was elected on the ticket of Awami 
League. 
 
2.40 Zahiruddin 
Mr Zahiruddin was born in 1917 in Calcutta. By profession he was a lawyer, with a 
good practice established in Dacca. He started his political career with Muslim League 
but later on switched to Awami League since the formation of the party. 
 
3 Members of West Pakistan 
3.1 Mr Malik Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon 
Mr Malik Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon was born in 1893. He belonged to Lahore and 
got his early education from Lahore’s famous Aitchison College. Later he moved to 
England to receive his higher education from Wadham College Oxford. He had a 
degree in Law and was called to Bar from Inner Temple London. 
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He became involved in politics in 1920’s when he got elected to the legislature of 
Punjab, his native state. He was also an appointed member of Governor General’s 
council and visited America and Canada to explain India’s role in World War II. He 
also represented India in War Cabinet. 
 
After Pakistan came into being, he played a significant role in politics. He belonged to 
Muslim League and served in various roles e.g. Governor of East Bengal and Chief 
minister of Punjab. He was a member of constitutional assembly both in the first and 
second assemblies. 
 
Mr Noon, as commonly known, was also a writer and authored four books. A novel 
named Scented Dust about India, an administrative comparative case study known as 
Canada and India, another descriptive book called India and a children’s book named 
Wisdom From Fools. 
 
3.2 Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana 
Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana was a famous landlord and political leader 
of the Punjab state of Pakistan. He was born in 1916 in Wihari, Punjab (Mahmood, 
1998, 491). 
 
He did his bachelors from the Punjab University having History as majors. After 
wards he obtained his law degree from UK and studied at Corpus Christi College at 
Oxford. He also did his Masters from the Oxford University. 
 
He became politically active in 1940’s when he joined Muslim League. He got elected 
to Punjab’s legislative assembly in 1943. His constituency was rural areas of Sialkot, a 
small city in Pakistani Punjab. He was a close associate of Mr Jinnah and was 
appointed by him to All India Muslim League Committee of Action in 1946. He was 
elected to the first constituent assembly in 1946 and also stayed as a member in the 
second assembly.  
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After Pakistan came into being, he stayed as a staunch member of Muslim League and 
even became its president for some time. He also served as the Finance Minister and 
also as chief minister of Punjab. 
 
3.3 Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Kizilbash 
As the word ‘Nawab’ in itself means a landlord, Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Kizilbash 
was a landlord belonging to Lahore. His family Kizilbash family was an old and 
traditional landlord family.  
 
Mr Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Kizilbash was born in 1908 in Lahore. He graduated 
from Lahore from Punjab University and then moved to UK for further studies. He did 
his law degree from Cambridge University and practiced law for some time in 
England. In 1936, he came back to India and also got elected to Punjab Assembly in 
1936. 
 
He joined Muslim League in 1947 when invited by Mr Jinnah and stayed as its 
member for a long time. 
 
3.4 Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
Also known as Peer Lal Badshah, he was a popular political leader as well as ‘Peer’44 
of Mukhad.  He was 47 years old at the time of constitution-making. 
 
3.5 Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani 
Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani was born in 1905. As previously said, the word  
“Nawab’’ means a vast estate owner. He sure was a very well established landlord and 
was very well off. His initial education was obtained through private tuitions but later 
on took admission in M.A.O College Aligarh for Masters.  
 
                                                 
44
A  “Peer”  in Indian sub-continent is a highly respected person who is believed to have spiritual 
powers. 
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3.6 Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti  
Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti was born in 1895 in Muzaffargarh. Word  “Sardar’ 
means a leader or a chief. Mr Dasti was a chief of clan named Dasti in Muzaffarrgarh. 
 
He was a politician, a lawyer and a philanthropist. He studied from different colleges 
all renowned in their own capacity e.g. Islamia College, Government College, and 
Law College Lahore. He practiced law in his home town Muzaffargarh. He was 
founder of a religious institution to help the plight of poor and orphan students. 
 
Politically, he was a member of Muslim League and joined the Punjab legislative 
assembly on Muslim League ticket for the first time in 1945. He served as minister in 
many governments and was also chief minister of Punjab for some time. 
 
3.7 Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
Also known commonly as Col Abid Hussain, Mr Shah was born in 1915 in the city of 
Jhang, Punjab, Pkaistan. 
 
He had some formal education from Aitchison College, Government College and FC 
College Lahore. However due to some reasons he was unable to get a formal degree
45
. 
 
Professionally he was a landlord and owned vast lands and farms in Jhang. He also 
owned a horse farm in Jhang. His estate exists till today and is very well established. 
He joined Indian military service for some time and then got released to participate in 
elections of 1945. He got elected to Central legislature. He was then again elected to 
Punjab assembly after partition in 1951. 
 
3.8 I.I Chundrigar 
Mr Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar was born in 1897 (Khan, 1960, 106).  He had a very 
shining academic career at the Bombay University. He did his law degree from 
Bombay University. He commenced his law practice in Ahmedabad. Later on he 
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shifted his practice to Bombay High Court. He was associated with several social 
agencies and was involved with many educational institutes. 
 
3.9 Chaudri Muhammad Hussain Chatta 
Chaudri Muhammad Hussain Chatta was born in September 1914 at Sheikhupura. He 
did his bachelors from Government College Lahore and then obtained his law degree 
from Law College Lahore. 
 
He entered politics when he was very young and was a college student. He was also 
jailed for some time because of his anti-British political movements. He joined the 
provincial assembly of Punjab after winning the elections of 1951 from his home town 
constituency. 
 
3.10 Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
Mr Sardar Azim Khan was a minister at the time of first and second constitutional 
assembly. He belonged to Gujrat (a small city in Punjab) and was born in October 
1914. He received his early education from Punjab and then moved to Agra to 
complete graduation in Arts and Law. He also did masters from the same university.  
 
He entered politics in 1936 when he joined Muslim League. Soon he became a 
prominent and active member. After partition he settled in a city of Punjab named 
Rawalpindi and did a great deal of work for the refugees. He became a prominent 
name in the area with all his relief work. 
 
3.11 Soofi Abdul Hameed Khan 
Soofi Abdul Hameed Khan was born in 1900 in Karnal District (now in India). He was 
educated in Bahawalpur in Sadiq Egerton College. Then he received informal 
trainings in public affairs from the Prime Minister of Bahawalpur state. 
 
He started taking part in politics in 1926 from Karnal district. Later he got elected to 
Punjab provincial assembly in 1946 on Muslim League ticket. He also got elected as a 
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member of Pakistan’s first and second constituent assemblies. He was a social worker, 
doing a great deal of work for refugees coming into Pakistan. 
 
3.12 Chaudry Aziz Din 
Mr Din belonged to Lyallpur, a small city in the state of Punjab. By profession he was 
a lawyer. He was elected to the constitutional assembly on behalf of Muslim League. 
 
3.13 Khan Iftikhar Hussain (Khan of Mamdot) 
He was born in 1905 (Mahmood, 1998, 221). He did bachelor from Government 
College Lahore. He was a very prominent landlord of the area. 
 
He was a Muslim League member from Punjab and he also served as President of 
Muslim League for some time. 
 
3.14 Mian Abdul Bari 
Mian Abdul Bari was also from Punjab, belonging to a city named Lyallpur. He was 
born in 1895 (Mahmood, 1998, 646). In the First World War he was imprisoned for 
his political activities and remained jailed for more than a decade. He is not known to 
have a formal degree. He was elected to second constitutional assembly of Pakistan on 
Awami League ticket. 
 
3.15 Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
Mir Balakh Sher Mazari was born in Dera Ghazi Khan District in July 1928. He was 
educated in Lahore from Aitchison’s College. But he did not have a formal degree 
(Mahmood, 1998, 467). 
 
He was chief of Mazari clan and owned vast estates and lands. He was a great 
philanthropist and did a considerable deal of work for students and the poor 
(Mahmood, 1998, 258). Politically his affiliations were with Muslim League and he 
contested the elections to Constituent Assembly on Muslim League ticket. 
 
110 
 
3.16 Malik Amir Mohammad Khan  
Malik Amir Mohammad Khan belonged to Mianwali District of Punjab. He is more 
commonly known as the Khan of Kalabagh. He was an influential leader of his area 
and was a big landlord. He was from Muslim League. He was a graduate of Oxford 
University. 
 
3.17 Mian Mohammad Iftikharuddin 
Mian Mohammad Iftikharuddin was an independent member of the constituent 
assembly. He was a famous landlord and owned vast lands in his area. He belonged to 
Mian family of Baghbanpura (Lahore, Punjab). His early education was from 
Aitchison College. Later on he did Bachelors from Oxford University.  
 
When he returned from England in 1937, he started participating in politics and was 
elected to Punjab assembly on Congress ticket. He stayed with Congress for some 
time and later joined Muslim League in 1945. He again won the election to Punjab 
assembly in 1946 on Muslim League ticket. 
 
He was expelled from Muslim League later on and then he founded his own political 
party in 1950 naming it Azad Pakistan Party. He was a member of both the first and 
the second constitutional assemblies of Pakistan. 
 
3.18 C.E.Gibbon 
Mr C.E.Gibbon was from Punjab. He won the elections to the only non-Muslim seat 
from Punjab. He was a Christian member of the assembly. He won the elections as an 
independent member but later associated himself with Muslim League. 
 
3.19 Mian Jaffer Shah 
Mian Jaffer Shah was born in 1903 in Nowshera. He belonged to one of the most 
respectable families in Nowshera named as ‘‘Kaka Khel Family’’.  
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His initial education was from Islamia College Peshawar. He joined politics early   at 
the age of 16 and joined many political organizations. He had no formal educational 
degree. He was elected to the provincial assembly in 1937 at Congress ticket. 
 
After Pakistan came into being, Mian Jaffer Shah joined Muslim League and 
ironically served as the minister of education in NWFP. He was elected to the 
assembly on Muslim League ticket. 
 
3.20 Mr M.R.Kayani 
M.R.Kayani was born in 1900 in Kohat district of NWFP. He was a student of law in 
Aligarh University when he started participating in politics. 
 
3.21 Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan, commonly known as “Jalal Baba’’, was born in 
Abbottabad (NWFP) in 1903. He left school at an early age to participate in politics. 
Later he started his own transportation business. 
 
He was a staunch Muslim League member from the very beginning. He was also a 
social worker and helped the wounded and the sick in the Kashmir area during the 
unrest after partition. 
 
3.22 Mr M.A.Khuhro 
Mr M.A.Khuhro was a famous landlord of Larkana (Sind). He was born in 1901 in 
Larkana Sind (Mahmood, 1998, 221). 
 
He did his matriculation exam from Sind Madrassah Karachi but later on quit studies 
to manage his lands. After some time he joined politics. He was elected to the 
assembly on Muslim League ticket. 
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3.23 Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi was an eminent journalist of Sind, representing Pakistan in 
many countries. He was an editor of Sind Observer, a daily newspaper published from 
Karachi. He belonged to Muslim League. 
 
3.24 Syed Amjad Ali 
Syed Amjad Ali was born in 1907 in Lahore Pakistan (Mahmood, 1998, 247).
.
 He did 
his bachelors from Government College Lahore. He started his political career from 
Unionist Party but later on switched to Muslim League. In 1946 he was elected to first 
constitutional assembly on Muslim League’s ticket. He was a writer also and authored 
several books including his own biography. 
 
3.25 Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur was born in 1909. His family was Royals of Talpur and was 
very influential. He himself owned vast lands and property. 
 
He was educated in Hyderabad (Sind), Aligarh and Bombay. He had a Bachelors 
degree. He was associated with several organizations e.g. banks, hospitals and 
municipalities etc. He was elected to the assembly on Muslim League ticket. 
 
3.26 Haji Moula Baksh Soomro 
Haji Moula Baksh Soomro was born in Shikarpur district of Sind in 1905. He 
belonged to the family of famous philanthropist and rich landlords. 
 
He started his career as a magistrate and was later elected to the provincial assembly in 
1943. He was a loyal member of Muslim League and was elected to the constitutional 
assembly on Muslim League ticket. 
 
3.27 Mr Siroomal Kirpaldas 
Mr Siroomal Kirpaldas was a Hindu member from Sind. He was born in District 
Nawabshah of Sind in year 1905. He was elected to the provincial assembly for the 
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first time in 1946. He was the leader of a Hindu party in Sind and was elected to the  
assembly on its mandate. Professionally he was a landlord. 
  
3.28 Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
Mr Gillani was 36 at the time of constitution-making. He was one of the younger 
members of Punjab. He belonged to the city Multan and came from a very wealthy 
and prestigious family of the area. 
 
He had a bachelor’s degree from Emerson College, Multan. Later on he entered 
political life from the platform of Muslim League. 
 
3.29 Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
Mr Ghuman belonged to Punjab specifically Sialkot city. He belonged to Muslim 
League. 
 
3.30 Dr Khan Sahib 
Dr Khan Sahib was a seasoned politician from NWFP. His real name was Abdul 
Jabbar Khan and he was born in 1882 in Uttmanzai in N.W.F.P. 
 
His early education was from Peshawar Government High School and Mission 
College in NWFP. Then he moved to London to do his medical degree from St 
Thomas medical college and Hospital. He stayed in London for 11 years (Mahmood, 
1998, 470). After graduation, initially he started his practice from public sector but 
later he established his own private practice. 
 
He joined politics in 1930 when he tried to mobilize the masses to ask for 
independence from British rule. He was made the provincial chief minister in 1945. 
He gained much popularity when he abolished forced labour in the area. He freed 
many laborers from the captivity of big landlords. 
 
3.31 Mr Yusuf A Haroon 
Mr Yusuf A Haroon was the only member from the capital area of Karachi. 
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He was born in Karachi in 1917. His schooling was from St-Patrick’s High School, 
Karachi. He entered political life in 1937 at the young age of 20 when he became the 
President of Sind Muslim league national guards. 
Mr Yusuf A Haroon remained on many important posts within the administration and 
also within the Muslim League party. Being a successful businessman himself, he was 
involved with many labour and trade unions.  
 
3.32 Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
Sradar Abdur Rashid Khan was also a Muslim League member from NWFP. He was 
an ex-civil servant of police department. He retired at the rank of Inspector-General of 
Police. 
 
He was born in 1906 in Dera Ismail Khan. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan received his 
early education from Edward’s College Peshawar and Islamia College Peshawar. Then 
he did Masters from Aligarh University and also obtained law degree from the same 
university in 1929 (Khan, 1960, 15). 
 
3.33 Syed Ahmed Nawaz Shah Gardezi 
Syed Ahmed Shah Nawaz Gardezi was a nominated member of the constituent 
assembly. He was from Bahawalpur nominated by the “Amir’’ (leader) of the 
Bahawalpur. He was in his thirties at the time of constitution-making. 
 
He received his education from the University of Aligarh. He belonged to an old and 
respectable family of Bahawalpur. 
 
3.34 Mian Abdus Salam 
Mian Abdus Salam was also a nominated member of the constitutional assembly. He 
was also nominated by the Amir of Bahawalpur. He was originally from Jallunder city 
of East Punjab (now Indian Punjab). He did bachelors from University of Punjab and 
was then inducted into state services. After starting his political career from Muslim 
League, he later joined Awami League party. 
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3.35 Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Qizilbash 
Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Qizilbash came from Khairpur state. He was elected to the 
constituent assembly by the elections through state legislature. He was also a member 
of the first constituent assembly. He was born in Agra (Utter Pardesh India ) in 1897 
and received his college education from MAO College Aligarh. Later he went to 
Allahabad University and graduated in 1917. 
 
He started his career with joining of provincial services in Utter Pardesh and did a 
great deal of work for the social uplift, agrarian reforms, rural development and relief 
efforts. After Pakistan came into being, he joined central civil services. After 
retirement he joined politics. 
 
3.36 Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
Nawab Mir Bai Khan belonged to Mekran (Baluchistan States Union). He was the 
ruler of Mekran. He was elected to the assembly by Baluchistan States Union. 
 
3.37 Major-General Mohammad Abdul Huq Jahanzeb 
Major-General Mohammad Abdul Huq Jahanzeb was the ruler of state of Swat and 
was born in 1915. He represented the interests of North West Frontier States like 
Chitral, Dhir, Swat and Amb in the constitutional assembly. 
 
He graduated from Islamia College Peshawar. He was a great philanthropist and 
benevolent ruler of the area. He did a lot of work for the area in sense of economic and 
social development. 
 
3.38 K.B Mehrdil Khan 
K.B Mehrdil Khan belonged to the famous Mahsud tribe. He was a leader of the area 
of Waziristan and represented their interests in the assembly. He was elected by the 
tribal advisory council of the area. 
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3.39 Malik Waris Khan 
He was the chief of Malik Din Khel tribe of the Afridis. He was a very important 
leader of the area and was about 40 years of age. He was also elected by the tribal 
advisory council of the area. 
 
3.40 Malik Jahangir Khan 
Malik Jahangir Khan was the leader of “Maddakhel Wazir tribe’’ of North Waziristan. 
He was about 35 years of age. He was also elected by the tribal advisory council of the 
area. 
 
This chapter provided a short description of the biographies of the members of 
constitutional assembly. Each member was an individual unit of analysis for our 
research. These details can be found in the tabular form in Appendix 2. Also the 
various attributes can be found in different tables of chapter IX. 
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1 The First Session of the New Assembly 
1.1 Venue 
The CAP had its first session in on 7
th
 July, 1955. It was held in a small city of Punjab 
named Murree
46
. This city was neither a state capital nor a usual seat for such 
constitutional or legislative sessions (Nawa-e-Waqt, Lahore. 16
th
 June, 1955). Specific 
arrangements had to be made and the members were settled in hotels (Nawa-e-Waqt, 
Lahore.25th May 1955). Other issues like health facilities and clubs for evening 
entertainments were also addressed. Extravagant arrangements had been made in the 
city to make the members’ stay most comfortable. All these arrangements put a lot of 
pressure on the already meagre national exchequer (Civil and Military Gazette, 
Lahore, 23rd June 1955). The venue of the first session was interesting in the sense 
that the members from the West Pakistan were enjoying the city like a tourist spot but 
the members of East Pakistan mostly fell sick because of the weather (Nawa-e-Waqt, 
Lahore. 8th July 1955).  
 
In the very first session the first move by opposition was to change the venue to 
Dacca. Though the proposition was made by Mr Mujeeb, it had the backing of almost 
all the opposition members (Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 8
th
July 1955). Despite 
the efforts of opposition party the ruling Muslim League did not give in. By the end of 
first session there was a unanimous agreement by all members of East Pakistan that 
they wanted the sessions to be moved to Karachi (the capital) which was done later on 
(Nawa-e-Waqt Lahore, 8
th
 July 1955).   
 
No session was held in East Pakistan despite the insistence by many members of East 
Pakistan assembly to take some sessions to Dacca. During the discussions on 
constitution, local elections to provincial assemblies were taking place so many 
members wanted to stay closer to their constituencies thus the venue of the meetings  
stayed an alive issue in the debates.  
 
                                                 
46
It is a hill station and a touristic spot in Punjab (West Pakistan). It is known for its cooler weather and 
attracts many tourists in summer. 
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1.2 The Environment 
Generally speaking about the process of the constitution making, one feels that the 
constitution of Pakistan seemed to be passed in a hurry. First constitutional assembly 
was already dissolved due to the reason that it had failed to produce a constitution. 
Country was in a complete political and constitutional chaos and the masses were  
unhappy with the situation (Jalal, 1991, 194).  
 
The President of the time had already dissolved one assembly and was threatening to 
put all the democratic process on hold if a constitutional settlement was not reached 
soon. This fact was mentioned in the assembly debates as well in as many polite words 
as possible. Another factor was that India had formulated a constitution in 1949 which 
made the absence of a constitutional set up in Pakistan even more glaring
47
. The 
government benches did realize that it was important that the constitution had to be 
finalized regardless of the issues that kept cropping up on daily basis.  
 
On the other hand the opposition members of the assembly wanted to take time and 
tried to use delaying tactics. It is true that they probably did need more time to discuss 
the draft or to feel more involved in the preceding discussions, on the other hand this 
is also true that the country needed a constitution urgently. The delaying efforts of 
opposition are obvious from this fact that the opposition members fought tooth and 
nail to circulate the constitutional draft for public opinion (CAD, 16
th
 Jan, 1956). In a 
country where media, modes of communication, literacy, even a population census, 
i.e. everything that would be relevant for the people to make an informed 
constitutional choice was missing
48
, to demand a public referendum in such a scenario 
can be viewed as a tactic to use rules to one’s own advantage. 
 
                                                 
47
 Indian Constitution was passed in assembly on 26
th
 November 1949 as provided by website of Indian 
government (http://www.india.gov.in/govt/constitutions_india.php). 
48
 Mautner (1992, 3) mentions the Principles of Direct Democracy in which he emaphasizes that public 
should be able to make an informed choice. The public should be informed through debates and other 
means. He also acknowledges the fact that public can be easily manipulated and public debates should 
be objective, balanced and factual. This kind of informed choice cannot be expected to be made in 
Pakistan of 1956 and the members knew it. So on one hand it could be reasonable demand, on the other 
hand a delaying tactic. 
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1.3 The Session 
In the first session Mr Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, a Muslim League member from 
Punjab and a very famous landlord was selected as a Chairman for the interim 
period
49
(till an actual chairman could be elected). 72 members were already elected 
and the rest had to be nominated or selected by the assembly
50
. On the first day most 
members were present
51
. 
 
Once the preliminaries were over, the first job of the assembly was to validate old 
laws and the second was to focus on the formation of the constitution (Khan, 2009, 
92). The ruling power wanted to expedite the process of constitution-making as much 
as possible
52
. The country was into eighth year of its inception and surviving without a 
constitution. So the new government coalition was eager to have this feather in its 
crown.  
 
Even before the first session, the government already had a rough constitutional draft 
that probably came from the efforts of the first constitutional assembly
53
. This draft 
was given to the new assembly right away and certain committees were created to 
discuss the draft in detail. However the discussion on the bill in full assembly was 
only done in the final readings and not before that.  
 
As far as the interest of the members in the assembly is considered, only a few 
members are seen to have a strong interest in the matter at hand.  Many of them are 
seen to be more interested in the perks and privileges given as seen by the fact that 
there were a total of 30 days of discussion on constitution and 12 days started on a 
point of privilege by members. The members initiated the sessions in those 12 days 
with complaints that their previleges were being undermined and the precious time of 
                                                 
49
Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 8
th
July 1955. 
50
Nawa-e-Waqt Lahore, 8
th
 July 1955. 
51
71 members attended the 1
st
 session. Sardar Abdur Rashid was absent on account of illness (Dawn 
Karachi, 8
th
 July, 1955). 
52
Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore,25th June 1955. 
53
Nawa-e-Waqt Lahore, 8
th
 July 1955. 
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assembly was used on these issues
54
. This point of privilege was allowed by the rules 
where members could show their grievance or indignation on some issue. 
 
As regards the participation of members, only some members are seen as actively 
participating and all others are seen as either passively following or interested only in 
hooting and making bitter remarks or probably absent all together (as shown in table 8 
of next chapter). There are also some silent members who are only seen at the time of 
voting and otherwise sitting quietly. These silent members are mostly indifferent in 
discussion but do vote when they are needed most probably according to party leaders’ 
wishes. 
 
Again the reason for silence could be that in the British India government machinery 
was run by the majority party Congress and the Muslim League was just a minority. 
So most members did not have a lot of experience in government business, although as 
far as the political activities are concerned they were known names. These members 
could not be that productive as far as constitutional choices are concerned. 
Professionally some were doctors; some were coming from religious schools
55
. And 
other totally uneducated, so really the intricacies of constitution making must be Greek 
to them. It can be suspected that probably they voted according to what their party 
wished or desired.  
 
There were also coercion and manipulation playing its part. There were threats of 
detention under the pretence of one case or another. For example, there were different 
laws e.g. PRODA
56
 which could be used by ruling parties to satisfy their own personal 
vendettas. Many complaints are seen in the newspapers archives of politicians 
claiming that they have been coerced (Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 24th June 
1955). Ofcourse it is impossible to tell now whether these complaints were true or not. 
However the newspapers do narrate the cases like detention of two opposition 
members of constitutional assembly (CAD 26
th
 January 1956). Arrest was made on 
                                                 
54
 Detailed dates can be seen in Appendix I. 
55
 The table 4 of chapter IX provides the detailed professional attributes of members. 
56
Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act. It was a highly dreaded and notorious act 
passed in 1949 which could determine misconduct on part of public officers and politicians. It could 
be used according to executive discretion and was a tool to curb and punish opposition. 
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airport when they were flying from Dacca for a session. The charges made were quite 
petty. 
 
Manipulation and arm-twisting could be noted even within the party of the 
government. Several politicians claimed that members of provincial assemblies were 
threatened to vote for a candidate of ruling party or suffer the consequences under 
different acts (Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 24th June 1955).  
 
There were also threats of expulsion from political party if party discipline was not 
followed properly (Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 1
st
 July 1955). A prominent 
political leader (Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti) who also held the executive 
position in Punjab said in a press statement that all the members of their political party 
should follow the policy guidelines of their party in the assembly. He said in a news 
report 
 
“Strict discipline must be maintained with in the Muslim League party and no 
breach of party discipline would be tolerated’’ (Civil and Military Gazette, 
Lahore, 1
st
 July 1955). 
 
As a consequence of breaching the party discipline Mr Noon and two other members 
were expelled from party and they created their own wing of Muslim League (Nawa-
e-Waqt, Lahore.24th June, 1955. Also 2nd July, 1955). In the light of these instances 
one can feel that there must be lots of political games being played at that time. The 
procedural rules did not allow the process of secret ballot while voting on 
constitutional rules (Rule 30 of Rules & Procedures of assembly). One could expect 
that there had to be members who voted under the party influence. These members in 
personal interactions may support other opinions but are unable to vote against their 
parties
57
. 
 
                                                 
57
CAD 1st Feb 1956: just as an example, Mr HS Suhrwardy mentions that Mr Gurmani is also 
proponent of provincial autonomy but is unable to express his preferences because of party discipline. 
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1.4 Transparency of Sessions 
The constitutional assembly sessions were open to public and media if the Speaker 
allowed it (Rule 40 of Rules & Procedures of assembly). Normally the rules of 
procedures allowed secret meetings but this privilege was not used in any session on 
constitutional discussion (Rule 40 of Rules & Procedures of assembly). All the 
statements and opinions were open to public for scrutiny and transparency. This 
transparency factor maybe appreciated in any developed society but in case of 
constitution of Pakistan this became a problem for members. The society despite of 
having minimal educated attitudes on any constitutional clause did have very strong 
opinions about the religion. This religious fervour in society led to the problem in 
constitution-making. Whenever a member talked about any constitutional clause to get 
a little secular the media would term the person as “UnIslamic’’ or  “Kafir’’ (non-
believer) easily jeopardizing his public standing or even personal security. A few 
members did make a complaint about this (CAD: 8
th
 January, 1956) but banishing the 
press was neither an option nor educating the society on such short notice was an 
option. So the situation resulted in the fact that even the members who wanted a 
secular constitution were quite subtle about it
58
.  
 
Similarly when some members expressed opinions that their constituency must be 
given certain rights, or spoke against a strong centre; they were called traitors by the 
newspapers (CAD, 23
rd
 Jan, 1956). This put their political reputation at stake.  
 
Another problem that author felt regarding the open proceedings of the assembly was 
that masses were not very informed about the technicalities of the constitutional rules. 
They were only knowledgeable about how it will turn out politically. For example, 
people will not know what a federation is? or how federations work? They will just 
understand what will be their representation or will it be more or less than the 
                                                 
58
 As a background information we would like to tell that archives associates about 4 members to be 
associated with press either as journalists or newspaper owners. Three of them were the part of ruling 
coalition and one from opposition  (names are A.K.Fazlul Huq, Pir Ali Rashdi,  Abul Mansur 
Ahmad,Yusuf A Haroon) 
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neighbouring state, therefore the constitutional clauses seem to hold a lot of political 
value for common people. In case of the Pakistani constitution, this fact was used by 
the political leaders for their own political gains. Since the proceedings were public, 
members made more of political speeches than the actual constitutional discussion. 
Despite being warned again and again they seem to use the time to further their 
political gains (CAD, 21st Jan, 1956). 
 
1.5 Procedural Issues 
The officers in the assembly had an important role in conducting the business of the 
assembly
59
. Their neutrality is sometimes assumed but it may always not be the case. 
In case of Pakistan, the speaker and the deputy speaker of the assembly were from the 
ruling majority and they seem to respond better to their own party leaders. To the 
members of ruling party they provide much time and listen reverently while the 
opposition is interrupted time and again. They are not allowed to make a coherent 
speech, instead curtailed every other minute. A count was made of the times speaker 
curtailed the speeches, interrupted a discussion or told the member to cut short his 
speech. It was observed that speaker did this to the ruling party four times while did 
this to the opposition members 29 times. This shows that he was able to curtail 
members to give their opinions in the assembly
60
. 
 
Discussion on the constitution was done according to the standard procedures 
regarding all bills. The bill was presented to assembly on 8
th
 January 1956 by the law 
minister for first reading (CAD: 8
th
 January 1956). There was a time period selected 
for discussion on constitution in general sense. Many hours of discussion were 
provided to all the members to make general observations. Superficial discussion on 
the draft was carried out and everyone was allowed to discuss and give their point of 
view.  
 
                                                 
59
 As evident from vast powers provided to speaker of the assembly (Rle 35-39) also provided in 
section 7.2. 
60
 Here we didnot go into the qualitative assessment wether a member was really talking irrelevant or 
not. 
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In second reading of the bill constitution was read clause by clause and members were 
allowed to propose amendments. These amendments were then voted on in the 
assembly and if accepted then these amendments were added to the draft. As many as 
600 amendments (Pakistan Times Lahore: 1
st
 March 1956) were proposed but hardly 
any were allowed to be incorporated into the bill. In the third reading of the bill the 
amended draft was finally accepted. 
 
In the debates after the 1
st
 reading of the bill, there were two motions moved, the first 
was that bill will be accepted and moved for further deliberations/second reading 
(CAD: 1
st
 February 1956). The second motion was proposed by the opposition saying 
that draft was totally unacceptable and should be sent back for complete restructuring. 
The voting on this resulted in division and a list of members voting in Yes or No was 
made available in public records
61
.  
 
On the final reading of constitution some people were absent. The ones present, did 
not participate in individual voting rather the voting took place in such a manner that 
speaker called out the clause, members stayed quite or murmured agreed. As detailed 
discussion had already taken place so constitution was already accepted in essence.  
The members who were strictly against walked out in protest and can be considered to 
have rejected the constitution
62
.  
 
1.6 The Constitution 
Constitution was mostly favoured or opposed according to political party affiliations. 
It seems from the assembly records that only a few members were vocal enough and 
the others voted according to what their leaders wanted. Members were either depicted 
in available literature as against constitution as a whole or in favour of constitution as 
a whole and not in favour of individual clauses.  
                                                 
61
 The voting list is available in appendix 3. 
62
 29th Feb 1956, CAD, Names of the members were HS Suhrwardy , Ataur Rehman, Sheikh Mujib ur 
Rehman, Zahiruddin, Abdur Rehman Khan, Abdul Khaleque, Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish, BK 
Das, BK Dutta, AK Das, Canteswar Barman, Mian Iftikhar ud Din,MahmudAli, Dr SK Sen,Rasa Raj 
Mandal, Gour Chandra Bala. 
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The study of debates showed right away that the 6 rules that were considered by 
authors to be the basic milestones of any constitution were not considered too 
important by the members. As explained before these were chosen because these were 
related to basic constitutional design. However during the course of reading archives 
and historical records, some other constitutional rules were noted to have more 
importance for the individuals concerned.  So these rules are also considered and 
added in the discussions. These are Language Issues, Islamisation of Constitution, 
Joint vs. Separate Electorate, Location of federal Capital and also the land reforms 
and abolition of landlordism. 
 
Constitution was finally delivered on 29
th
 Feb 1956
63
. It contained 234 articles which 
were divided into 13 parts. Each part contained the articles relating to a specific issue. 
The constitution also contained six schedules. These were added to the constitution to 
provide flexibility as schedules can generally be easily amended as compared to the 
constitution itself. The schedules related to election of president, oaths and 
affirmations, judiciary, rules and procedures, division of powers between national and 
provincial governments etc. 
 
As mentioned previously in the book, most ex-British colonies seem to be influenced 
by the British constitutional systems. We expected certain members to be influenced 
by British systems e.g. landlords or foreign educated members but during the 
discussion most members seem to talk less about British constitution and more about 
Indian constitution. It can be thought that in case of Pakistan, Indian constitution was 
also of an influence just like British. This maybe because of similar culture, similar 
history, or similar geographical area. The members quote these constitutions again and 
again. One could say that constitutions get influenced by ex-colonial influence as well 
as the countries which are neighbouring or have been in similar circumstances
64
. 
 
                                                 
63
Text of the Constitution of Pakistan 1956 as obtained from the National Assembly of Pakistan. 
64
 We can see the details for this in table 11 & 12 of the chapter IX. 
127 
 
2 Available Voting Roll-Calls on Certain Clauses 
There are 15 clauses on which detailed voting roll calls are available, as voting on 
these ones were conducted through division (CAD 9
th
 January 1956 to 29
th
 Feb 
1956)
65
.  
 
2.1 Acceptance of the Constitution 
In the discussion on the constitutional bill the first clause that resulted in division was 
voted upon on 1
st
 Feb 1956. The motion was that the constitutional draft should be 
referred to a select committee for reconsideration OR it should be forwarded for 
second and third readings (CAD, 1
st
 Feb 1956). 13 members from opposition voted 
Yes and 45 members from government benches voted No. Therefore the bill was 
forwarded for next readings and not sent back for reconsideration. 
 
2.2 Fundamental Rights 
The next available list of voting roll calls was relevant to Fundamental Rights clauses. 
The clause 10 allowed freedom of association subject to any restrictions imposed by 
the law of the country (CAD 4th Feb 1956). The opposition demanded that a word 
“reasonable’’ be inserted so that the restrictions are not subject to the whims of the 
ruling parties. However again the word ‘reasonable’ would not bring any change in the 
clause unless it is defined properly or interpreted by the courts. It seemed like that the 
opposition only wanted to show their indignation as stated by their leader Mr HS 
Suhrwardy (CAD 4th Feb 1956). This motion was also turned down by 16 to 35 votes. 
However in the final draft available today in the archives shows the word reasonable 
in article 10 of constitution of 1956. This must have come before the third reading 
when the government benches kept meeting with the opposition for approval of 
constitutional draft. 
 
Next division came in second reading of the bill about fundamental rights. It was the 
clause 7 which dealt with human rights (CAD 13th Feb 1956). Opposition wanted that 
surety is given in the constitution that no man is detained without trial except in case 
                                                 
65
 The detailed roll calls are available in appendix 3. 
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of an enemy alien. However this constitutional protection was also refused by 15:35 
votes. 
 
The next division was again done in second reading of the constitutional bill. It related 
to clause 15 of the bill. Clause 15 related to the property rights/fundamental rights 
(CAD 14th Feb 1956). In some areas of Pakistan the landlord system was prevalent at 
that time and many of those landlords were in assembly. These amendments talked 
about landlord system and the acquisition of personal property with or without 
compensation. Since protection of personal property and right of property was granted 
by the constitution. The opposition wanted that in case of landlord system the 
constitution should allow the national and provincial assemblies to acquire such 
property even without compensation. Understandably enough (with a large percentage 
of landlords in assembly) this motion was negated by 15 to 39. 
 
2.3 Parity Issues 
Next voting roll call is available for Clause 17 which was related to the appointments 
in federal and government services (CAD 6th Feb 1956). In this the opposition desired 
to have the clause inserted that in all services the number of appointees will be the 
same from both East and West Pakistan. This amendment was also turned down by 12 
to 34 votes. 
 
Yes/No details are also available for Clause 31 which again related to services in 
Pakistan (CAD 7th Feb 1956). Opposition wanted that for all government services 
parity should be maintained between employees from East and West Pakistan and the 
government should make sure that this is done expeditely. This motion was also 
rejected by the government benches and turned down by 34 to 15 votes. 
 
2.4 Powers of Center 
The sub-clause (3) of clause 122 was also decided by division (CAD 8th Feb 1956). 
The opposition demanded that the executive authority of federation should be curtailed 
in provinces and a clause is inserted to that effect. This motion was also turned down 
by ruling party by 9 to 33 votes. This relevant clause is not present at 122
nd
 number in 
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the final draft which was extricated from archives. Even if the numbers are not same, 
the spirit of the amendment remains the same and the fact that government benches 
were not ready to give in on a simple point of principles.  
 
Next list of voters available for the federal list of subjects (5
th
 Schedule) (CAD 16th 
Feb 1956). This relates to the powers of the centre and whether the centre should be 
powerful or not. The opposition opposed the bill and wanted this list to be as short as 
only 3 subjects however this was also struck down by 33 to 18 votes. 
 
2.5 Presidential Powers 
The next available list is about clause 201, more specifically about its sub-clause (1) 
(CAD 9th Feb 1956). The number of the clause is again different in the final draft 
nevertheless it is important to know the subject of the clause. This clause was relevant 
to the emergency provisions. In case of any disturbance the President and the central 
government was allowed to declare emergency and to intervene in provincial affairs. 
Opposition wanted to maintain a limit on this intervention by demanding to insert the 
words that this can only be done in case of war, external aggression and armed 
rebellion. This would at least limit the central government that emergency provisions 
will not be invoked unnecessarily. However this demand by opposition was also 
turned down by 14:34. 
 
Next division resulted for the constitutional rule regarding presidential powers. This 
was the clause 33 which gave the President the immunity regarding his election. The 
clause ensured that the election of President and Vice President was to be conclusive 
and not to be challenged in any court of law. The members (mainly opposition) who 
wanted to curtail presidential powers voted in opposition but lost by 18 to 38 votes. 
 
2.6 Previleges of the Members 
The next clause to be dealt this way was clause 233. It was about the privileges of the 
members of national assembly (CAD 10th Feb 1956). Opposition wanted that judicial 
immunity is granted to some extent and members are not arrested for petty crimes 
without approval of assembly. As mentioned previously there were many notorious 
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laws existing at the time that governments could use to their advantage. This 
amendment could have prevented this to some extent but it was also rejected by 15 to 
38 votes. 
 
2.7 Country Name 
The next available roll call was about Clause 1 of the constitution which related to the 
name and territories of Pakistan (CAD 21st Feb 1956). The opposition wanted to 
oppose this clause because of the objection on the name of the country being Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan. The opposition members and almost all the non-Muslim 
members opposed the clause because of the word Islamic. However this clause was 
also passed by ruling party by 47 to 22 votes. 
 
2.8 Islamic Provisions 
The next division was about a similar provision. This was about the Islamic provisions 
of the constitution. The clause was 32
nd
 in number and talked about the qualification 
of a member to become president. Along with other factors like being atleast 40 years 
of age and eligible to be a member of National Assembly. The President had to be a 
Muslim. Again many members had apprehensions regarding the President being 
Muslim only (CAD 21st Feb 1956). Some members had the objection that this was 
against fundamental rights that non-Muslim members were debarred from becoming a 
President. Many non-Muslim members were against this qualification. However the 
clause was passed by 43 votes in favour and 20 against (CAD 21st Feb 1956). 
 
2.9 Electorates 
The next voting roll call is available for clause 153 (available as article 145 in the final 
draft) (CAD 21st Feb 1956). This related to principles of electorates. The constitution 
advised that elections may be held on basis of joint or separate electorates according to 
wishes of National and Provincial assemblies. However the members of opposition 
wanted that joint electorates should be prescribed by the Constitution. However the 
constitution stayed vague about the issue and delegated the power to the legislatures. 
Despite the wishes of opposition the motion was rejected by 46 to 20 votes. 
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For the Constitutional Bill to be passed for a third reading the opposition demanded 
that a division is called for again (CAD 23rd Feb 1956). The reason was to slow down 
the process so that the bill could be reconsidered again. However the ruling majority 
struck down the motion by 31 to 15 votes and the bill moved for a third reading. 
 
3 Specific Institutions in Focus 
As discussed in chapter IV, six aspects of constitutional structure were chosen 
carefully to be discussed in detail. In case of Pakistan the clauses which related to 
these institutions were thoroughly read and researched. But during the course of the 
research, some new issues presented themselves which seemed to hold more interest 
for the members as evident from table 10 of chapter IX. The discussions made by the 
members revolved more around these new issues than to the questions of basic 
constitutional design. These were Islamic provisions in constitution, parity amongs the 
two wings and language issues etc. They are also discussed in the later part of this 
chapter, but first we go through our initially chosen six rules. 
 
3.1 Federalism  
Federalism provides an interesting form of government to those states which do not 
want to leave their autonomy while have to unite together for a common goal e.g. for 
defence reasons or for economic reasons. In case of Pakistan multicultural people 
joined hand for a common religion (or to say separation from Hindu majority). 
 
Pakistan in 1956 had unique geographical issues. There were two geographical parts 
of country which were more than a thousand mile apart and had a hostile country 
(India) in the middle. Both wings were culturally, ethnically and linguistically 
different from eachother. East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh later on) was just 
one province, much smaller in area but holding 55% of population. While West 
Pakistan had 45% of population, much bigger area and four different provinces. These 
provinces again had similar differences amongst them. In such circumstances, where 
there were no similarities between people belonging to different parts of the same 
country, federation was an assumed form of government. No record in archival 
material shows that there was any objection to this type of government.  
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3.1.1 Working of a Federation 
Whenever a country decides to have a federal form of government, the next obvious 
fact is that there will be dual government i.e. central and provincial. In federal system 
it is important that a constitution must either explicitly or implicitly dictate their 
spheres of action and also ensure that their encroachment upon each other is 
restricted. Generally this is done by providing three lists in the constitution. Federal 
list enumerates the subjects in control of federal government, Provincial list names the 
subjects for provinces to run and concurrent/residual lists which name the left-over 
subjects to central government or to provincial government as desired by the 
constitution-makers. These lists dictate the Division of Powers between the central and 
provincial governments. 
 
The other question which comes up after a federation is decided to be created is the 
representation of states in the federal legislature. Almost always in case of federation 
there are two houses of the federal legislature. In US these are Senate and Congress, in 
India Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, in Germany Bundestag and Bundesrat. Sometimes 
even unitary governments allow bicameral system to accommodate their society 
setups as in case of United Kingdom. However unlike these countries, One-Unit 
formula envisaged a single house of Parliament named national assembly (Khan, 
2009, 92). It consisted of 300 members, half coming from each part of Pakistan 
thereby giving a simpler solution to all issues regarding the representation of states. 
 
Regardless of what the theory of Federalism says the questions of working of 
federation are always answered according to a country’s own perception of its 
problems. Generally no set rule works for everyone and the constitution-makers 
decide according to their own needs and problems. In case of Pakistan, federal system 
was an undisputed choice. But the next questions were a problem i.e. of representation 
of provinces and division of power. That is why the intricacies of the new federation 
stayed undecided for 9 long years.   
 
3.1.2 Representation of Provinces 
The representation of provinces was the basic question that was the contentious issue 
between the provinces for about 8 years. Because of this basic question constitution 
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could not be finalized for so long. The question of representation was solved by 
passing the one unit bill in assembly in 1955. This was the landmark constitutional 
compromise that finally led to the decision of constitutional draft (Maluka, 1995, 
142ff). 
 
As mentioned previously West Pakistan consisted of four provinces, 796096 sq.km 
area and 45% population while East Pakistan was just one province, 147570 sq.km of 
area with 55% population (Maluka, 1995, 131ff). Any basis of representation whether 
on basis of area, population or provinces was bound to fail. Then came forward the 
unique administrative formula named One-unit Bill. It was quite a compromise by 
West Pakistan which agreed to let go of its provinces and all units merged to make one 
single great province named West Pakistan,  bringing it in parity with East Pakistan. 
This move brought both East Pakistan and West Pakistan in equality and the only 
issue left was to now decide the number of members in the assembly.  
 
However there were many objections that arose on this decision (National Assembly 
Debates, 31
st
 August, 1955). As we already know that East Pakistan had a population 
more than West Pakistan so some people believed that their representation was less 
than what they deserved. Similarly in case of West Pakistan Punjab had the most 
population but its representation was less than what was Punjabis expected.  
 
People also had the fear that the rights of the smaller provinces will be usurped by the 
bigger ones once the West Pakistan became a single unit (National Assembly Debates, 
31
st
 August, 1955). Also some politicians believed that this move reduced the number 
of central and provincial ministries and was not in their interest. Also there were 
questions as to how to divide military and civils beauracracies amongst the two states. 
Again remote administration had issues of its own. 
 
Some people also believed that the method that the assembly had easily decided the 
issue within closed walls was not a popular way rather this decision should have made 
by the people, by referendum or other mode (Maluka, 1995, 145).  
 
People of East Pakistan had also a major objection that Karachi was being made a part 
of West Pakistan. They believed that since Karachi was the capital at that time it 
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should not be a part of any unit rather it should stay independent. During the partition 
of India East Pakistan had already lost a major industrially developed city name 
“Calcutta’’ to India and they did not want now that Karachi is made a part of West 
Pakistan. With all these apprehensions the West Paistan unification came into being 
and which later facilitated the formation of the constitution. 
 
The area of the West Pakistan was too great to be centrally administered, similarly the 
provinces were culturally, ethnically quite distinguished to be combined like this 
however the move was successful in the sense that it led to constitution formation later 
on. There were some student demonstration in Sindh and Karachi against this merger 
but overall the move was welcome (Khan, 2009, 93). 
 
3.1.3 Division of Power 
Division of powers and not usurping the other government’s powers is the spirit of 
federalism. The basic issue between the federalists and anti-federalists in US was 
almost the same as in case of Pakistan. In Pakistan some people wanted extreme form 
of federation bordering on a confederation while others wanted a strong and dominant 
centre. There was a debate of some members wanting a powerful centre with as many 
as 51 subjects in federal list while others wanting only three subjects for the center 
(defence, currency, and foreign policy) (CAD, 17
th
 Jan, 1956). In our discussion we 
term them as Centralists and Provincialists, favouring a strong centre or a strong 
province respectively. 
 
There are no set rules or formulae to state a perfect blend of federalism. All the 
countries which adopted this form of governments had to devise their own optimal 
level of centralisation or de-centralisation. In case of Pakistan the issue was to define 
the subjects which are to be given to states or centre.  
 
3.1.4 A Comparison with other Federations 
To have an idea and comparison we can look into the US Constitution. US has the 
oldest running constitution and is explicitly federal in character. According to it the 
states and the people are the sources of power and the center has only those powers 
which are delegated to the center by the states. This fact is explicitly reiterated in the 
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10
th
 amendment of the constitution so that no central government can get tempted to 
encroach upon state powers
66
. Section 8 of the Article I of the US constitution clearly 
enumerates the subjects handed over to the central government. There are 18 clauses 
which generally relate to defence, currency, postal, naturalization etc. 
 
In Indian Constitution, Part XI relates to the federation details. It spans the Articles 
245 - 263 (Constitution of India). These articles clearly define the relations between 
the centre and states. There are three lists of subjects, federal, state and concurrent 
lists. While the concurrent subjects can be debated upon by both national and state 
governments, national parliament laws have supremacy over the state laws. Similarly 
national government can legislate over the state subjects if need arises i.e. in case of 
emergency or threat to national security, thereby giving more power to national 
government. 
 
Unlike US constitution which embodies the central lists within the constitution’s main 
text Indian constitution enumerates this list in the specific schedules. Seventh 
Schedule provides this list and derives its powers from Article 246. The union 
list/federal list itself contains 97 subjects and can also be extended if need arises. 
There have been a few amendments in these specific articles over time but the essence 
has remained the same. In addition to this the concurrent list had 47 subjects and 
National Parliament’s decisions stood superior to those of state governments. So 
implicitly speaking the concurrent list can also be considered in essence as a second 
federal list. 
 
In Pakistani constitution of 1956. Part IV of the Pakistani constitution contained the 
articles relevant to federation. The articles ranged from 32 to 69. The ‘Part IV’ further 
contained chapters. Chapter I was related to federal government and how the executive 
branch functioned. The Chapter II contained the articles relevant to parliament. It 
talked about the parliament and the eligibility of the members, and also about its 
functioning. 
 
                                                 
66
 The Constitution of the United States. 
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Part VI of the constitution contained articles from 105-132. These were divided into 
four chapters. These articles mention the three lists and stated that concurrent lists can 
be legislated by the provinces and state governments but the supremacy of parliament 
remains over provinces in case of dispute. The articles are not only in essence 
similarly to relevant articles of the Indian Constitution but are at times in exact same 
language.  
 
One difference remains however. These articles do not provide any emergency powers 
to national parliament rather the emergency powers are with President only. Also the 
residuary powers are vested with states unlike Indian Constitution which rests the 
residual powers with national government under Article 248.  
 
The second question that came up was assigning the powers to the centre or provinces. 
Since members referred to Indian constitution time and again in the debates. India had 
97 subjects in Federal list as compared to 51 (CAD 16th Jan 1956) in Pakistan as 
envisaged in the initial draft. India had 66 subjects in state lists as compared to 94 in 
Pakistan and then again the residuary powers went to national government in case of 
India while to Provinces in Pakistan. India and Pakistan had 47 and 19 subjects in 
concurrent lists respectively. 
 
In Pakistani Constitution emergency provisions were provided but they did not allow 
the national government to take up the subjects of provinces while in Indian 
constitution they were explicitly allowed. In case of US federation only a few subjects 
are given to national legislature and those are embodied in the text of constitution thus 
made rather difficult to amend. So what was the problem bothering the constitutional 
assembly members of Pakistan? They were getting a much flexible federation despite 
the fact that many members even the Prime Minister was a proponent of unitary state. 
He mentioned in the debates that personally he would have preferred a unitary 
government but since it is unacceptable for many people so he would rather go with 
the federal system (CAD, 16th Jan 1956).  
 
According to most of the opposition leaders they had promised to their voters that they 
would only give three subjects to national government namely defence, foreign affairs 
and currency. So how did they envisage the running of such a national government 
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without its ability to tax or levy duties? The opposition main demand that a complete 
provincial autonomy is given was strange in its own self as no government can take up 
responsibilities without been given some rights. With only three powers a center was 
bound to remain weak. 
 
People of East Pakistan were suppressed badly in British Dominance. The area was a 
great bearer of agricultural income and produced many export quality agricultural 
products. People were apprehensive that in case of a strong center, income from East 
Pakistan will not be spent on the development of province rather will be drained away. 
And they will remain suppressed and down trodden as they were in British rule. This 
argument had been raised in assembly with a lot of numbers and figures (CAD, 16
th
 
Jan, 1956). Since it is not possible to double check these number this far down in 
history and no one was contradicting it in the assembly, so probably they were right. 
And they did have reasons for their apprehensions. 
 
After having an overview of the situation in Pakistan and in its constitutional assembly 
in 1956 we come back to our initial hypotheses. We expected members coming from 
rich states, to support federalism. Also we expected older age group, landowner, 
foreign educated and Ulema to vote against federal system. 
 
The voting roll calls that we use have been previously described. We use the voting 
roll call on the sub-clause (3) of clause 122 which related to curtailment of the 
executive authority of federation and another vote on clause 201, sub-clause (1) which 
was relevant to the emergency provisions exercised by the President and the central 
government. We also use a third voting roll call for the federal list of subjects (5
th
 
Schedule). This relates to the powers of the centre and whether the centre should be 
powerful or not. We term the people who want to curtail the executive authority in 
province or who want to limit the emergency powers or minimise the federal list as 
provincialists and others as federalists. 
 
3.2 Structure of Government (Presidential vs. Parliamentary) 
Just like federation was an assumed form of government, structure of government was 
also parliamentary without question. No archival record showed that there was any 
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proposal for a presidential form of government. This question may have arisen 
between the members but the members worked in committees and no archival records 
are available for those committees’ discussions. These records were not formally 
maintained in the first place thus no relevant data is available in archival material.  
 
Parliamentary system was a system of choice by all members and there was no second 
guess about it. It could also be that the Viceroy of British government was an all 
powerful position in the colonial rule and the masses had to struggle a lot to make 
their voice heard at the government level (CAD, 17
th
 Jan, 1956). So it could be that 
after the British rule, India and Pakistan wanted representative parliamentary 
democracies. Where head of the government would be Prime Minister and would not 
be all powerful in his own capacity rather would be subject to the advice of 
parliament. Also since India and Britain both have the parliamentary structure system, 
maybe their system was deliberately chosen by the constitution-makers of Pakistan. 
Because these two countries are mentioned time and again in the debates as given in 
tables 11 and 12 of chapter IX.  
 
The second constitutional assembly was given a rough draft proposal which envisaged 
a parliamentary system of government. And the discussions arose only about how 
much parliamentary supremacy the system should hold.  
 
Major problem that instigated many discussions was the problem with the authorities 
of the Head of the State and Head of the government. Since Pakistan had a governor-
general who had a vast power under the provisional constitution (adapted from 
colonial act which gave vast powers to British appointed governor - general). There 
were now a few people who wanted to curtail the powers of president while others did 
not want so (CAD, 17
th
 Jan, 1956). The governor-general had already dissolved the 
first constitutional assembly and many members of the parliament now wanted to 
curtail this power. The disputed issues were that whether the president should be able 
to dismiss the democratically elected government? If he should have the power to 
proclaim emergency? What should be his powers during emergency? 
 
Opposition members had the objection that President of Pakistan holds so much 
powers and he is not even directly elected like the president of the US. Another issue 
139 
 
was that President held the power to dissolve the directly elected parliament which 
many people objected strongly. 
 
Since the president was the head of the executive there was an apprehension that the 
president with vast powers will not only affect the parliamentary democracy rather it 
will make the center even stronger (CAD, 23rd Jan, 1956) thereby compromising the 
provincial autonomy. The members linked the provincial autonomy to the powers of 
president. If President had limited powers then the center will not intervene in the 
provinces and vice-versa. 
 
The hypotheses proposed were that the following should be promoting the presidential 
system or in our case presidential powers; members with a strong political presence, 
members belonging to majority (ethnic, political, religious and linguistic) and foreign 
educated members. During the course of research, we did not see members making a 
choice between the two systems; rather the issue was how much power to grant to 
president and parliament. We call them presidentialists and parliamentariasts 
according to their choice of power shift. 
 
On a similar note the members who are expected to vote for curtailments of 
presidential powers will be, members belonging to the minority (ethnic, political, 
religious, linguistic), members belonging to religious interest groups or Ulema, older 
age groups and landowners. We call them Parliamentarists. 
 
We have two voting lists that relate to the powers of the president. The first is the 
clause 33 which gave the President the immunity regarding his election (CAD, 20
th
 
Feb, 1956). And the second is about clause 201, more specifically about its sub-clause 
(1). This clause was relevant to the emergencypowers of President and the center 
(CAD, 9th Feb, 1956). 
 
3.3 Human Rights 
As was with the general trend of all the constitutions at that time, fundamental rights 
were also added into the Pakistani constitution. There was no argument that these 
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fundamental rights will be provided to citizens through constitution. But again the 
contention arose over the provisos attached.  
 
Most of the fundamental rights were conditional. It is true that rights are only granted 
as long as they do not interfere in another person’s personal sphere. No man can have 
unlimited rights. There were vast fundamental rights granted provided they did not 
involve national security, treason etc. Some members believed that these provisos 
could be used by coming governments against their political opponents and to curb 
human rights (CAD, 21st Jan, 1956).  
 
Some members had an issue with only a Muslim eligible to become a President or a 
Vice-President; they thought this clause was against human rights and minority rights. 
Another issue was that the constitutional draft provided that a man could be detained 
without a trial (CAD, 21st Jan, 1956). Many members objected that it was against the 
spirit of fundamental rights. There were also issues that people had the right to 
assemble freely unless it was against public order. Again such qualifications attached 
to the clauses dampened the spirit of fundamental rights as stated by many East 
Pakistan members.  
 
There are some fundamental rights clauses, for which voting was done though 
division. The first available list of voting roll call was relevant to fundamental rights 
clause 10 (CAD, 4th Feb, 1956). It allowed freedom of association subject to any 
restrictions imposed by the law of the country. Next list is about clause 7 which dealt 
with human rights (CAD, 13th Feb, 1956). Opposition wanted that surety is given in 
the constitution that no man is detained without trial except in case of an enemy alien. 
The next controversial clause was clause 15 of the bill which related to the property 
rights/fundamental rights and the acquisition of personal property with or without 
compensation (CAD, 13th Feb, 1956). The clause 32 was also voted by division. It 
talked about the rule that only a Muslim can become President (CAD, 21st Feb, 1956). 
 
3.4 Number of Houses 
The debates over this issue are minimal. It was already known that national assembly 
would consist of a single house which will consist of equal members from both units 
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of Pakistan. This was decided in the One-Unit Bill that converted the West Pakistan in 
to a single unit and parity was provided to both units in the assembly (Khan, 2009, 
92). It was reconciliation between the two wings with differences in population. As the 
procedure of the bill of one – unit is totally different and not discussed in 
constitutional assembly (secondly this was agreed already by all the parties) so 
checking this variable becomes irrelevant. 
 
However another idea could be that whoever rejected the constitution can be taken as 
to have rejected this option as well. In all the available literature only at one point, Mr 
Fazlur Rehman has shown agreement to uni-cameral legislature verbally (Pakistan 
Times Lahore, 8th January 1956). Otherwise there is no mention of this rule in the 
debates or archival material. 
 
3.5 Judicial Independence 
The discussion on these rules is minimal and only a few members have taken this into 
account. 
 
3.6 Procedures of Amendments 
No reference to this clause has been found in any records. At only one point, Prime 
minister who said that they made the amendment process easy so members who have 
any objection are able to propose amendments (CAD 17th February 1956). He said 
that after 8 years it was important to have a constitution, and the short-comings could 
be dealt with later on through amendments. Article 216 related to the procedure to 
amend the constitution. It allowed that 2/3
rd
 of total members should be present and 
voting and the amendment should be passed by a simple majority of those attending 
members. 
 
3.7 Islamisation of the Constitution 
Through out the debates regarding the constitution, this problem was the most 
confusing of all. Almost every vocal member discussed it or at least gave reference to 
it, but not a single one of them defined what they actually wanted. 
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There was a group of members in the assembly who came from the religious schools 
and madrassahs (table 6, chapter IX). These madrassahs taught local languages as well 
as Arabic and taught Quran and Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence). Surely these members 
knew about Islamic law more than other members.  
 
Taking one example, Mr Maulana Tarkabagish (CAD 17
th
 January 1956) spoke for a 
very long time that the constitution was not Islamic enough but all he could come up 
was that Islam does not allow a tyrant and a president in this constitutional draft will 
be nothing but a tyrant. But in essence he could not provide definition of an Islamic 
President. Such a definition/description was not given by any other member in the 
debates as well. 
 
Government benches had added a clause in the constitution that only a Muslim can be 
a president but opposition believed that it was against the right of minorities (Article 
32). Infact these provisions only played the word game otherwise there were very slim 
chances of a non-Muslim becoming a president in Pakistan as 90% population was 
Muslim. 
 
Government benches as well as opposition benches both had their own version of 
Islam and both could not convince each other. It is probable that it was a winning card 
on the basis of which simple, uneducated masses could be manipulated.  
 
3.8 The Issue of Electorates 
The issue of electorates was so problematic that in the end the constitution decided to 
stay silent over this inflammatory issue. Since Pakistan was established on the basis of 
religion and Muslim politicians claimed that Muslims needed their own homeland to 
profess their religion. So many orthodox members believed that Hindus or Christians 
living in Pakistan are different from them and  they should not be able to contest 
elections or vote in generality. Rather special seats should be allocated to them. Most 
non-Muslim members wanted to contest the elections on the basis of joint electorates 
even if they had more chances of losing, but they said that they wanted to be a part of 
the nation (CAD, 28
th
 Jan, 1956). However government benches especially Ulema 
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would not let this happen and demanded separate electorates for them (CAD, 23rd Jan, 
1956). In the end constitution left this to the choice of legislatures. 
 
A voting roll call is available for clause 153 (available as article 145 in the final draft). 
This related to the principles of electorates which the opposition lost (CAD, 21st Feb, 
1956).  
 
3.9 The Issue of Capital 
There were also issues regarding what should be the capital of Pakistan. Islamabad the 
capital today did not exist then and both wings wanted that the capital should be in 
their wing. East Pakistanis wanted that capital should be Dacca as 55% population 
lives in East Pakistan (CAD 21
st
 January 1956). While West Pakistan members did not 
want to shift the capital from Karachi. 
 
Sindh as a province had its own issues that it is forced to give up Karachi as it was the 
most developed and industrialised city of Pakistan at that time. The issue of forming 
the capital kept coming up in the debates. Karachi was a rich city, and a lot of revenue 
came from it. East Pakistan demanded that since it was the capital of federation, the 
revenues should be distributed judiciously. This issue stayed alive in many parts of the 
constitutional discussions and took the focus away from constitutional rules of general 
design (CAD, 16
th
 Jan, 1956). 
 
3.10 The Issue of Parity 
This was also an issue that was on the minds of the constitution-makers especially 
from East Pakistan. Parity or balance between the two wings of the country was very 
important for East Pakistanis as they considered themselves at a disadvantage. Their 
per capita income was lesser and the expenditures of government were lesser on that 
side (as claimed by members in their speeches) (CAD, 9
th
 January 1956 by Mr Abul 
Mansur Ahmad).  The reason East Pakistan wanted provincial autonomy was also 
related to this issue because they did not want that their revenues go to a common pool 
and expended by the center or West Pakistan. Opposition also demanded that all 
federal services should hold equal number of employees from East and West Pakistan 
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to create a balance (CAD, 7th feb, 1956). The government benches struck down these 
demands by majority voting. Such a simple and straightforward assurance from 
constitution could have lowered skepticism from opposition benches but it was not 
done so. 
 
This desire of parity also made opposition demand curtailment of powers of center and 
president. The parity issue led to the making of One-Unit which then enabled the 
country to form a single chamber parliament with equal number of members from both 
sides. This was again an attempt to attain the highly evasive parity.  
 
The language issue also related to the parity issue as the East Pakistan members 
wanted Bengali to be given equal status as Urdu and they wanted that their  language 
is promoted accordingly. A member mentioned that even the radio stations were 
minimal in East Pakistan which was an idea to suppress their culture (CAD: 21st 
January, 1956). In a nutshell all the demands could be boiled down to this single desire 
as to not let go of their own powers/revenues and yet enjoy the security of a common 
defence, foreign affairs etc.  
 
3.11 Language Issues 
As mentioned previously, language became an issue because of the presence of 
varying ethnicities and linguistic groups in Pakistan. However the main friction was 
between Urdu and Bengali. Urdu is derived originally from Arabic, Turkish and 
Persian and was spoken in Muslim groups in all over India
67
. On the other hand, 
Bengali was mostly limited in East Pakistan. That is why most people believed that 
official language of Pakistan would be Urdu as all groups will be able to speak and 
understand. However this issue flared up right after independence when constitutional 
discussions started to take place. Since the founder of Pakistan Mr Jinnah had stated at 
a public forum that national language of Pakistan will be Urdu, many people wanted to 
give respect to his wishes. They wanted the national language to be Urdu while 
Bengalis claimed that since 55% people speak Bengali then atleast it should be 
accepted as a state language. This was one of the issues that kept coming up through 
                                                 
67
 Online Resource: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/619612/Urdu-language 
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out the constitutional discussions. Many members in order to emphasize this point and 
using rule 29 of the Rules and Procedures of assembly made their speeches in Bengali. 
These speeches were later on translated into English and Urdu. English was the 
official language and all business in government offices was conducted in English. 
 
East Pakistan members believed that the suppression of their language is a plan to 
suppress their identity as was done in British rule. That is why they were more 
protective of their language and this issue took up a lot of time of the assembly. 
 
With this we sum up the general discussions and cursory observations as noted by the 
author while reading archives. The chapter consisted of obvious impressions 
developed by reading the newspapers and radio reports of the time. We continue the 
discussion on specific points in the next chapter. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IX: Results II (Details) 
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This chapter compiles the results of our research in an organised way. It 
provides the results of testing of specific hypotheses. First a systematic 
overview of the various personal attributes of the members is provided e.g. 
ages, professions, religion etc and then the discussion on the specific 
constitutional rules is made. 
 
The constitution of Pakistan was passed on 29
th
 Feb 1956 (CAD, 29
th
 Feb 
1956). The discussion on the constitution started on 9
th
 January 1956. In total 
the constitution was passed in 51 days out of which 30 days consisted of debate 
on constitution and the rest were free days
68
. The sessions usually lasted from 
3p.m till late in the evening. The constitution making though theoretically 
lasted 51 (CAD, Jan-March 1956) because the constitutional draft drew heavily 
from the draft of the first assembly (which took about 8 years to come up with 
the draft). The second assembly only modified what was already provided by 
the first assembly. However the credit goes to the second assembly for 
providing a reasonably accepted solution to the contentious issue of “Parity69’’. 
The assembly consisted of 80 members in total. 72 members were elected 
through indirect elections and the rest 8 were the nominated members
70
.  
 
1  Short Tabular Descriptions of Members and Their Attributes 
The detailed raw data can be seen in the excel files given as Appendix II. For 
short overview multiple tables are provided here for general information. 
 
1.1  The geographical distribution of the members  
The geographical distribution of the members between different parts of the 
country was as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
68
 The dates in which the session took place are provided in Table I of Appendix. 
69
 The issue of “Parity” is explained in detail later (Section 6.1). 
70
 Nawa-e-Waqt Lahore, 8
th
 July 1955. 
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  States Seats in 
Constitutional 
Assembly 
Percentage of total 
seats 
East 
Pakistan 
East 
Pakistan 
40 50.00% 
West 
Pakistan 
  
  
  
  
Punjab 21 26.25% 
Tribal Areas 9 11.25% 
Sindh 5 6.25% 
NWFP 4 5.00% 
Baluchistan 1 1.25% 
Table 1: List of members according to geographical distribution 
 
The same can be viewed in the graphical mode below. 
 
 
1.2 The Political Parties in the Assembly 
As far as the political parties in the assembly are concerned, a full 
detail has been given in preceding chapters. A short tabular and 
graphical overview is as follows.  
Political Party  Seats in the Assembly Percentage of 
Seats in the 
Assembly 
Muslim League 32 40.00% 
United Front 16 20.00% 
Awami League 13 16.25% 
Muslim League 
Associates 
4 5.00% 
Congress/UF 4 5.00% 
Independent 
Members 
4 5.00% 
Scheduled Cast 
Federation 
3 3.75% 
Noon 
Group/Republican 
3 3.75% 
Ganatantari Dal 1 1.25% 
Table 2: List of members according to political parties 
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1.3 Religion wise Outlook of the Assembly 
The religion wise distribution of members in assembly is shown below. 
 
Religion Number of 
Members 
Percentage 
Muslims 69 86.25% 
Hindus 5 6.25% 
Scheduled 
Caste Hindus 
3 3.75% 
Christians 3 3.75% 
Table 3: List of members according to religion. 
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1.4  The Professions Most Dominant in Assembly 
The profession-wise distribution in the tabulated form is as below. 
 
Profession Number Percentage 
Lawyers 28 35.00% 
Landlords 23 28.75% 
Not Known 13 16.25% 
Businessmen 7 8.75% 
Journalist/Authors 6 7.50% 
Ex-Government 
Servants 
5 6.25% 
Teachers 4 5.00% 
Ulema 2 2.50% 
Doctors 2 2.50% 
Table 4: List of members according to professions 
 
 
 
1.5 The Age Groups of the Members 
The age groups of the members were as follows. 
 
Ages Number Percentage 
Twenties 2 2.50% 
Thirties 11 13.75% 
Forties 19 23.75% 
Fifties 29 36.25% 
Sixties 10 12.50% 
Seventies 3 3.75% 
Eighties 1 1.25% 
Not Known 5 6.25% 
Table 5: List of members according to age groups 
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1.6 Education-Wise Outlook of Assembly 
Education Number Percentage 
Locally Educated 49 61.25% 
Not Known 20 25.00% 
Foreign Educated 8 10.00% 
No Formal Education 3 3.75% 
Table 6: List of members according to educational institutes 
 
 
 
Education Level Number Percentage 
Less Than Bachelor 
Level 
8 10.00% 
Bachelor Level 14 17.50% 
Masters/Professional 
Degree 
34 42.50% 
Religious Education 2 2.50% 
Not Known 22 27.50% 
Table 7: List of members according to educational level 
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2  Participation by Members 
During the general discussion phase of constitutional debate, all the members 
were allowed to speak freely about their ideas of constitutional design. They 
were only required to inform the party whips or the Speaker of their desire to 
make a speech and then they could express their point of view (Rule 22).  
However as said in the last chapter that many members were either absent or 
indifferent to the process because their participation was almost negligible. 
During the phase of general discussions we analysed the participation of 
members on four levels i.e. 
 
 Members who made speeches in Assembly,  
 Members who gave only meaningful remarks or short  information, 
 Members who only made hooting remarks and  
 Members who participated in the final voting after general discussions 
 
The participation of the members is shown below: 
 
Table 8:  Members according to their participation in the constitution-making process( general 
phase) 
 
Level of Education in Assembly
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Members who made speeches in Assembly 32
Members who gave only meaningful remarks or short information 8
Members who only made hooting remarks 1
Members who participated in the final voting after General Discussions 58
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It was seen that about 58 members voted in the final voting after the general 
discussions while only 32 had made speeches. One reason can be that most 
members were not linked with the machinery of government in British Rule to 
know the intricacies of constitutional design. Another reason can be that many 
members were either uneducated or their educational background was 
completely different from what was needed to understand the legalities of a 
good constitutional design. This could be the reason that lawyers participated 
more enthusiastically than other groups (15 out of 31 who made speeches were 
lawyers by profession). Yet another reason can be that many members may not 
have a strong interest in the process itself but only appear at the time of voting, 
just to maintain their loyalty with their political party. 
 
We can also look at the total number of members participating in voting 
according to our general hypothesis. 
 
Non-Interest Specific 
Clasues Rule 
Members 
Participating in 
Voting Avg 
Vote 1 
Presidential vs 
Parliamentary 48 
50.142 
Vote 2 
Presidential vs 
Parliamentary 56 
Vote 3 Federalism vs Unitary 42 
Vote 4 Federalism vs Unitary 50 
Vote 5 Human Rights 51 
Vote 6 Human Rights 50 
Vote 7 Human Rights 54 
Interest Specific Clasues 
Vote 1 Parity 46 
58.6 
Vote 2 Parity 49 
Vote 3 Islamisation Issue 69 
Vote 4 Islamisation Issue 63 
Vote 5 Electorate Issue 66 
Table 9: Members participating in the Voting Roll Calls 
 
Another observation made is that on 21
st
 February 1956 votings took place on 3 
different clauses e.g. for clause 1 and 32 relating to Islamisation Issue and 
clause 153 of Joint electorate. The number of members who participated in 
three votes was 69, 63 and 66. This shows that the members were there on that 
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day but were not sitting in the assembly at the time of all three voting. Why the 
members decided to stay absent is an open question for which we could not 
find an answer. 
 
We observe that on average the participation was more in the interest specific 
rules and less in the rules of general constitutional design. This brings us back 
to our original proposition that members are generally more focused on their 
self-interest and they donot participate in the constitution-making process with 
altruistic motives. We also observe this phenomenon operating in the general 
discussions as evident from Table 10 (words spoken about specific clauses in 
general discussions) and here in the specific discussion phase as well. 
 
3 Acceptance of the Constitution 
The formal mode of accepting the constitution was the “three readings’’ 
process as described before. The idea was that members can give their opinions 
during debates in the assembly and also propose their own ideas in form of 
amendments. Theoretically this should have brought the constitution in line 
with the desires of most, if not all members. But in this case it was not done so. 
All the three readings were in essence done on the same draft. As many as 600 
amendments (Pakistan Times Lahore: 1
st
 March 1956) were proposed but in 
actuality only a few were accepted and those too were mostly consistent of a 
mere “language change’’ instead of giving a new meaning. 
 
The bill was rejected by the opposition members during all the three readings 
of the bill. In the first discussion on the constitutional bill, opposition proposed 
right away that a division is called upon. This voting was done on 1st Feb 1956 
(CAD, 1st Feb 1956). The motion was that the constitutional draft should be 
referred to a select committee for reconsideration or it should be forwarded for 
second and third readings. 13 members from opposition voted Yes and 45 
members from government benches voted No. The bill was forwarded for next 
readings and was not sent back for reconsideration. 
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For the Constitutional Bill to be passed through second reading the opposition 
demanded that a division is called for again. They wanted to reject the bill. And 
despite knowing that majority will again strike their proposal down. They 
called for a division. The reason was to slow down the process so that the bill 
could be reconsidered again. However the ruling majority struck down the 
motion by 31 to 15 votes and the bill moved for a third reading. 
 
In the last reading of the constitutional bill 16 members
71
 walked out of the 
assembly showing their indignation at the constitutional plan. These members 
gave their comments quickly and walked out of the assembly hall. In other 
words rejecting the constitution through their actions. They made sure that they 
say something before leaving so that their rejection is recorded in the historic 
records properly.  
 
The lists for all the two divisions as well as the names of the members who 
walked out are given in Appendix III as List I, XV and XVI. 
 
The members who rejected the constitution had minimal issues with the basic 
constitutional draft and were rather more critical of the specific issues at the 
time of constitution-making. To make sure that a reasonably correct idea can be 
obtained, we counted the number of words spoken in the assembly about the 
issues of general constitutional design and these specific issues. The words are 
counted for the phase of general discussion when members had a free hand to 
make speeches and to express their opinion on the constitution. 
 
Table below shows the number of words spoken about different issues during 
general constitutional debate. The words spoken about other issues or non 
relevant topics have not been counted and the percentage is taken through sum 
of the words spoken about issues in focus. 
                                                 
71
29th Feb 1956, CAD, Names of the members were HS Suhrwardy, Ataur Rehman, Sheikh 
Mujib ur Rehman, Zahiruddin, Abdur Rehman Khan, Abdul Khaleque, Maulana Abdur Rashid 
Tarkabagish, BK Das, BK Dutta, AK Das, Canteswar Barman, Mian Iftikhar ud Din, 
MahmudAli, Dr SK Sen, Rasa Raj Mandal, Gour Chandra Bala. 
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Issue Percentage of Words 
Spoken 
Number of 
Words 
Spoken 
Islamization of Constitution 26.20% 34244 
Federalism/Unitary 24.18% 31612 
Parity Issues 22.52% 29442 
Joint Electorates 7.24% 9464 
Human Rights 5.95% 7784 
Language Issue 5.62% 7350 
Presidential/Parliamentary 5.32% 6958 
Judicial Independence 2.51% 3276 
Unicameralism/Bicameralism 0.40% 518 
Amendments 0.05% 70 
Table 10: Number of words spoken according to the constitutional rules. 
 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the issues that have been traditionally considered as a 
basic framework of any constitutional design have not been given reasonable 
importance by Pakistani politicians. It may also be true in case of other 
countries that while debating on the constitution the communal or local issues 
are given more importance than the ones which are more fundamental. 
Politicians may be more interested in their own self-interest as the communal 
and local flammable issues can be a manifesto for next elections. These 
politicians by representing their constituency and representing the constituency 
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interests are actually safeguarding their own interest i.e. to achieve a better 
popularity amongst the voters. 
4  British Influence on the Constitution 
Initially it was assumed that British influence would be profoundly seen on the 
constitutional draft of Pakistan but a careful reading of the debates shows that 
instead of British constitutional design other influences were more profound. 
The 1935 Indian Act that was introduced by British was later adopted as the 
Interim Constitution in Pakistan. It was quite similar to the final constitutional 
draft of 1956. Similarly Indian Constitution was also taken as reference time 
and again in the discussions. To have a stronger idea a count was done about 
the number of times the members referred to these acts and constitutions in the 
general discussion of the constitutional draft. The following table depicts the 
results. 
 
Indian Constitution 61 
Indian Act of 1935 22 
British Constitutional Design 4 
Table 11: Number of times other constitutions mentioned in the general discussions. 
 
As evident from the above tables, Indian constitution had a strong influence on 
Pakistani constitution. Speakers mentioned the Indian Constitution like a 
constitutional Bible, and quoted openly. Now the question itself remains if the 
Indian Constitution itself was influenced by British Constitution. 
 
The reason of this may be because of the similar culture of the countries. Both 
countries had similar history and background so similarities were bound to 
exist. 
 
Initially in chapter IV (Implications of the model) we assumed that the old aged 
members, foreign educated, landowners are likely to be more influenced by the 
British Constitutional design. Also we supposed that older members are more 
likely to support British Constitutional rules due to risk averse nature of the 
older generation in Pakistani society. The four times the constitution of Britain 
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was mentioned, it was done by Mr Rashdi, Abdus Salam, Dr S K Sen and KK 
Dutta. Their professions, age groups and educational background are given 
below, which do not support any of our hypotheses except in case of ages.  
 
Member Profession Age Educational 
Background 
Pir Ali Mohammad 
Rashdi 
Journalist 51 No formal 
Education 
Dr S.K.Sen Doctor 59 Local 
Kamini Kumar 
Dutta 
Lawyer 78 Local 
Abdus Salam Ex Civil 
Servant 
Unknown Local 
Table 12: List of members quoting British Constitution. 
 
5 Hypotheses Analysed 
The initial layout of the research was simple: to relate the personal interests of 
the members to their voting behaviours and to understand the co-relation if it 
was found to be existent. During the data collection one major piece of data 
was missing rather it was never created i.e. the voing roll calls on individual 
clauses. Due to this there was no choice except to probe and extract the best 
possible research conclusions based on the available data. 
 
What we have is the detailed list of voting roll calls on 15 different issues. So 
we use these roll calls and discuss the original hypotheses one by one (relating 
to basic constitutional designs) as well as the new issues which were seen 
locally in case of Pakistan during the course of data collection. 
 
5.1  Presidential vs Parliamentary Structure of Government 
In the preceding chapters we had generated multiple hypotheses relating to who 
might favor Presidential system and which member is likely to support 
Parliamentary system of government. We believed that if a constitution-maker 
has a strong political presence then he is more likely to support presidentialism. 
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Similarly if a constitution-maker belongs to the majority (ethnic, political, 
religious, linguistic), he will most probably support presidentialism. 
On the other hand the members who belong to the minority groups, (be it 
ethnic, political, religious, linguistic minority) will most probably support 
parliamentary system. Also a member, who belongs to religious interest groups 
or Ulema groups, is likely to vote for parliamentary system. 
 
Also through other arguments given previously we assumed that members from 
older age group and landowners group are likely to vote for parliamentary 
system
72
. We had assumed also that foreign or local education is not likely to 
create any influences in case of structure of government.  
 
In light of these conjectures we tried to find some data that could help in 
confirming or refuting the hypotheses. The articles that term the governments 
as a parliamentary democracy were not voted on though the process of 
division
73
 therefore reasonable results cannot be drawn from these articles.  
 
However there were some other articles which were finalized through 
divisions. This could be used in relevance to our study. As discussed 
previously, in the Pakistani Constitution-making the issue was not to have a 
presidential or parliamentary system because there seemed to be already a 
consensus upon the system itself. However the contentions arose when it was to 
be decided how much power the president should wield. Some people wanted 
to increase the sphere of action of presidential powers while others wanted to 
curtail them. Assuming these two groups as Presidentialists and 
Parliamentariasts we can make a table of expected voing behaviour according 
to our initial hypotheses: 
 
                                                 
72
 Initially we assumed that women members would also vote for parliamentary system but we 
saw that there was not even a single woman member in the assembly so it will not be possible 
to see the effect of gender on the constitutional choice of structure of the government in case of 
Pakistan. 
73
Articles: 1, 32, 43 of Constitution of Pakistan 1956. 
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Presidential Parliamentary 
Ethnic Majority Ethnic Minority 
Linguistic Majority Linguistic Minority 
Political Majority Political Minority 
Religious Majority Religious Minority 
Strong Members/Party Leaders Common members 
  Ulema 
  Older Age Group 
  Landowners 
Table 13: Table of expected voting behavior regarding structure of government 
 
5.1.1 Vote I 
The clause 201 was relevant to this issue, more specifically its sub-clause 
(1)(CAD, 9th Feb, 1956). This clause related to the emergency provisions. In 
case of any disturbance the President and the central government were allowed 
to declare emergency and to intervene in provincial affairs. Opposition wanted 
to maintain a limit on this intervention by demanding to insert the words that 
this can only be done in case of war, external aggression and armed rebellion. 
This would at least limit the central government to some extent that emergency 
provisions are not invoked unnecessarily. The final article of the constitution 
(191) allowed the President to invoke emergency powers in case of economic 
disturbance, security  of Pakistan, internal disturbance, and also in a situation 
that became beyond the control of provincial government. These vague 
sentences automatically led to vast powers as the interpretation could be 
manipulated. This is why the opposition only wanted to curtail this power to 
only cases of war, external aggression or armed rebellion and not internal 
disturbances. 
 
This demand by opposition was also turned down by 14:34 and the voting list 
is given in Appendix III. Analysing the voting result for the Vote I in context of 
our hypotheses, we come to the following numbers. 
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Attribute Total Presidential Parliamentary Abstained 
from 
Voting 
Ethnic 
Majority 
61 22 14 25 
Linguistic 
Majority 
61 22 14 25 
Political 
Majority 
56 34 3 19 
Religious 
Majority 
69 32 11 26 
Strong 
Members/Party 
Leaders  
26 13 2 11 
Ulema 5 2 1 2 
Older Age 
Group (50+) 
43 19 6 18 
Landowners 23 13 1 9 
Ethnic 
Minority 
19 2 3 14 
Linguistic 
Minority 
19 12 0 7 
Political 
Minority 
24 0 11 13 
Religious 
Minority 
11 2 3 6 
Table 14: Hypotheses analysed (Vote I) regarding structure of government. 
 
5.1.2 Vote II 
Another list of the voting roll call is also available in regards to powers of 
President. It was the clause 33 of constitutional bill which gave the President 
the insulation (termed as immunity in Pakistani constitution) regarding his 
election (CAD, 20
th
 Feb, 1956). The clause ensured that the election of 
President and Vice President was to be conclusive and not to be challenged in 
any court of law. The members (mainly opposition) who wanted to curtail 
presidential powers voted in opposition, because they thought that this kind of 
immunity will increase the control of President over the parliament and the 
elected governments. Opposition lost this vote by 18 to 38 votes. The list of the 
members present and voting is given in Appendix III. 
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The members are here again show as presidentialists and parliamentariasts. 
 
Attribute Total Presidential Parliamentary Abstained  
from Voting 
Ethnic Majority 61 23 18 20 
Linguistic Majority 61 23 18 20 
Political Majority 56 34 13 9 
Religious Majority 69 34 14 21 
Strong Members/Party 
Leaders 
26 14 5 7 
Ulema 5 1 1 3 
Older Age Group (50+) 43 23 9 11 
Landowners 23 14 0 9 
Ethnic Minority 19 15 0 4 
Linguistic Minority 19 15 0 4 
Political Minority 24 4 5 15 
Religious Minority 11 4 4 3 
Table 15: Hypotheses analysed (Vote II) regarding structure of government. 
 
By looking at the results of voting roll calls on the above two votes one may 
question why so many people chose to abstain? Were they protesting anything? 
It was a puzzle to see these many numbers as missing in the final discussions 
of the assembly. We tried to read through the archival materials and 
discussions but could find no clue as to why the members could not ensure that 
they sit through the votings and participate. One thing we can say for sure that 
it was not a protest or a planned abstainence as no where the newspapers or 
assembly discussions mention this except for the last day when the members 
actually walked out protesting the constitutional bill in total. Also the finance 
department was contacted to check which member was actually being paid that 
day to participate but the data was not available.  
 
As seen from the two votes above regarding the presidential and parliamentary 
system of government, we draw some conclusion. As regards to the initial 
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hypotheses we thought that majorities (ethnic, linguistic, religious, political) 
will be more inclined towards Presidential systems. This was seen to be 
considerably true in case of ethnic, linguistic and political majorities. Also in 
case of religious majority the ratio of presidential vs. parliamentary votes were 
seen as the approximate ratio 3:1 for Vote I and 2:1 for Vote II. 
 
Similarly for all the other attributes we see the following ratios. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Ratio 
Presidential vs 
Parliamentary 
(Vote I) 
Ratio 
Presidential 
vs 
Parliamentary 
(Vote II) 
Presidential  Ethnic Majority 3:2 4:3 
Linguistic Majority 3:2 4:3 
Political Majority 11:1 3:1 
Religious Majority 3:1 2:1 
Strong 
Members/Party 
Leaders  
6:1 3:1 
Parliamentary Ulema 2:1 1:1 
Older Age Group 
(50+) 
3:1 3:1 
Landowners 13:1 14:0 
Ethnic Minority 2:3 15:0 
Linguistic Minority 12:0 15:0 
Political Minority 0:11 4:5 
Religious Minority 2:3 1:1 
Table 16:  Hypotheses analysed regarding structure of government: Final. 
 
Calculation of these ratios was done by using only the members “present and 
voting” and the assumptions about the absent members were not made as it was 
not possible with the available data. We see from the above tables that our 
initial hypothesis about the majorities and strong members wanting the 
Presidential system are found to be quite consistent. 
On the other hand the hypotheses about the minorities, older aged members, 
landowners and Ulema choosing the Parliamentary system are found to be 
correct only in case of political minority and to some extent religious 
minorities. 
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We conclude from our research and the analysis of the above two votes, that 
the majorities who think that their position is considerably stronger at the time 
of constitution-making and expect that this strength will remain stable for quite 
a reasonable length of time, prefer to opt for a presidential system of 
government. The reason, we perceive, is that they would expect to have a 
stronger hold on executive authority in case of the presidential system. While in 
case of parliamentary system the parliament holds more power and the 
executive authority is subject to the will of several persons (depending on the 
number of members in assembly). In contrast to this if a President would 
belong to their interest group there is a greater opportunity to wield power 
according to their own interest. The same self-interest urges the strong political 
leaders and political party heads to choose the presidential system and not the 
parliamentary system as they did in case of Pakistan.  
 
On a similar note we proposed that minorities should support Parliamentary 
system because in such a system they would expect their smaller interest 
groups to carry more weight than in the Presidential system. This hypothesis 
seemed to hold true only in case of political minority and religious minority, 
two very important interest groups. We believe that the reason for seeing these 
results is because in case of Pakistan’s assembly the interest groups that were 
most efficiently organised were religious and political. These groups showed 
most bonding to each other and their pressure affected the process of 
constitution-making in a very strong manner. These two groups were the most 
organised and the most effective and had the source of bonding at an 
ideological level. They disturbed and dominated all the other affiliations and 
bondings that were present but could not manifest themselves in a much 
defined manner. The reason could be that a member’s political and religious 
affiliations were naturally a public matter in a community of Pakistan of 1956. 
While the other affiliations like belonging to religious groups of Ulema or 
owning lands were subtle matters. Thus to openly go against the political party 
desires or religious desires of the group was not a simple thing to do. The order 
of affiliations for a member was his political and religious affiliations first and 
ethnic and others later. In our opinion built on a general reading of the archival 
material (assembly discussions, newspapers and journals of the time) political 
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party affiliation was the most dominating effect and modified the behaviour of 
every member accordingly. 
   
We also expected the foreign educated people, landlords and older aged 
members to support parliamentary system because of their preference to British 
systems. As shown before, British constitution had the least influence on 
Pakistani Constitution. Thus it seems reasonable that these members didnot act 
the way we expected.   
 
In the end, Pakistani constitution-makers came up with a system that was 
Parliamentary in nomenclature but had quite a strong President. The majority 
political party wanted to give vast powers to the President and succeeded in 
doing so by easily winning all the votings on the issue. India had a tradition of 
having Mogul emperors, then British Viceroys and later on Governor Generals. 
This tradition continued in Pakistan with a very powerful President in a 
Parliamentary system of government.  
 
5.2 Federalism vs. Unitary form of government 
For the system of government the problem was not of deciding if it is going to 
be a federal system or a unitary system of government rather the problem arose 
when the devolution of powers to the provinces were to be decided. At the time 
of constitution-making when constitution-makers had to decide how the 
legislative powers are to be divided between the centre and the provinces there 
were major discussions on the issue (CAD, Jan-Feb 1956). As shown 
previously 24.18% of the words spoken about multiple issues were spoken 
about the distribution of powers between the center and the provinces.  
 
There were some members who were proponent of a strong center bordering on 
to almost a unitary system and the others who wanted a weak center with 
maximum devolution of powers to the provinces. We call the formers 
“Centralists” and the latter “Provincialists”. Expected voting behaviour 
according to hypotheses is tabulated here: 
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Federalism Unitary 
Members from Rich States Older Age Group 
  Landowners 
  Foreign Educated 
  Religious Ulema 
Table 17: Table of expected voting behavior regarding system of government 
 
For this constitutional rule we were able to find two voting lists that could 
serve our purpose to some extent.  
 
5.2.1 Vote I 
The sub-clause (3) of clause 122 was decided by voting through division. The 
opposition demanded that the executive authority of federation should be 
curtailed in provinces and a clause is included to that effect. This motion was 
also turned down by ruling party by 9 to 33 votes (CAD, 8th Feb 1956).  
 
Attribute  Total Federalism Unitary system Abstained 
from 
Voting 
Members from 
Rich States 
62 9 23 30 
Older Age 
Group (50+) 
43 4 20 19 
Landowners 23 1 9 13 
Foreign 
Educated 
8 0 2 6 
Religious 
Ulema 
5 1 1 3 
Table 18: Hypotheses analysed (Vote I) regarding system of government 
 
5.2.2 Vote II. 
Second vote conducted in this context was over the 5
th
 Schedule that contained 
the federal list of subjects. This relates to the powers of the centre and whether 
the centre should be powerful or not. The opposition opposed the bill and 
wanted that the federation should only have only 3 subjects however this was 
also struck down by 33 to 18 votes (CAD, 16
th
 Feb, 1956). 
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Attribute  Total Federalism Unitary 
system 
Abstained 
from 
Voting 
Members from 
Rich States 
62 18 21 23 
Older Age 
Group (50+) 
43 10 18 15 
Landowners 23 1 8 14 
Foreign 
Educated 
8 1 2 5 
Religious Ulema 5 1 0 4 
Table 19: Hypotheses analysed (Vote II)  regarding system of government 
 
According to our original hypotheses, we had predicted that members from rich 
states are more likely to vote for a weaker center while older age group, 
landowners, foreign educated and Religious ulema are likely to vote for a 
stronger federation bordering on almost unitary system. 
 
Now making a comparison of the two votes and getting a concluding idea we 
analyse the following table (as before we omit the absent members out of the 
ratios for the reasons mentioned before i.e. for the lack of data we are unable to 
predict their stance in this choice of constitutional rule). 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Ratio Unitary vs 
Federal (Vote I) 
Ratio Unitary vs 
Federal (Vote II) 
Unitary 
System 
Older Age Group 
(50+) 
5:1 9:5 
Landowners 9:1 8:1 
Foreign Educated 2:0 2:1 
Religious Ulema 1:1 0:1 
Federal 
System 
Members from 
Rich States 
8:3 3:1 
Table 20: Hypotheses analysed regarding system of government: Final 
 
Our initial hypotheses prove to be quite consistent in case of older age groups, 
landowners and foreign educated who tend to favour Unitary system as 
expected. While not so much in case of Ulema who prefer the federal system in 
contrast to our initial hypothesis. 
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The members from rich states also behave inconsistently with our initial 
hypothesis as we supposed they will be favoring federal system and not unitary 
system. 
 
Even when we see that our hypotheses seem to hold true in case of older age 
groups, landowners and foreign educated we believe that this observation is not 
because of the British influence as suggested in Chapter IV. As British 
influence was not seen to be so profound in the constitution-making process as 
the Indian so we do not believe that British influence would have caused these 
hypotheses to hold true. We believe that the political party and religious 
affiliations were responsible for these observations both where hypotheses hold 
true (older age groups, landowners and foreign educated) or where they donot 
(Ulema, members from rich states). As mentioned before, political and 
religious affiliations stood first in order of the preferences in case of Pakistan’s 
constitutional assembly members of 1956. All other attributes for which we 
made assumptions in case of this constitutional rule (older age groups, 
landowners and foreign educated, Ulema, members from rich states), come 
only secondary to religion and political party affilations.  
 
The political parties which were in majority i.e. Muslim League and United 
Front wanted to keep a Federal form of government but with very limited 
powers to the provinces. This is why we saw a Federal system that deviated 
from other federations of the world. The reasons for this were many as we have 
already discussed in detail but it is only natural that the final draft reflected the 
wishes of the majority party. No other option could have survived the majority 
voting process against the will of Muslim League and United Front. 
 
5.3 Bicameralism 
The number of Houses of the National assembly in Pakistan was decided in the 
Establishment of West Pakistan Bill in 1955 (Khan, 2009, 92). This Bill was 
introduced to solve the issue of Parity and to bring the two wings of the country 
at par with each other. A single House of National Assembly was then 
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introduced that had 300 seats. 150 members were chosen from each wing and 
East and West Pakistan were given equal representation.  
 
During the discussions in the constitutional assembly this constitutional rule 
was given almost negligible importance. The reason could be that it was a pre-
decided issue and the arguments were already exhausted by the members. As 
we know from previous discussions, only 518 words were spoken on this topic 
in the general discussion of the assembly which were less than 1% of the words 
spoken on the constitutional rules in the constituent assembly. 
 
Since there was no detailed discussion on the topic and no voting roll call is 
available, a testing of the hypotheses can not be done owing to the lack of data. 
 
5.4 Judicial Independence 
We had assumed that majorities would want to curtail judicial independence as 
much as possible for them without losing face in public.  
 
During the general discussions in the assembly only 3276 words were spoken 
about structure or independence of the judiciary. These words are hardly 2.5% 
of the total words that were spoken in the assembly for multiple constitutional 
rules in the general discussions phase. 
 
Voigt and Hayo in their paper “Explaining de Facto Judicial Independence’’ 
(Hayo & Voigt, 2007) empirically show that Judicial Independence in letter 
would be different from the independence actually provided to the judiciary in 
any society. However the actual status of the judiciary would heavily rely upon 
the legislation regarding the issue. They conclude that 5 variables are important 
in determining the level of the independence that the judicial system enjoys in a 
society. These factors are the laws and the legislations, parliamentary 
democracies, political instability, per capita income and the level of confidence 
of people on their legal system (Hayo & Voigt, 2007). 
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In case of Pakistan there was political instability as well as parliamentary 
democracy playing a role however even then the constitution makers in general 
were reluctant to touch the subject of Judicial Independence. They talked about 
general issues that the judges should be made independent but no one was able 
to provide any concrete ideas as how to do this. We found no voting roll call on 
this issue, which makes the hypotheses testing not possible. 
 
5.5 Procedures for Amendments 
The procedures of amending the constitution were not discussed in great detail 
in the constitutional assembly of Pakistan. Only one or two members gave 
some passing remarks. The number of words spoken were approximately only 
70 in the general discussions phase accounting for less than 0.1%. The sitting 
Prime minister (and the leader of house) just mentions that he wanted to keep 
the amendment process simple so that the constitution becomes flexible and 
can be changed according to the desires of the later assemblies (CAD 17th 
February 1956). 
Our initial hypotheses that members belonging to the majority (ethnic, political, 
linguistic, religious) are likely to vote for stringent amendment rules and vice 
versa with minorities, can not be empirically tested for the want of further data. 
 
5.6 Human Rights 
As predicted that, verbally almost no member can be expected to support the 
Human Rights curtailment. Similar to the case of de Facto Judicial 
Independence, the de Facto Human Rights status can be far different from that 
what the Constitutions or the relevant laws grant. 
 
But similar to the case of Judicial Independence, Human Rights clauses were 
not entirely welcomed by all the members and many were not willing to 
provide too many rights constitutionally. 
 
For the Human Rights situation we have 3 voting roll calls. 
171 
 
5.6.1 Vote I: 
The first available list of voting roll call related to Fundamental Rights was the 
clause 10 of the Constitution (CAD, 4
th
 Feb 1956). It allowed freedom of 
association subject to any restrictions imposed by the law of the country. The 
opposition’s demand was that a word “reasonable’’ be inserted so that the 
restrictions are not subject to the whims of the ruling parties. The difference 
that word “reasonable’’ would have brought is itself debatable, because the 
interpretation of such a vague word is itself subject to many different 
viewpoints. However one could sense the intensity of this demand while 
reading the debates.  
 
It seemed like that the opposition only wanted to show their indignation as 
stated by their leader Mr H S Suhrwardy (CAD 4th Feb 1956). This motion was 
also turned down by 16 to 35 votes. However in the final draft available today 
in the archives shows the word reasonable in article 10 of constitution of 1956. 
This must have come before the third reading when the government benches 
kept meeting with the opposition for approval of constitutional draft. 
 
The detailed voting is given in the appendix III, however an overview in 
tabular form is provided: 
 
Attribute  Total Narrow 
HR 
Broad HR Abstained 
from 
Voting 
Ethnic Majority 61 23 16 22 
Linguistic Majority 61 23 16 22 
Political Majority 56 30 4 22 
Religious Majority 69 28 12 29 
Ethnic Minority 19 12 0 7 
Linguistic Minority 19 12 0 7 
Political Minority 24 5 12 7 
Religious Minority 11 5 4 2 
Table 21: Hypotheses analysed (Vote I) regarding Human Rights 
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5.6.2 Vote II: 
Next division came in second reading of the bill about fundamental rights. It 
was the clause 7 which dealt with human rights (CAD, 13th Feb, 1956). 
Opposition wanted that surety is given in the constitution that no man is 
detained without trial except in case of an enemy alien. However this 
constitutional protection was also refused by 15:35 votes. 
The detail is as follows: 
 
Attribute  Total Narrow HR Broad HR Abstained 
from Voting 
Ethnic Majority 61 20 15 26 
Linguistic Majority 61 20 15 26 
Political Majority 56 33 4 19 
Religious Majority 69 32 11 26 
Ethnic Minority 19 15 0 4 
Linguistic Minority 19 15 0 4 
Political Minority 24 2 11 11 
Religious Minority 11 3 4 4 
Table 22: Hypotheses analysed (Vote II) regarding Human Rights 
 
5.6.3 Vote III: 
The next division was again done in second reading of the constitutional bill. It 
related to clause 15 of the bill. As previously mentioned, Clause 15 related to 
the property rights/fundamental rights (CAD, 14 Feb, 1956). It allowed the 
State to confiscate bigger landholdings with or without compensating for it. A 
move like this would have improved not only the distribution of income but 
also would have created new jobs because many lands were left uncultivated by 
the bigger landlords. However many of the members called it against the 
fundamental right of owning personal property and opposed it. The clause 
could not pass because a great majority of members were landlords and they 
opposed the clause. This motion was negated by 15 to 39. 
 
Superficially it may seem to be a Human Rights clause where people are 
allowed/not allowed to keep personal property, but closely observing the clause 
is imperative in a broader sense. Landlord system is an issue for Pakistani 
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society even today and was in 1956 also. Landlord system is considered by 
many as unfair towards farmer who basically brings in the income from crops 
(Gazdar, 2009). But since he is not the owner and rather simply a worker, he is 
only getting a very negligible sustenance from his hard work. Most of the times 
these farmers do not have a social standing which is equal or comparable to the 
landlord. The landlord has usually a high social influence on the farmers who 
then vote according to what their landlord says. This influence brings many of 
these landlords to politics resulting in them gaining even more power. This 
problem was addressed in East Pakistan where bigger landlords were forced to 
give up much land (CAD, 21
st
 Jan, 1956). The East Pakistan members wanted 
the same for West Pakistan and wanted the constitution to take these lands 
without compensation.  
 
This clause was tricky on one hand that it would have kept a few members of 
society to give up their large landholding while at the same time emancipating 
many others. So on one hand it may seem like that this clause is curtailing 
fundamental right of owning property but on the other hand it was providing 
rights to tenants e.g. right to get an education, right to vote independently, right 
to marry freely, right to look for an employment and so on. However it was 
never granted and landlord system is prevalent in Pakistan even today. The 
voting detail for this vote is as follows: 
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Attribute  Total Narrow HR Broader HR Abstained from 
Voting 
Ethnic 
Majority 
61 22 15 24 
Linguistic 
Majority 
61 22 15 24 
Political 
Majority 
56 34 5 17 
Religious 
Majority 
69 35 10 24 
Ethnic 
Minority 
19 17 0 2 
Linguistic 
Minority 
19 17 0 2 
Political 
Minority 
24 5 10 9 
Religious 
Minority 
11 4 5 2 
Table 23: Hypotheses analysed (Vote III) regarding Human Rights 
 
The combined voting results for all the three votes are given below for 
comparison (omitting the absences as before). 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Ratio 
Broad:Narrow 
(Vote I) 
Ratio 
Broad:Narrow 
(VoteI I) 
Ratio 
Broad:Narrow 
(VoteI III) 
Narrower 
Human 
Rights Ethnic Majority 2:3 3:4 3:4 
  Linguistic Majority 2:3 3:4 3:4 
  Political Majority 1:7 1:6 1:7 
  Religious Majority 1:2 1:3 1:3 
Broader 
Human 
Rights Ethnic Minority 0:12 0:15 0:17 
  Linguistic Minority 0:12 0:15 0:17 
  Political Minority 2:1 5:1 2:1 
  Religious Minority 4:5 4:3 5:4 
Table 24: Hypotheses analysed regarding Human Rights: Final 
 
We observe from the above ratios that our hypotheses that majorities (ethnic, 
linguistic, political and religious) will try to curtail human rights for others 
were confirmed. Similarly we assumed that minorities will opt for broader 
human rights which were supplemented by results in case of political and 
religious minorities but were not supported by empirical analysis in case of 
ethnic minority and linguistic minority. 
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As we see in the above tables the majorities mostly tried to curtail broader 
human rights while minorities behave otherwise (except for ethnic and 
linguistic). We believe that majorities which expect to remain in power for a 
long time donot want to provide unlimited human rights specially freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, freedom of press and so on
74
. On the opposite 
the minorities wanted to have this freedom to make their voices heard. 
 
We believe that most of these results are seen under the strong influence of 
political party and religious interest groups. We donot see the ethnic minorities 
to behave as expected because they were in majority political party and voted 
according to this affiliation and not their ethnic affiliations. 
6  The Issues Most Discussed in the Assembly 
Now we come to the issues which brought most heated debates in the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1956. 
 
6.1 Parity Issue 
This issue gained importance right after the Independence of Pakistan. As soon 
as Pakistanis separated from British dominance and Hindu majority, they 
started fearing that one or the other group might establish unwanted dominance 
over them. This is why almost all the ethnic religious and linguistic groups 
became very apprehensive. The most bitter and prominent friction became 
apparent between East and West Pakistan. Their reconciliation seemed as 
difficult as bridging the geographical distance amongst them. As said 
previously there were issues regarding the fact that there were differences in 
their population, cultures, economic stability and so on. The major issue was to 
somehow reconcile this difference as far as national assembly and parliament 
was concerned. This issue was the second most discussed and 29442 words 
were spoken about this issue in the general discussion. This was about 22.52 % 
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 This is something we noted during the constitution-making process as the members were not 
able to demonstrate secular beliefs or provincial feelings because of the fear of offending 
the common masses. 
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of all the words spoken about constitutional rules in the general discussion 
phase. 
The voting roll calls available in this context are two and are given below. 
Since we had not established any hypotheses on interest-specific clauses 
considering them to be pretty straight forward we can have only a general look 
at the voting details. 
 
6.1.1 Vote I 
Voting roll call is available for Clause 17 which was related to the 
appointments in federal and government services (CAD, 6
th
 Feb, 1956). In this 
the opposition desired to have the clause inserted that in all services the number 
of appointees will be the same from both East and West Pakistan. This 
amendment was turned down by 12 to 34 votes. The detailed analysis is as 
below: 
 
Attribute 
 
Total Members 
demanding 
equality 
Members 
Against 
Abstained 
from 
Voting 
East Pakistan 40 12 17 11 
West Pakistan 40 0 17 23 
Ethnic Majority 61 12 24 25 
Linguistic Majority 61 12 24 25 
Political Majority 56 0 30 26 
Religious Majority 69 12 29 28 
Strong Members/Party 
Leaders  
26 2 15 9 
Ulema 5 1 3 1 
Older Age Group (50+) 43 5 18 20 
Landowners 23 1 8 14 
Ethnic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Linguistic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Political Minority 24 12 4 8 
Religious Minority 11 0 5 6 
Table 25: Vote I regarding Parity. 
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The parity meant equality of East and West Pakistan and ideally one should 
have seen that all the East Pakistan members would have asked for this parity 
but again in the voting roll calls we see that  East Pakistan members against  
this demand were more than the members actually asking for it (17:12). On the 
other hand in West Pakistan no member agreed to provide parity to the East 
Pakistanis in the constitution.  
Out of 34 members who said “No”, 30 were from ruling coalition and 14 of 
these 30 were from East Pakistan. The reason can be that either the political 
party pressure was so intense that the East Pakistani members who were in 
government’s coalition party chose to either abstain from voting or chose to 
say “No”. But again who were the 4 members who were not part of political 
majority but were against the parity anyway. These were 3 members
75
 from 
Hindu community (schedule castes) and one independent member from West 
Pakistan. This shows that apart from usual political pressure that was evident in 
all the voting roll calls before there could be a possibility that the parity issues 
may not be as profound as the political minorities portrayed them. 17 East 
Pakistan members voting against parity can also mean that the issue could be 
more of a political slogan and less of an actual problem.  
 
6.1.2 Vote II 
Voting details are also available for Clause 31 which again related to services 
in Pakistan (CAD, 7
th
 Feb, 1956). Opposition wanted that for all government 
services parity should be maintained between employees from East and West 
Pakistan and the government should make sure that this is done promptly. This 
motion was also rejected by the government benches and turned down by 34 to 
15 votes. 
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A   Attribute     Total Members 
demanding 
equality 
Members 
Against 
    Abstained 
from 
Voting 
East Pakistan 40 15 14 11 
West Pakistan 40 0 20 20 
Ethnic Majority 61 15 24 22 
Linguistic Majority 61 15 24 22 
Political Majority 56 3 31 22 
Religious Majority 69 12 30 27 
Strong Members/Party  
Leaders 
26 2 13 11 
Ulema 5 1 3 1 
Older Age Group (50+) 43 7 18 18 
Landowners 23 1 12 10 
Ethnic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Linguistic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Political Minority 24 12 3 9 
Religious Minority 11 3 4 4 
Table 26: Vote II regarding Parity. 
 
Again looking at the voting details, out of 34 members who were against the 
parity, 3 were from political minority (2 Hindus from East Pakistan and 1 
independent from West Pakistan). On one hand the 14 members from East 
Pakistan saying “No” can be explained on the basis of political affiliations and 
the pressures. Or the two members from minority parties (East Pakistan) may 
show that the issue may not be as problematic as it was shown. 
 
This brings to light another important aspect of constitution-making. The open 
debates in the constitutional assembly that are reported on day to day basis by 
the media can be troublesome at two levels, first that the members can be 
forced to suppress their opinions (on religious, communal, ethnic levels) 
because of the fear of offending the public. As these members are usually 
political figures (as in case of Pakistan) and can not afford to lose votes from 
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their constituencies. And the second level is that they may exaggerate issues to 
mobilize public support and create issues out of non-issues. Both these factors 
may influence the constitution-making process as they did in case of Pakistan. 
 
6.2 The Language Issues 
The next issue which was emphasized by the members again and again was the 
language issue. The members from East Pakistan were demanding that both 
Urdu and Bengali should be considered as State Languages (Article 214 of 
Constitution of 1956). 
 
This demand was finally accepted and Bengali and the Urdu both were 
designated as State languages while English was chosen as the official 
language for a fixed time period
76
. This demand of the opposition was thus 
accepted and fulfilled. There was no voting done through division on this 
clause so no voting roll call is available but 5.62 % of the words were spoken 
about this issue in general discussion of the constitution. Absence of voting roll 
call for this issue is surprising as alot of time of assembly was used to discuss 
this issue. 
 
6.3 Islamization of the Constitution 
This topic was also heatedly discussed by many members in the assembly. 
Most members were Muslims so they demanded and talked about an Islamic 
system of the Government. The Islamisation of the constitution did not exactly 
relate to Islamic system but was only used as a flammable issue as no member 
gave a precise definition of what he wanted.  
 
During hypotheses-generation Islamisation factor was expected to be seen in 
the constitution. Most members in general were assumed to favour Islamisation 
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 No detail is seen during the constitutional debates as to what and why it was done. However 
most historians quote that this was done as a transitional step until Urdu could be fully applied 
as the official language. Till today the official language is English despite the fact that current 
constitution of Pakistan (1973) only allowed it to be the official language for 15 years “until 
arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu” (Article 251(2)). 
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of the constitution, and Islamic interest groups were expected to play an 
important role. Especially Ulema/scholars were anticipated to manipulate the 
fellow members in the name of religion (a factor prevalent even today and 
especially pronounced in those times when independence was gained for 
Muslim majority areas in the name of the religion). As most other members 
were also Muslims so they could be made to act accordingly because of public 
and peer pressure.  
 
The two controversial clauses were the name of the country and the criteria to 
become President. The name of the country was chosen to be Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan and only a Muslim was allowed to be President. This would not 
have mattered in any case because much of the population was Muslim and 
chances of a non-Muslim becoming a president were quite bleak. Despite this 
the issue remained quite troublesome in the assembly. Not only the non-
Muslim members were unhappy about these conditions but also many Muslim 
members sided with the non-Muslim members. Despite their utmost efforts 
these provisions were not removed from the constitution and were accepted as 
such. In the 3
rd
 reading of the constitutional bill the non-Muslim members 
walked out in protest against these provisions (CAD, 29
th
 Feb, 1956).  
 
There are two voting roll calls available in this context. 
 
6.3.1 Vote I  
The next available roll call was about Clause 1 of the constitution which related 
to the name and territories of Pakistan (CAD, 21st Feb, 1956). The opposition 
wanted to oppose this clause because of the objection on the name of the 
country being Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The opposition members and 
almost all the non-Muslim members opposed the clause because of the word 
Islamic. However this clause was passed by ruling party by 47 to 22 votes. 
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Attribute Total Yes No      Abstained 
from Voting 
Religious Majority 69 12 29 28 
Religious Minority 11 0 9 2 
Ethnic Majority 61 12 24 25 
Linguistic Majority 61 12 24 25 
Political Majority 56 0 30 26 
Strong Members/Party Leaders 26 2 15 9 
Ulema 5 1 3 1 
Older Age Group (50+) 43 5 18 20 
Landowners 23 1 8 14 
Ethnic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Linguistic Minority 19 0 10 9 
Political Minority 24 12 4 8 
Table 27: Vote I regarding Islamisation of Constitution. 
 
6.3.2 Vote II 
The next division was about a similar provision. This was about the Islamic 
provisions of the constitution. The clause was 32
nd
 in number and talked about 
the qualification of a member to become president (CAD, 21st Feb, 1956). 
Along with other factors like being at least 40 years of age and eligible to be a 
member of National Assembly. The President had to be a Muslim. Many 
members had reservations regarding the President being Muslim only. Some 
members had the objection that this was against fundamental rights that non-
Muslim members were debarred from becoming a President. Many non-
Muslim members as well as Muslim members were against this qualification. 
However the clause was passed by 43 votes in favour and 20 against. 
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Attribute Total No Yes Abstained 
 from Voting 
Religious Majority 69 12 43 14 
Religious Minority 11 0 8 3 
Ethnic Majority 61 20 27 14 
Linguistic Majority 61 20 27 14 
Political Majority 56 5 40 11 
Strong Members/Party  
Leaders  
26 6 13 7 
Ulema 5 1 3 0 
Older Age Group (50+) 43 10 23 10 
Landowners 23 1 16 6 
Ethnic Minority 19 0 16 3 
Linguistic Minority 19 0 16 3 
Political Minority 24 15 3 6 
Table 28: Vote II regarding Islamisation of Constitution. 
 
As in case of Parity it was important to compare the behavior of members of 
East and West Pakistan. Similarly in case of Islamisation of constitution it is 
important to see the role of religious affiliations. 
 
As we see in both the above mentioned votes the Religious minorities wanted 
that this discrimination should not be allowed constitutionally. On the other 
hand the religious interest groups wanted to keep the balance of power in their 
own hands. Also if we see the group of Ulema only one person voted “No” 
(Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish) who was member of Awami League, the 
opposition party. The interesting thing is that the country had Muslim 
community as an almost complete majority and in the circumstances it was 
very difficult that a non-Muslim could ever become a President.  But despite 
that both sides wanted to keep their side stronger and wanted to use these 
provisions to further their own interests. 
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The non-Muslim members who were abstaining (2 and 3 for Vote I and Vote II 
respectively) can be traced to some extent
77
. As some members walked out on 
the last session of constitutional assembly we could check if these three also 
walked out but they did not. These three members were from ruling 
coalition/majority party and it shows again that political pressure was quite 
profound and these people chose to abstain instead of going against their own 
political party. 
 
6.4  Joint Electorates 
This issue was again raised by the non-Muslim members, and Muslim members 
of the opposition stood shoulder to shoulder with them. 
 
Separate electorate was introduced by the British rule. This meant that for the 
non-Muslim seats in assembly only a non-Muslim member could be the 
candidate or the voter. In British rule this was introduced to protect minorities 
and to make sure that the minorities will be returned to the assembly. This 
insured the proper representation of the minority in the assembly. 
 
In case of Pakistan the constitution allowed separate electorates for the non-
Muslims. This became an issue because non-Muslim members felt that that 
they have been segregated and driven away from the national political system 
(CAD, 28
th
 Jan, 1956). They demanded that they should be allowed to vote and 
contest election along with the general population. They stated that even if joint 
electorate worsens their chances of being returned to the assembly they would 
take the chance in the name of national integration. 
On the other hand many orthodox Muslim believed that Pakistan was claimed 
to be created for Muslim minority and if non-Muslims were integrated in the 
society so openly then the concept of ‘getting a homeland for Muslims’ will be 
lost. They wanted that the non-Muslim Minority is allowed only separate 
electorates (CAD, 23
rd
 Jan, 1956). This issue became so problematic that even 
by the time constitution was approved and finalized; this issue could not be 
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 CE Gibbon, Siroomal Kirpaldas for Vote I and Vote II, and Kamini Kumar Dutta for Vote I. 
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reconciled. The ruling majority simply took out the election /electorate rules 
and left it as a policy choice. 
 
This is how a constitution was formed which had a pretty unique structure of a 
uni-cameral federation and no electoral rules. There is a single voting roll call 
available for this rule. 
 
6.4.1 Vote I 
The next voting roll call is available for clause 153 (available as article 145 in 
the final draft). This related to principles of electorates (CAD, 21st Feb, 1956). 
The constitution advised that elections maybe held on basis of joint or separate 
electorates according to wishes of National and Provincial assemblies. 
However the members of opposition wanted that joint electorates should be 
prescribed by the Constitution. In the end the constitution stayed vague about 
the issue and delegated the power to the legislatures. Despite the efforts of 
opposition the motion was rejected by 46 to 20 votes. 
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Attribute Total No Yes Abstained 
from 
Voting 
Ethnic 
Majority 
61 20 29 12 
Linguistic 
Majority 
61 20 29 12 
Political 
Majority 
56 5 42 9 
Religious 
Majority 
69 13 43 13 
Strong 
Members/Party 
Leaders  
26 6 15 5 
Ulema 5 1 3 1 
Older Age 
Group (50+) 
43 10 26 7 
Landowners 23 1 17 5 
Ethnic 
Minority 
19 0 17 2 
Linguistic 
Minority 
19 0 17 2 
Political 
Minority 
24 15 4 5 
Religious 
Minority 
11 7 3 1 
Table 29: Vote I regarding Joint Electorates. 
 
From the voting analysis we see that only three people from religious 
minority did not want to have Joint electorates and were comfortable leaving 
the choice to Parliament. Two of them were from majority party and one from 
schedule castes. From the group of Ulema only the member from opposition 
said “No” to this vote. In this vote again the political interests and regious 
interest played their role. The attributes of the members which were not 
directly conflicting with the issue of joint electorates eg profession, age etc 
did not play any factor in this voting decision. 
7 Last Remarks 
This chapter concluded the information on the attributes of the members and 
the available voting roll calls on different constitutional rules. Out of the six 
chosen constitutional rules, the roll call data was available only for two 
constitutional rules.  
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The hypotheses were analysed at two levels, ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’. At the 
broad level we saw that the members were indeed utility-maximizing 
individuals participating in the constitution-making process for their own 
interest. They did not give any importance to the clauses which did not meet 
their interest. They showed more attendance and participation in interest 
specific clauses. Some of them participated in the process only to vote 
according to their political or religious interests and otherwise showed no 
participation. 
 
We also found that British influence was less pre-dominant than that of the 
Indian and the old constitutions. In addition the chapter also provided an 
overview of the general behavior of the members during the constitution-
making and also of their voting behaviors. 
 
From this chapter we also see that our initial assumption, that in interest 
specific provisions members will vote according to their obvious interest (as 
seen in the votes casted by non-Muslim members and East Pakistan 
members) was proved quite reasonably correct. But here we also noted that 
several interests play simultaneous roles and every member votes according 
to his own utility function. 
 
In this chapter we saw that political party and religious interest groups were 
the most strongest of all. All kinds of pressure mechanisms were applied by 
these two interest groups. The ethnic affilations also seemed to play a role but 
not to that extent as the other two. We also saw that majorities preferred more 
the presidential system while minorities seem to relate more to parliamentary 
system (an effect somewhat mollified by interest groups but seemed to hold 
true to much extent). Also the majorities did not seem to favour with broader 
human rights just as expected. 
 
The final constitutional draft was parliamentary but with an unusually strong 
president, federal with almost Unitary behavior and had human rights that 
were subject to will of majority and were considered unfair to non-Muslims 
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and to minority groups. Surprisingly the constitution lacked electoral rules 
and had one house of Parliament pairing with a federation in place.  
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Chapter X: Conclusion 
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Like most research projects, from the stage of literature review till the stage 
of results generation there were several unexpected setbacks. The most 
important one was that of gathering meaningful data for the empirical 
analysis. Despite this problem, by making use of the available data and 
resources we were able to generate meaningful results and these findings may 
be seen as a contribution in the newly developing field of Positive 
Constitutional Economics.  
 
The research has yielded several important findings, the crux of which is that 
Self-Interest and Utility Maximizing behavior of individuals do not cease to 
manifest even making seemingly altruistic decisions. Even when the 
probability of finding the desired outcomes is almost negligible, the self-
interest does not stop playing a major role in decision making. Time duration 
in which the decision/contract is implemented or stays in effect may lead to 
the expectation that decision maker may get a little irresponsible or 
complacent. But in case of Pakistani constitution we did not see such a thing. 
We saw that the interest groups who have a powerful position at the time of 
constitution making expect to hold that position in future too and neither give 
in nor stop acting according to their interests. They do what they think is in 
their interest and vote accordingly. 
 
Our project focused on the Individualistic Economic Model and Voting 
behavior predictions. Despite the limited amount of data available, our 
hypotheses were confirmed to be pretty accurate. We find that the 
constitution-maker is also a rational individual who can rank his choices with 
perfect certainty. He can rank his alternatives and choose the alternate results 
of collective choice according to his own utility function. 
 
In case of presidential system we saw that as expected the ethnic majorities, 
linguistic majorities, political and religious majorities and strong members 
favored more the presidential system. While the political and religious 
minorities as expected favored the parliamentary system. The hypotheses 
were not found so consistent in case of linguistic minorities, ethnic 
minorities, landowners and ulema. There may be other explanations for these. 
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In case of federalism we found out that as expected the older age group 
members, landowners and foreign educated members favored more the 
unitary system. In case of religious ulemas and rich states members the 
hypotheses were not found consistent. 
 
In case of human rights, we found that that majority (ethnic, linguistic, 
political and religious) will try to curtail human rights for others. Similarly 
we assumed that minorities will opt for broader human rights which were 
corroborated by results in case of political and religious minorities but were 
not supported by empirical analysis in case of ethnic minority and linguistic 
minority. 
 
We found other observations that also supplement our research model. We 
saw a lot of “peer pressure’’ playing a role in assembly. We noted at more 
than one occasions that members admitted personal preferences of an option, 
but they did not vote accordingly due to political party pressure or public 
pressure. This observation also supplements our model of utility 
maximization because to remain in good favors of the political party and the 
public is definitely a self-interested behavior. This peer pressure was also 
noted when many members were used only for voting and these did not 
participate in the meetings actively. 
 
We also noted that  non-self interested clauses were not discussed in 
assembly at all rather some like election rules were not included in the 
constitution altogether. Also self-Interested behavior was obvious by the 
Islamisation factor in the constitution. The religious fervor was used by the 
constitution-makers for their own agendas. Although many members were 
not consistent on what they wanted, they tried to use the Islamic passion of 
the society to their own advantage. 
 
Procedural rules are always considered to have their own importance in the 
final shape of a constitution (Voigt, 2009). We came across the observation 
that procedural rules not only shape the constitution in a general way but can 
also be manipulated to influence the constitution in a self-interested way. We 
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saw that rules providing for referendum were called on again and again to be 
used as delaying techniques etc. 
 
In Pakistani constitutional debates the discussions in assembly were open to 
press and public which led the members to speak and vote according to the 
desires of the public as noted in case of Islamisation of the constitution. On 
one hand this transparency may seem necessary but in our case we noted the 
fact that this rule was manipulated by the constitution-makers who used the 
assembly floor to their own political advantage. This costs not only the time 
and resources but also maneuvers the emotions of masses. We also saw that 
procedural rules relating to powers of speaker curtailed many meaningful 
discussions that did not match with majorities’ point of view. 
 
Regarding the misuse of procedural rules, another observation was made 
about the neutrality of the officers of assembly. It was put to question in the 
research and it was found that they did favour one interest group over the 
other. We find out that these officers had their own contribution in shaping 
the constitution as we noted on several occasions that debates against their 
own view point were curtailed or ridiculed.  
 
The case study also shows that the constitutions are not just influenced by 
pre-constitutions but also by other contemporary constitutions especially of 
the neighboring states. We expected that Pakistani constitution be somewhat 
influenced by the British constitution. Although it was found to be true to 
some extent, however we found the Indian constitution to have more of an 
impact on the minds of constitution-makers. In future research projects it may 
be possible to analyse a country‘s new constitution on the basis of its 
neighbors or other relevant countries. 
 
For concluding our discussions, we go back to the research questions that we 
noted down in the beginning. 
1) What were the Economic Interests that influenced the constitutional 
choices seen in Pakistan’s constitution?  
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Referring back to our Economic Model we can say that all Personal and 
Ideological interests of the members influenced the final shape of the 
constitution.  
2) The constitutional choices that are seen, is there any inter-relation?  Does 
one choice lead to another or simply a random approach is taken based upon 
the interests of the utility maximising individuals.  
We saw that constitutional choices were decided in such a way that first the 
clauses relating to the general design of the constitution were selected and 
once the decisions were made on those, the discussion on interest-related 
clauses started. The general design clauses albeit their importance were not 
given any extra importance by the constitution-makers (again showing their 
self-interested behavior). The interest-related clauses however took great 
bargaining from the parties and also consumed a lot of time of assembly. 
 
3) Which interest groups were involved and whose interests seem to be 
manifested in the constitutional draft? 
Major interest groups identified in the society were landlords, lawyers, 
Punabis, Bengalis, and Ulemas. The constitution seems to be a bargain 
between all these members fighting for their own interests. 
 
Once it becomes obvious that the self-interest plays a major role, one may 
think about minimizing or putting checks on the system. The research can 
also be extended to the important policy choices. It can easily be deduced that 
if self-interest does not stop playing a role at the constitutional level, it sure is 
likely to affect policy level decisions.   
 
Thus keeping this theory in mind retrospective checks and balances can be 
applied not only on constitutional decisions but also on policy level choices. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I 
Dates of Sessions: 
1. 9th January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
2. 16th January 1956 
3. 17th January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
4. 21st January 1956 
5. 23 rd January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
6. 24th  January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
7. 25th January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
8. 26th January 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
9. 27th January 1956 
10. 28th January 1956 
11. 31st January 1956 
12. 1st February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
13. 2nd February 1956 
14. 3rd February 1956 
15. 4th February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
16. 6th February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
17. 7th February 1956 
18. 8th February 1956 
19. 9th February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
20. 10th February 1956 
21. 13th  February 1956 
22. 14th February 1956 
23. 15th  February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
24. 16th  February 1956 
25. 17th  February 1956 
26. 20th  February 1956 
27. 21st February 1956 
28. 23rd  February 1956 (Point of Privilege) 
29. 28th February 1956 
30. 29th February 1956 
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Appendix III: Voting Roll Calls 
List I: Constitutional Draft shall be referred for Reconsideration or 
Referendum 
Page   2304,        date 1st Feb ,   1956 
                               NOES      AYES 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
8. Farid Ahmad 
9. A. K. Fazlul Haq 
10. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
11. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
12. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
13. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
14. Rasa Raj Mandal 
15. Dr. S. K. Sen 
16. Yousaf Ali Choudhry 
17. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
18. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
19. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
20. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
21. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
22. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
23. I. I. Chundrigar 
24. Mohamad Ali 
25. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
26. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
27. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
28. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
29. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
30. Mian Jaffar Shah 
31. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
32. M. R. Kayani 
33. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
34. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
35. M. A. Khuhro 
36. Siroomal Kirpaldas  
37. Dr. Khan Sahib 
38. Yusuf A. Haroon 
39. Mian Abdus Salam 
40. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
41. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
42. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
43. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Muhsud 
44. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Ataur Rehman Khan 
6. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
7. Fazlur Rahman 
8. Mahmud Ali 
9. Moslem Ali Molla 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Zahiruddin 
 
  
 
 
203 
 
List II: Word ‘’Reasonable’’ be inserted for Restrictions in Human Rights (10) 
Page 2427 Date 4th Feb.  1956       
Noes            Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Latif Biswas 
3. Abdus Sattar 
4. Adeluddin Ahmed 
5. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. Farid Ahmad 
7. A. K. Fazlul Haq 
8. Gour Chandra Bala 
9. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
10. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
11. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
12. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
13. Rasa Raj Mandal 
14. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan 
Dasti 
15. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
16. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
17. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
18. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
19. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
20. I. I. Chundrigar 
21. Mohamad Ali 
22. Chaudhry Muhammad 
Hussain Chatha 
23. Syed Mohyuddin Lal 
Badshah 
24. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin 
Khan 
25. M. R. Kayani 
26. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
27. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
28. M. A. Khuhro 
29. Siroomal Kirpaldas  
30. Dr. Khan Sahib 
31. Yusuf A. Haroon 
32. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan 
Kizalbash 
33. Major General M. A. H. 
Jahan Zeb 
34. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda 
Khel Wazir 
35. K. B. Malik Mehrdil Khan 
Mahsud 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Basanta Kumar Das 
6. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
7. Canteswar Barman 
8. Fazlur Rehman 
9. Mahmud Ali 
10. Moslem Ali Molla 
11. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
12. Muzaffar Ahmad 
13. Nurur Rehman 
14. Peter Paul Gomez 
15. H. S. Suhrawardy 
16. Zahiruddin 
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List III: Clause 17 which was related to the appointments in federal and 
government services. In this the opposition desired to have the clause inserted 
that in all services the number of appointees will be the same from both East 
and West Pakistan.  
    Volume 1,         Page 2476      .  6th Feb 1956 
                                Noes      Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
8. Farid Ahmad  
9. A.K. Fazlul Huq 
10. Gour Chandra Bala 
11. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
12. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
13. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
14. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
15. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
16. Rasa Raj Mandal 
17. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
18. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
19. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
20. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
21. I. I. Chundrigar 
22. Mohamad Ali  
23. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
24. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
25. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
26. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
27. M. R. Kayani 
28. M. A. Khuhro 
29. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
30. Yusuf A. Haroon 
31. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
32. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
33. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Mashud  
34. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad  
5. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
6. Fazlur Rahman  
7. Mahmud Ali 
8. Moslem Ali Molla 
9. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
10. Muzaffar Ahmad 
11. Nurur Rehman 
12. Zahiruddin 
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List IV: Clause 31 which again related to services in Pakistan. Opposition 
wanted that for all government services parity should be maintained between 
employees from East and West Pakistan and the government should make sure 
that this is done expeditely.  
Page 2599 ,         7th feb, 1956 
             Noes       Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
8. Farid Ahmad 
9. Gour Chandra Bala 
10. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
11. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
12. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
13. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
14. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
15. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
16. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
17. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
18. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
19. I. I. Chundrigar 
20. Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot  
21. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain 
Chatha 
22. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
23. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
24. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
25. M. R. Kayani 
26. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
27. Haji Maula Bakhsh Soomro 
28. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
29. Dr. Khan Sahib 
30. Yusuf A. Haroon 
31. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizilbash 
32. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
33. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel 
Wazir 
34. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel 
Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid 
Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman  
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Fazlur Rahman  
9. Mahmud Ali 
10. Moslem Ali Molla 
11. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
12. Muzaffar Ahmad 
13. Nurur Rehman 
14. Peter Paul Gomez 
15. Zahiruddin 
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List V:  Sub-clause (3) of clause 122. The opposition demanded that the 
executive authority of federation should be curtailed in provinces and a clause is 
inserted to that effect.  
Page 2719      ,     8th Feb 1956 
       Noes        Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
8. Farid Ahmad 
9. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
10. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
11. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
12. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti  
13. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
14. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
15. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
16. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
17. Choudhri Aziz Din 
18. I. I. Chundrigar 
19. Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot  
20. Mohammad Ali 
21. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
22. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
23. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
24. Mian Jaffar Shah 
25. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
26. M. R. Kayani 
27. M. A. Khuhro 
28. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
29. Dr. Khan Sahib 
30. Yusuf A. Haroon 
31. Mian Abdus Salam 
32. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizilbash 
33. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
 
1. Abdur Rehman Khan 
2. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
3. Abdul Mansur Ahmad  
4. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
5. Mahmud Ali 
6. Moslem Ali Molla 
7. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
8. Muzaffar Ahmad 
9. Zahiruddin 
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List VI:  Clause 201-sub-clause (1). The number of the clause is again different 
in the final draft nevertheless it is important to know the subject of the clause. 
This clause was relevant to the emergency provisions. In case of any 
disturbance the President and the central government was allowed to declare 
emergency and to intervene in provincial affairs. Opposition wanted to 
maintain a limit on this intervention by demanding to insert the words that 
this can only be done in case of war, external aggression and armed rebellion. 
This would at least limit the central government that emergency provisions 
will not be invoked unnecessarily.  
Page   2804           date 9th Feb , 1956 
                             Noes      Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Farid Ahmad 
6. A. K. Fazlul Huq 
7. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
8. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
9. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
10. Mohammad Nurul Huq Choudhury 
11. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
12. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
13. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
14. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
15. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
16. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan 
17. Choudhri Aziz Din 
18. I. I. Chundrigar 
19. Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot  
20. Mohamad Ali 
21. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
22. Mian Jaffer Shah 
23. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
24. M. R. Kayani 
25. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
26. M. A. Khuro 
27. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
28. Dr. Khan Sahib 
29. Yusuf A. Haroon 
30. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizilbash 
31. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
32. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
33. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel 
Wazir 
34. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Mahsud 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid 
Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman  
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Mahmud Ali 
9. Moslem Ali Molla 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Peter Paul Gomez 
14. Zahiruddin 
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List VII: Clause 233. It was about the privileges of the members of national 
assembly. Opposition wanted that judicial immunity is granted to some extent 
and members are not arrested for petty crimes without approval of assembly. As 
mentioned previously there were many notorious laws existing at the time that 
governments could use to their advantage.  
Page 2873      10th feb, 1956 
                    Noes                                          Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Adeluddin Ahmed 
5. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. Farid Ahmad 
7. Gour Chandra Bala 
8. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
9. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
10. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
11. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
12. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
13. Rasa Raj Mandal 
14. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
15. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
16. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
17. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
18. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
19. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
20. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
21. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
22. I. I. Chundrigar 
23. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
24. Mohamad Ali 
25. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
26. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
27. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
28. Mian Jaffar Shah 
29. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
30. M. R. Kayani 
31. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
32. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
33. M. A. Khuhro 
34. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
35. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
36. Yusuf A. Haroon 
37. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
38. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman 
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Mahmud Ali 
9. Moslem Ali Molla 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Peter Paul Gomez 
14. Zahiruddin 
15. Mian Abdus Salam 
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List VIII: Clause 7 which dealt with human rights. Opposition wanted that 
surety is given in the constitution that no man is detained without trial except in 
case of an enemy alien.  
Page 2941                                  Date              13th Feb, 1956 
   Noes        Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. A. K. Fazlul Haq 
7. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
8. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
9. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
10. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
11. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
12. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
13. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
14. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
15. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
16. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
17. I. I. Chundrigar 
18. Mohamad Ali 
19. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain 
Chatha 
20. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
21. Mian Jaffar Shah 
22. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
23. M. R. Kayani 
24. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
25. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
26. M. A. Khuhro 
27. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
28. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
29. Dr. Khan Sahib 
30. Yusuf A. Haroon 
31. Mirza Mumtaz Hasan Kizilbash 
32. M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
33. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel 
Wazir 
34. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Muhsud 
35. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
4. Basanta Kumar Das 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman 
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Mahmud Ali 
9. Moslem Ali Molla 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Peter Paul Gomez 
14. H. S. Suhrawerdy 
15. Zahiruddin 
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List IX:  Clause 15 related to the property rights/fundamental rights. In some 
areas of Pakistan the landlord system was prevalent at that time and many of 
those landlords were in assembly. These amendments talked about 
landlordism system and the acquisition of personal property with or without 
compensation. Since protection of personal property and right of property was 
granted by the constitution. The opposition wanted that in case of landlord 
system the constitution should allow the national and provincial assemblies to 
acquire such property even without compensation.  
Page    3073                         Date   14 Feb,  1956 
            Noes     Ayes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Latif Biswas 
3. Akshay Kumar Das 
4. Farid Ahmad 
5. Fazlur Rahman 
6. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
7. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
8. Rasa Raj Mandal 
9. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
10. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
11. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
12. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
13. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
14. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
15. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
16. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
17. Malik Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon 
18. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
19. Mohammad Ali 
20. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
21. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
22. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
23. Mian Jaffar Shah 
24. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
25. M. R. Kayani 
26. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
27. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
28. M. A. Khuhro 
29. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
30. Siroomal Kirpaldas  
31. Dr. Khan Sahib 
32. Mian Abdus Salam 
33. Syed Ahmad Nawaz Shah Gardezi 
34. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
35. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
36. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
37. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
38. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Mahsudm 
39. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
4. Basanta Kumar Das 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman 
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Mahmud Ali 
9. Moslem Ali Molla 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Peter Paul Gomez 
14. S. K. Sen 
15. Zahiruddin 
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List X:The federal list of subjects (5
th
 Schedule). 
List Page no 3200, 16 feb, 1956 
AYES      NOES 
1. Mr. Abdul Aleem 
2. Mr. Abdul Karim 
3. The Honourable Mr. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Mr. Abdus Sattar 
5. Mr. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. The Honourable Mr. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Mr. Fazlur Rahman 
8. The Honourable Mr. Hamidul Huq 
Choudhury 
9. The Honourable Mr. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
10. The Honourable Mr. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
11. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
12. Mohd. Nurul Huq Chaudhry  
13. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
14. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
15. Sardar Amir Azim Khan 
16. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
17. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
18. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
19. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana 
20. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
21. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
22. Mian Jaffar Shah 
23. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
24. M. R. Kayani 
25. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
26. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
27. M. A. Khuhro 
28. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
29. Yusuf A. Haroon 
30. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
31. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
32. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
33. K. B. Haji Malik Mehrdil Khan Mahsud 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Ataur Rehman Khan 
6. Basanta Kumar Das 
7. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
8. Canteswar Barman 
9. A. H. Deldar Ahmad  
10. Mahmud Ali 
11. Moslem Ali Molla 
12. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
13. Muzaffar Ahmad 
14. Nurur Rehman 
15. Peter Paul Gomez 
16. S. K. Sen 
17. H. S. Suhrawardy 
18. Zahiruddin 
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 List XI: Clause 33 which gave the President the immunity regarding 
his election. 
Page 3288  20
th
 Feb, 1956 
Ayes          Noes 
1. Mr. Abdul Aleem 
2. The Honourable Mr. Abdul Latif Biswas 
3. Mr. Abdus Sattar 
4. Mr. Adeluddin Ahmed 
5. The Honourable Mr. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. A.K. Fazlul Huq 
7. Mr. Fazlur Rahman 
8. The Honourable Mr. Hamidul Huq 
Choudhury 
9. The Honourable Mr. Kamini Kumar 
Dutta 
10. The Honourable Mr. Lutfar Rahman 
Khan 
11. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
14. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
15. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
16. Sardar Amir Azim Khan 
17. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
18. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
19. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
20. C.E. Gibbon 
21. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
22. Mohamad Ali  
23. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
24. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
25. Mian Jaffar Shah 
26. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
27. M. R. Kayani 
28. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
29. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
30. M. A. Khuhro 
31. Siroomal Kirpaldas 
32. Dr. Khan Sahib 
33. Yusuf A. Haroon 
34. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
35. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
36. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
37. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
38. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Ataur Rehman Khan 
6. Basanta Kumar Das 
7. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
8. Canteswar Barman 
9. A. H. Deldar Ahmad  
10. Mahmud Ali 
11. Moslem Ali Molla 
12. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
13. Muzaffar Ahmad 
14. Nurur Rehman 
15. Peter Paul Gomez 
16. H. S. Suhrawardy 
17. Zahiruddin 
18. Mian Abdus Salam 
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List XII: Clause 1: relating to the name and territories of Pakistan. The opposition 
wanted to oppose this clause because of the objection on the name of the country being 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  
Page 3410    21st Feb, 1956 
Ayes        Noes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
7. Farid Ahmad  
8. A.K. Fazlul Huq 
9. Fazlur Rahman 
10. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
11. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
12. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
13. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
14. Mian Abdul Bari 
15. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
16. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
17. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
18. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
19. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
20. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
21. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
22. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
23. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
24. Malik Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon 
25. I. I. Chundrigar 
26. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
27. Mohamad Ali  
28. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
29. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana 
30. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
31. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
32. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
33. Mian Jaffar Shah 
34. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
35. M. R. Kayani 
36. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
37. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
38. M. A. Khuhro 
39. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
40. Dr. Khan Sahib 
41. Yusuf A. Haroon 
42. Mian Abdus Salam 
43. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
44. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
45. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
46. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
47. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. Ataur Rehman Khan 
7. Basanta Kumar Das 
8. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
9. Canteswar Barman 
10. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
11. Gour Chandra Bala 
12. Kamini Kumar Dutta  
13. Mahmud Ali 
14. Moslem Ali Molla 
15. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
16. Muzaffar Ahmad 
17. Nurur Rehman 
18. Peter Paul Gomez 
19. Rasa Raj Mandal 
20. S. K. Sen 
21. H. S. Suhrawardy 
22. Zahiruddin 
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List XIII: Clause 32: the qualification of a member to become president. Along 
with other factors like being at least 40 years of age and eligible to be a member 
of National Assembly. 
Page 3430 ,          21st Feb , 1956 
Ayes        Noes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
7. Farid Ahmad 
8. Fazlur Rahman 
9. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
10. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
11. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
12. Mian Abdul Bari 
13. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
14. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
15. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
16. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
17. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
18. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
19. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
20. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
21. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
22. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
23. Mohamad Ali  
24. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
25. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
26. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
27. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
28. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
29. Mian Jaffar Shah 
30. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
31. M. R. Kayani 
32. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
33. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
34. M. A. Khuhro 
35. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
36. Dr. Khan Sahib 
37. Yusuf A. Haroon 
38. Mian Abdus Salam 
39. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
40. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
41. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
42. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
43. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Akshay Kumar Das 
6. Ataur Rehman Khan 
7. Basanta Kumar Das 
8. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
9. Canteswar Barman 
10. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
11. Gour Chandra Bala 
12. Mahmud Ali 
13. Moslem Ali Molla 
14. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
15. Muzaffar Ahmad 
16. Nurur Rehman 
17. Peter Paul Gomez 
18. Rasa Raj Mandal 
19. S. K. Sen 
20. Zahiruddin 
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List XIV:  Clause 153 (available as article 145 in the final draft). This related to 
principles of electorates.  
Page 3468           21st Feb, 1956 
Ayes        Noes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Moulana Hafiz Athar Ali 
8. Farid Ahmad 
9. Fazlur Rahman 
10. Hamidul Huq Choudhury 
11. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
12. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
13. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
14. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
15. Mian Abdul Bari 
16. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
17. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti 
18. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan 
19. Syed Abid Hussain Shah 
20. Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani 
21. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
22. Malik Amir Mahmood Khan 
23. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
24. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
25. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot 
26. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
27. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan 
Daultana 
28. Syed Mohyuddin Lal Badshah 
29. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani 
30. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan 
31. Mian Jaffar Shah 
32. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
33. M. R. Kayani 
34. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
35. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
36. M. A. Khuhro 
37. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
38. Siroomal Kirpaldas  
39. Dr. Khan Sahib 
40. Yusuf A. Haroon 
41. Mian Abdus Salam 
42. Mirza Mumtaz Hassan Kizalbash 
43. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
44. Major General M. A. H. Jahan Zeb 
45. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
46. Malik Waris Khan Malikdinkhel Afridi 
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Abdur Rehman Khan 
3. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
4. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
5. Ataur Rehman Khan 
6. Basanta Kumar Das 
7. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
8. Canteswar Barman 
9. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
10. Gour Chandra Bala 
11. Mahmud Ali 
12. Moslem Ali Molla 
13. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
14. Muzaffar Ahmad 
15. Nurur Rehman 
16. Peter Paul Gomez 
17. Rasa Raj Mandal 
18. S. K. Sen 
19. H. S. Suhrawardy 
20. Zahiruddin 
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List XV: For the Constitutional Bill to be passed for a third reading the 
opposition demanded that a division is called for again.  
Page 3526             23rd February, 1956 
Ayes        Noes 
1. Abdul Aleem 
2. Abdul Karim 
3. Abdul Latif Biswas 
4. Abdus Sattar 
5. Adeluddin Ahmed 
6. Akshay Kumar Das 
7. Farid Ahmad  
8. A.K. Fazlul Huq 
9. Fazlur Rahman 
10. Kamini Kumar Dutta 
11. Lutfar Rahman Khan 
12. Syed Mahfuzal Huq 
13. Nurul Huq Choudhury 
14. Chaudhry Abdul Ghani Ghuman 
15. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti  
16. Sardar Amir Azam Khan 
17. Chaudhri Aziz Din 
18. Mir Balakh Sher Mazari 
19. C. E. Gibbon  
20. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha 
21. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani  
22. Khan Mohammad Jalaluddin Khan 
23. M. R. Kayani 
24. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi 
25. Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur 
26. M. A. Khuhro 
27. Haji Moula Bakhsh Soomro 
28. Dr. Khan Sahib  
29. Nawab Mir Bai Khan 
30. Malik Jehangir Khan Madda Khel Wazir 
31. Malik Mehrdil Khan Muhsud  
 
1. Muhammad Abdul Khaleque 
2. Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish 
3. Abdul Mansur Ahmad 
4. Ataur Rehman Khan 
5. Bhupendra Kumar Dutta 
6. Canteswar Barman 
7. A. H. Deldar Ahmad 
8. Gour Chandra Bala 
9. Mahmud Ali 
10. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
11. Muzaffar Ahmad 
12. Nurur Rehman 
13. Peter Paul Gomez 
14. S. K. Sen 
15. Zahiruddin 
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List XVI: The Members who walked out of Final Reading 
29th Feb 1956,  
 
Names of the members were HS Suhrwardy , Ataur Rehman, Sheikh Mujib ur 
Rehman, Zahiruddin, Abdur Rehman Khan, Abdul Khaleque, Maulana Abdur 
Rashid Tarkabagish, BK Das, BK Dutta, AK Das, Canteswar Barman, Mian 
Iftikhar ud Din,MahmudAli, Dr SK Sen,Rasa Raj Mandal, Gour Chandra Bala. 
 
 
